Many senior army officials still claim that if they had been given enough soldiers and weapons, the United States could have won the war in Vietnam. In this probing analysis of U.S. military policy in Vietnam, career army officer and strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., argues that precisely because of this mindset the war was lost before it was fought. The army assumed that it could transplant to Indochina the operational methods that had been successful in the European battle theaters of World War II, an approach that proved ill-suited to the way the Vietnamese Communist forces fought. Theirs was a war of insurgency, and counterinsurgency, Krepinevich contends, requires light infantry formations, firepower restraint, and the resolution of political and social problems within the nation. To the very end, top military commanders refused to recognize this. Krepinevich documents the deep division not only between the American military and civilian leaders over the very nature of the war, but also within the U.S. Army itself. Through extensive research in declassified material and interviews with officers and men with battlefield experience, he shows that those engaged in the combat understood early on that they were involved in a different kind of conflict. Their reports and urgings were discounted by the generals, who pressed on with a conventional war that brought devastation but little success. A thorough analysis of the U.S. Army's role in the Vietnam War, The Army and Vietnam demonstrates with chilling persuasiveness the ways in which the army was unprepared to fight—lessons applicable to today's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Describes the changing face of war in the 21st century and identifies seven deadly scenarios that threaten our security in the years ahead.

How the character of war is changing and how militaries can successfully adapt to meet the challenge This book by military strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., is the definitive take on the race for military dominance in the twenty-first century. It shows how militaries that successfully pursue disruptive innovation can gain a major advantage over their rivals, while those that fail to do so risk exposing their countries to great danger. The Precision Warfare Revolution introduced by the U.S. military in the First Gulf War found the United States enjoying a near monopoly in this form of warfare for several decades. But now other powers have these capabilities. The U.S. military also confronts an emerging military revolution driven by advances across a wide range of technologies--from artificial intelligence and synthetic biology to quantum computing and additive manufacturing. To stay competitive, the U.S. military must pursue disruptive innovation in a race with other militaries to exploit war's changing character. Clues exist as to the winner's identity. They are revealed by militaries that went beyond the bounds of mere innovation to overturn the existing forms of warfare, changing the course of history and the fate of nations. Through exploring their experiences, Krepinevich shows how the U.S. military can win the race to identify and exploit the "next big thing" in warfare.

Andrew Marshall is a Pentagon legend. For more than four decades he has served as Director of the Office of Net Assessment, the Pentagon’s internal think tank, under twelve defense secretaries and eight administrations. Yet Marshall has been on the cutting edge of strategic thinking even longer than that. At the RAND Corporation during its golden age in the 1950s and early 1960s, Marshall helped formulate bedrock concepts of US nuclear strategy that endure to this day; later, at the Pentagon, he pioneered the development of “net assessment”—a new analytic framework for understanding the long-term military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the Cold War, Marshall successfully used net assessment to anticipate emerging disruptive shifts in military affairs, including the revolution in precision warfare and the rise of China as a major strategic rival of the United States. In The Last Warrior, Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts—both former members of Marshall’s staff—trace Marshall’s intellectual development from his upbringing in Detroit during the Great Depression to his decades in Washington as an influential behind-the-scenes advisor on American defense strategy. The result is a unique insider’s perspective on the changes in US strategy from the dawn of the Cold War to the present day. Covering some of the most pivotal episodes of the last half-century and peopled with some of the era’s most influential figures, The Last Warrior tells Marshall’s story for the first time, in the process providing an unparalleled history of the evolution of the American defense establishment.

How valid is the growing concern among senior U.S. leaders that state and non-state actors will become increasingly capable of executing cyber attacks with catastrophic consequences? Does the expansion of the military competition into the cyber domain represent a major shift in the character of warfare? This assessment finds the concerns of leaders like Secretary Panetta regarding cyber war have merit: the United States and other developed countries are ill-prepared to defend against a cyber attack on their critical infrastructure. Yet Krepinevich concludes that the damage inflicted by a major cyber attack would pale in comparison to the devastation of a nuclear strike, while suggesting that a major cyber attack is also far more likely to occur than a nuclear attack. Indeed, he argues that the long-term consequences of such an attack are likely to be in the form of the considerable and enduring cost states will incur in adapting their critical infrastructure to limit the damage from such attacks to an acceptable level.