Criminal activities in cyberspace are increasingly facilitated by black markets. This report characterizes these markets and describes how they have evolved, to provide insight into how their existence can harm the information security environment.

The authors identify promising advanced training-technology investments and how the U.S. Department of the Air Force can track and integrate them using a quantitative modeling approach, stakeholder perspectives, and an expert panel's analysis.

Electronic systems are becoming increasingly complicated and interconnected, and those of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) are no exception. Due to the evolution of electronic systems, combined with the need to save time, energy, and money, DoD plans to replace paper delivery of servicemember separation information with electronic delivery. A timely analysis is critical to ensure DoD is best positioned to optimize and effectively orchestrate this opportunity. Clear, authoritative information on characterization of service and reasons for separation is critical for individuals as they re-enlist, change duty status, or transfer into civilian employment; for dependents and survivors; for government agencies that adjudicate veteran status and benefits; and for military departments, as they move toward fully integrated digital databases. DoD's DD Form 214 has existed since the 1950s, when it standardized information across the services by replacing service-level forms. The form is largely unchanged since that time and has remained the defining document to verify a servicemember's discharge from active duty. As electronic information supplants paper, information provided by the services must continue to meet the important purposes of DD Form 214. To ensure consistency across the services and avoid omission of critical information, DoD needs an in-depth analysis of the current use of DD Form 214 to identify ways in which it could be improved to meet the diverse needs of the numerous organizations and individuals who use and depend on it.

In this report, the authors identify existing gaps and areas for improvement in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Qualification System and examine ways to measure and monitor its effectiveness in the future.

This report describes how computational cognitive models can enhance learning gains and reduce training time for mission-critical knowledge, skills, and abilities, with emphasis on second-language learning, for the U.S. Department of the Air Force.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes the need for U.S. forces to be interoperable with capable allies and partners. To support the NDS, the U.S. Army develops and executes doctrine and guidelines for how its units can achieve interoperability with partners. The Army identified a need to develop an overarching concept for interoperability that includes explicit links between current Army multinational interoperability doctrine and mission command doctrine. Concurrently, it wanted an enduring and standardized way to measure levels of interoperability achieved as a result of major training events. To that end, the Army asked RAND Arroyo Center to conduct an analysis of alternatives (AoA) of interoperability measurement systems. Researchers looked at eight different approaches, gathering and analyzing data from a review of materials provided by representatives for each approach and information from multiple rounds of interviews with representatives. No single approach addressed all dimensions identified as important for a future system, so a completely new approach was proposed, drawing on strengths and eliminating weaknesses from other approaches analyzed. The Army decided to develop a new system-the Army Interoperability Measurement System (AIMS), which includes a quantitative instrument for measuring interoperability levels, a qualitative component to enable capability gap analysis, an automated approach to connect and analyze the data, and exploitation panels that convene immediately following a training exercise. The authors document their AoA, present the supporting evidence for their measurement system recommendations, and details the early development of AIMS.

Training and education in the Department of the Air Force (DAF) is undergoing a major transformation as part of an effort to maintain an asymmetric advantage over competitors. As part of this transformation, the DAF wants to invest in advanced training technologies, such as augmented and virtual reality, gaming, and synthetic training environments. To reap the benefits of these new training technologies, the DAF must successfully transition them to the force. In this report, the authors examine what factors enable a successful technology transfer and how those factors have come into play in select use cases. They use their findings from a literature review from academic, industry, and government sources about technology transfer and DAF subject-matter expert interviews to construct a framework for training technology transfer in the DAF. This framework provides a view of the steps in the process and the potential barriers and enablers associated with each step. The authors also examine six use cases from ongoing efforts across the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to provide further insights into the challenges of training technology transfer. The use cases examined are the Generalized Intelligent Framework for Tutoring, Synthetic Training Environment-Information System, Joint Simulation Environment, Standard Space Trainer, Special Operations Center for Medical Integration and Development, and Integration Technology Platform.

Senior Department of the Air Force leadership is increasingly concerned that the current readiness assessment system is not providing sufficient insight into the capability of the force to meet future mission requirements because of the shortcomings of outcome measurements. Concurrently, the U.S. Air Force is evolving its training infrastructure in response to the prospect of operations in contested and denied environments, an increased pace of warfare, and the potential loss of superiority across multiple domains in a conflict with near-peer adversaries. Advances in the technological capabilities of training infrastructure can help fill gaps in current readiness assessments to provide senior leaders with better insight into the readiness of the force for future contingencies. To understand how such investments might do so, the authors used a multimethod approach that featured interviews with senior leaders in Air Force major commands and technical experts and included reviews of readiness reporting data and technical documentation. The report identifies current readiness assessment gaps and explores ways to address them through investments in training assets. One finding was that legacy metrics tend to focus on individual units, but the force must be able to integrate well to conduct the full spectrum of possible operations against a near-peer adversary. This requires adjusting training and how readiness is measured to assess how personnel from different units function as teams at various levels.

The authors examined friction between the U.S. Army's People First objectives (which focus on command climate, cohesive teams, career goals, and work-life balance) and mission readiness objectives and developed strategies to mitigate this friction.

Although policy guidance is in place to manage some risks, there is no comprehensive procedure on how to manage the array of risks that can afflict U.S. Army supply chains. Because the Army lacks a comprehensive supply chain risk management (SCRM) system, there is limited ability to proactively identify and manage supply chain risks across a weapon system program's life cycle. In this report, the authors develop frameworks to support implementation of an Army common operating procedure for identifying and managing supply chain risks during the acquisition life cycle. The authors surveyed the SCRM literature to catalog and define 10 supply chain risk categories and 31 supply chain risk drivers. They also documented lessons learned from three supply chain risk case studies. The authors reviewed the process steps and documents reflected in the Army acquisition life cycle; interviewed representatives from the acquisition and sustainment communities to understand the existing approach to SCRM; and then identified the steps along the process where supply chain risk activities might take place. The authors recommend the adoption of three interconnected SCRM frameworks that span the weapon system's life cycle. By managing across three frameworks, the Army can focus SCRM activities within the organizations that have the most knowledge and information about the weapon system at that point in the life cycle. The interrelated nature of the frameworks promotes sharing knowledge and acknowledging the changing nature of risks across the life cycle.