My library button
  • No image available

  • No image available

    Bank liquid asset holdings vary significantly across banks and through time. The determinants of liquid asset holdings from the corporate finance literature are not useful to predict banks' liquid asset holdings. Banks have an investment motive to hold liquid assets, so that when their lending opportunities are better, they hold fewer liquid assets. We find strong support for the investment motive. Large banks hold much more liquid assets after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and this change cannot be explained using models of liquid asset holdings estimated before the GFC. We find evidence supportive of the hypothesis that the increase in liquid assets of large banks is due at least in part to the post-GFC regulatory changes.

  • No image available

    A new wave of bank privatizations in the past decade has significantly changed the ownership structure of banking systems around the world. This paper explores how these changes affect the allocation of capital within countries. Increases in domestic blockholder ownership of banks adversely affect the allocation of capital through increased lending activity to less productive industries and to those with less dependence on external finance. This result is more pronounced in countries with higher levels of corruption. I find some evidence that foreign presence improves capital allocation efficiency by increasing lending to more productive industries, primarily in common law countries.

  • No image available

    We investigate whether the value of large banks, defined as banks with assets in excess of the Dodd-Frank threshold for enhanced supervision, increases with the size of their assets using Tobin’s q and market-to-book as our valuation measures. Many argue that large banks receive subsidies from the regulatory safety net, so they should be worth more and their valuation should increase with size. Instead, using a variety of approaches, we find (1) no evidence that large banks are valued more highly, (2) strong cross-sectional evidence that the valuation of large banks falls with size, and (3) strong evidence of a within-bank negative relation between valuation and size for large banks from 1987 to 2006 but not when the post-Dodd-Frank period is included in the sample. The negative relation between bank value and bank size for large banks cannot be systematically explained by differences in ROA or ROE, equity volatility, tail risk, distress risk, and equity discount rates. However, we find that banks with more trading assets are worth less. A 1% increase in trading assets is associated with a Tobin’s q lower by 0.2% in regressions with year and bank fixed effects. This relation between bank value and trading assets helps explain the cross-sectional negative relation between large bank valuation and size. Our results hold when we use instrumental variables for bank size.

  • No image available

    We examine the effects of bank merger and local market characteristics on local small business lending. Mergers involving small, in-state acquirers are positively associated with small business loan (SBL) originations in counties where target banks are located. Conversely, mergers involving large, out-of-state acquirers are associated with fewer SBL originations. The analysis suggests that the results are driven by acquirer's choice of target. Small and in-state acquirers target banks that focus more on SBL and targets with strong relationships while large, out-of-state acquirers pursue better performing banks with stronger balance sheets and less focus on SBL. Results are particularly strong in counties with a large number of small firms. Post-merger activity supports banks expanding on their acquisition strategy decisions. The findings suggest that acquirer strategy is important for evaluating the impact of acquisitions on local community development and that one-size-fits-all policy solutions for bank mergers may not produce common local outcomes.

  • No image available

    Aggregate bank liquid asset holdings (reserves and liquid securities) increased from 13% to 33% of assets from before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to 2020. If banks allocate their balance sheet by equalizing the marginal risk-adjusted expected return across asset classes, they hold more liquid assets when they have less advantageous lending opportunities. We show that, indeed, holdings of liquid assets are negatively related to lending opportunities. Our findings indicate that bank liquid asset holdings grew since the GFC because of weak lending opportunities, though regulatory changes help explain the higher liquid asset holdings of the largest banks before COVID.

  • No image available

    Abstract: Large scale bank privatizations over the last ten years have resulted in vast changes in the ownership structure of banking sectors throughout the world. This dissertation explores both the macro and micro level effects of these changes in bank ownership structure. The first essay explores how changes in bank ownership structure affect capital allocation efficiency within countries. I find that the decline in government ownership of banks by itself does not have any impact on capital allocation efficiency; rather, what matters is whether foreigners or large domestic shareholders acquire the stakes relinquished by the government. Increases in domestic blockholder ownership of banks adversely affect the allocation of capital through increased lending activity to less productive industries, while increased foreign presence improves capital allocation efficiency by directing credit to more productive sectors and to industries that rely more on external financing. In the second essay I explore how changes in bank ownership structure affect the performance of individual banks and the banking sector. The primary contribution of this essay is to examine the role of large domestic blockholders on bank performance. I find that increases in large domestic blockholder ownership of banks are associated with poor subsequent performance in terms of asset quality, profitability, and bank value. In contrast, increases in foreign ownership lead to improvements in profitability and bank value, consistent with prior findings. Government ownership of banks continues to affect bank performance adversely. Finally, increased presence of large domestic blockholders in the banking sector has a positive spillover effect on banking sector asset quality and profitability, while increased foreign presence is no longer associated with improvements in the competitiveness of the banking sector, contrary to what prior studies have found.