Mozambique is already vulnerable to extreme weather events and climate change is projected to exacerbate their frequency and intensity. The occurrence of cyclones and flooding has increased in recent years and the trend is expected to continue. The country’s coast—where 60 percent of the population, the three biggest cities, and critical infrastructure are situated—is most exposed to climate change-related risks, including damage from cyclones and projected sea level rise. Densely populated and low-lying regions, such as Zambezia, Nampula, Sofala, and Maputo Provinces, are particularly exposed to risks from flooding. More broadly, climate change is projected to increase average temperatures across the country and to result in higher variability in precipitation, especially in the south. The most critical economic sectors vulnerable to climate change in Mozambique are agriculture, transport, and potentially energy. In agriculture, maize is likely to be the most affected key crop. This can pose risks to food security (alongside expected higher food inflation because of climate change), given maize’s widespread cultivation and role in nutrition. The impact on other crops is likely to be more limited, and to a large extent driven by damages from increased frequency of extreme weather events. This could exacerbate challenges in the sector, which is already constrained by low productivity and limited arable areas. That said, climate change could create some opportunities; for example, rice yields are projected to improve. Most studies project agricultural production in the central region to be most adversely affected by climate change, albeit the impact varies by crop and within regions. Mozambique’s transport infrastructure is highly vulnerable to climate change due to the projected increase in flooding, the low proportion of paved roads, their limited interconnectivity, and the vulnerability of ports to cyclones and storm surges. Damages to Mozambique’s transport sector are likely to have knock-on effects to other sectors and can have significant regional implications, as the country serves as a conduit for landlocked neighboring countries. Infrastructure damages, alongside the projected coastal erosion, may severely affect the tourism sector. Furthermore, Mozambique’s high dependence on hydropower exposes it to losses from rainfall variability, which is expected to increase. The country’s largest hydropower plant is located downstream on the Zambezi River, which various studies project to dry up due to climate change. Increased water use in upstream countries (such as because of greater irrigation needs and in response to growing populations) could also pose risks to Mozambique’s hydropower sector.

Climate change is not projected to materially alter Malawi’s climate profile. Instead, it is likely to exacerbate existing climate vulnerabilities by increasing the frequency and intensity of cyclones, floods, and droughts. This is largely due to increased uncertainty around future precipitation levels. These adverse effects have already started to materialize and are expected to increase substantially over the next decades, particularly if efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by high emitting countries are insufficient. Climate change is also projected to increase average annual temperatures across the country. Climate change is expected to significantly affect Malawi’s economy, mainly because of its dependence on climate-sensitive economic sectors and its low capacity to take adaptation measures due to preexisting macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Malawi’s sensitivity to climate shocks is underpinned by significant environmental degradation, in particular deforestation, watershed degradation, and poor soil management. The two main impact channels are likely to be agriculture and road infrastructure. In agriculture, the increased uncertainty around future precipitation levels in Malawi will likely result in higher variability in crop yields. Climate change is projected to exacerbate preexisting environmental degradation challenges, including soil erosion. These effects are particularly problematic due to Malawi’s high poverty rate, lack of economic diversification (the agriculture sector represents one-third of the economy and employs over 70 percent of the workforce), and significant dependence on rainfed production (about 80 percent of the population). Climate change is likely to significantly impact Malawi’s road infrastructure, mainly due to increased risk of flooding, which would have broader economic and social knock-on impacts.

According to the United Nations, the world’s population will grow by 2 billion people over the coming decades to reach 9.7 billion by 2050 (UNDESA-DP 2019a). The dignity and life prospects of those additional 2 billion people will depend on their ability to meet basic needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter, and their access to adequate employment. The most pressing need for jobs will be felt in those regions and countries that have not yet gone through the demographic transition, and where the cohort of young people is growing rapidly. The challenge will be compounded by an increasingly crowded, more competitive world with fewer natural resources per capita, and by the threat of climate change, which is projected to affect every sector of the economy (Arent 2014).

