This paper examines the relationship between shared capitalist modes of pay and shared modes of decision-making via employee involvement and related committees and between them and measures of productivity and worker well-being in two data sets: the employee based Worker Participation and Representation Survey and the California Establishment Survey. It finds in both data sets that the forms of shared compensation are complementary in the sense that they are more likely to be found together than if firms chose them separately; that shared compensation systems are positively associated with shared decision-making; and that combining shared compensation systems and employee involvement has greater impacts on outcomes than each system by itself.

“The go-to guy on minimum wage” (Nobel Laureate and New York Times bestselling author Paul Krugman) tackles one of the thorniest social issues of our times—income inequality—from a new vantage point with field-leading economics. How did the labor market stop working for so many in the workforce? Why did wages at the bottom and in the middle of the pay scale fail to keep up with a growing economy that delivered over 70 percent productivity gains and soaring incomes for those at the top? What caused this divergence, and what can we do about it now? The Wage Standard is a deep dive into these very questions—questions Arin Dube has explored in over two decades of influential research. Painting a new picture with data, Dube shows us how wages for most workers became painfully frozen. But also, he argues, this fate was not inevitable, and more importantly, that it can be reversed. The Wage Standard lays bare how the labor market really works, revealing levers to pull to shift course: to reshape corporate decisions, rethink policy priorities, and rebalance economic power and social norms to better protect the typical worker. These are the keys to unlocking broad-based prosperity. Dube delivers a hopeful message. First, chances are, you deserve a raise. And second, it’s not necessary to fix the broken politics of Washington, DC, in order to get one. Political will, public engagement, and persistence can set a new standard to reset the labor market and improve the lives of American workers starting today. In fact, signs of progress are already offering a glimpse of what a fairer economy can and will look like.

We measure workers' preferences for wages and non-wage amenities at America's largest employer, Walmart, using targeted survey experiments. We find that workers have an economically significant willingness to pay for "dignity at work". Consistent with the presence of monopsony power, we estimate hypothetical quit elasticities similar to recent estimates from the literature. We document significant complementarities between wages and non-wage amenities, suggesting that measures of monopsony that do not account for amenities may be biased. We find that workers at low dignity jobs have higher quit elasticities, but lower bargaining elasticities, relative to workers at high dignity jobs. Finally, we use cross-state variation in the bite of Walmart's 2014 corporate minimum wage to estimate the effects of the minimum wage on both workplace dignity and other amenities. We find no evidence that non-wage amenities are reduced in response to a higher minimum wage, consistent with wage-amenity complementarity and labor market power.

We assess the effect of the minimum wage on labor market outcomes such as employment, unemployment, and labor force participation for most workers affected by the policy. We apply modern machine learning tools to construct demographically-based treatment groups capturing around 75% of all minimum wage workers--a major improvement over the literature which has focused on fairly narrow subgroups where the policy has a large bite (e.g., teens). By exploiting 172 prominent minimum wages between 1979 and 2019 we find that there is a very clear increase in average wages of workers in these groups following a minimum wage increase, while there is little evidence of employment loss. Furthermore, we find no indication that minimum wage has a negative effect on the unemployment rate, on the labor force participation, or on the labor market transitions. Furthermore, we detect no employment or participation responses even for sub-groups that are likely to have a high extensive margin labor supply elasticity--such as teens, older workers, or single mothers. Overall, these findings provide little evidence for changing search effort in response to a minimum wage increase.

We propose a novel method that infers the employment effect of a minimum wage increase by comparing the number of excess jobs paying at or slightly above the new minimum wage to the missing jobs paying below it. To implement our approach, we estimate the effect of the minimum wage on the frequency distribution of hourly wages using 138 prominent state-level minimum wage changes between 1979 and 2016. We find that the overall number of low-wage jobs remained essentially unchanged over five years following the increase. At the same time, the direct effect of the minimum wage on average earnings was amplified by modest wage spillovers at the bottom of the wage distribution. Our estimates by detailed demographic groups show that the lack of job loss is not explained by labor-labor substitution at the bottom of the wage distribution. We also find no evidence of disemployment when we consider higher levels of minimum wages. However, we do find some evidence of reduced employment in tradable sectors. In contrast to our bunching-based estimates, we show that some conventional studies can produce misleading inference due to spurious changes in employment higher up in the wage distribution.

Using the Quarterly Workforce Indicators, estimates the effects of minimum wage increses on earnings, employment levels and employment flows.

We use policy discontinuities at state borders to identify the effects of minimum wages on earnings and employment in restaurants and other low-wage sectors. Our approach generalizes the case study method by considering all local differences in minimum wage policies between 1990 and 2006. We compare all contiguous county pairs in the U.S. that straddle a state border and find no adverse employment effects. We show that traditional approaches that do not account for local economic conditions tend to produce spurious negative effects due to spatial heterogeneities in employment trends that are unrelated to minimum wage policies. Our findings are robust to allowing for long term effects of minimum wage changes.

We provide new estimates of the separations elasticity, a proximate determinant of the labor supply facing a firm with respect to hourly wage, using matched Oregon employer-employee data. Existing estimates using individual wage variation may be biased by mismeasured wages and use of wage variation unrelated to firm choices. We estimate the impact of the firm component of wage variation on separations using both firm fixed effects estimated from a wage equation as well as a matched IV event study around employment transitions between firms. Separations are a declining function of firm wage policies: we find that the implied firm-level labor supply elasticities generated are around 4, consistent with recent experimental and quasi-experimental evidence, and that they are approximately 3 to 4 times larger that those using individual wages. Further, we find lower separations elasticities for low wage workers, high turnover sectors, and periods of economic downturn but with little heterogeneity by urban status or labor market concentration. We conclude that monopsonistic competition is pervasive, and largely independent of forces driving classical monopsony.

Cities are increasingly setting their own minimum wages, and this trend has accelerated sharply in recent years. While in 2010 there were only three cities with their own minimum wages exceeding the state or federal standard, by 2020 there were 42. This new phenomenon begs the question: is it desirable to have city-level variation in minimum wage polices? We discuss the main trade-offs emerging from local variation in minimum wage polices and evaluate their empirical relevance. First, we document what type of cities raise minimum wages and we discuss how these characteristics can potentially impact the effectiveness of city-level minimum wage policies. Second, we summarize the evolving evidence on city-level minimum wage changes and provide some new evidence of our own. Early evidence suggests that the impact of the policy on wages and employment to date has been broadly similar to the evidence on state and federal-level minimum wage changes. Overall, city-level minimum wages seem to be able to tailor the policy to local economic environment without imposing substantial distortions in allocation of labor and businesses across locations.