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In this respect, the Predicate View differs fundamentally from both Referentialism and Classical Descriptivism. Indeed, it differs more from both of these accounts than they do from one another. The Predicate View assumes a very different structure for name bearing, i.e. how names themselves are individuated and how names are related to what they name. I show in Chapters 1 and 2 that the semantic behavior of names -- especially with respect to time and modality -- provides evidence that the Predicate View gets the structure of name bearing right. I argue further that data which were taken to support Referentialism are equally well explained by the Predicate View. This runs counter to a common assumption -- that the Predicate View faces a serious problem with modality, since it cannot deliver the result that names are rigid. I show that, on the contrary, the Predicate View offers a more nuanced and explanatory account of name rigidity than Referentialism. The Predicate View also explains a neglected fact that Referentialism cannot: that there are non-rigid occurrences of names.