Global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices have risen rapidly in recent months, driven in large part by the fallout from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia. Other factors, such as export bans in response to concerns about commodity shortages, have also contributed to rising prices. Figure 1 examines price changes in key food and nonfood commodities between June 2021 and June 2022. The period of interest for this study is June 2021 to April 2022. Over this period, palm oil and wheat prices increased by 68 and 113 percent in nominal terms, respectively. When deflated by the US Consumer Price Index, these price changes equate to 56 and 100 percent in real terms. Wide variation exists across food products, with nominal maize prices increasing by 19 per-cent (or 11 percent in real terms), and rice prices declining by 13 percent (or 7 percent in real terms) over the same period. Prices of nonfood commodities also rose substantially. Whereas crude oil prices rose 44 percent (or 34 percent in real terms), natural gas and fertilizer prices both doubled (or 88 and 101 percent in real terms, respectively). As shown in the breakdown in the bar chart, most of the price growth occurred after the start of the war in Ukraine, except for fertilizer.

Since the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015, heads of state and ministers at global convenings have repeatedly expressed commitments in support of achieving SDG2 — Zero Hunger — by 2030. Yet progress toward SDG2 has stalled, owing to economic slowdowns, unforeseen crises, geopolitical conflict, and lackluster investment in agricultural productivity and open trade. Where have commitments to SDG2 fallen short? While SDG2 calls for ending global hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition by 2030, this brief predominantly focuses on progress and commitments related to hunger and food insecurity. Drawing on the results of two recent studies, the policy brief (1) discusses trends and setbacks toward reducing hunger and food insecurity, (2) analyzes progress on the “means of implementation,” or mix of finances, technology, and policy choices, to address SDG2, (3) assesses 107 commitment statements in support of SDG2 made at 68 global meetings since 2015, and (4) explores how to improve accountability in the commitment-making process to accelerate progress toward Zero Hunger.

Achieving Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG 2), Zero Hunger, by 2030 is in jeopardy due to slowing and unequal economic growth, climate shocks, the COVID-19 pandemic, conflict, lackluster efforts toward investing in food system sustainability and agricultural productivity growth, and persistent barriers to open food trade. Nevertheless, numerous commitments to achieving SDG 2 have been repeatedly expressed by Heads of State and Ministers at diverse global meetings since the SDGs became a focus in 2015. To identify the intensity and degree of convergence of commitments that national governments have collectively made to realizing SDG 2, this paper provides a qualitative assessment of statements from more than 68 global meetings and 107 intergovernmental commitment documents since 2015. Analyzing these commitments against seven critical factors necessary for impact at scale, we find that stated intentions to solve the global food security and hunger challenge have become more pronounced at global meetings over time, especially in the wake of the crises. However, the intent to act is not consistently matched by commitments to specific actions that could help accelerate reductions in hunger. For instance, while increased financing is often recognized as a priority to reach SDG 2, few commitments in global fora relate to detailed costing of required investments. Similarly, many commitment statements lack specificity regarding what and how policy interventions should be scaled up for greater action on SDG 2 or the ways to enhance different stakeholders’ capacities to implement them. While horizontal coherence was mentioned across most global fora, it was only present in about half of the commitment statements, with even less recognition of the necessity for vertical coherence from global to local levels. Despite global acknowledgement of the importance of accountability and monitoring, usually by way of progress reports, we find few consequences for governments that do not act on commitments made in global fora. We discuss the implications of these findings and offer recommendations for how to strengthen the commitment-making process to help accelerate actions that can reduce food insecurity and hunger and augment the legitimacy of global meetings. This work can inform the policy advocacy community focused on SDG 2 and those engaged in catalyzing and supporting intergovernmental action on other SDGs. Our findings reiterate the importance of attention to global governance and the political economy of global meetings—which is necessary to strengthen our focus on delivering outcomes that put the world on a path that brings the solution to the problems of global hunger and food insecurity within reach.

Childhood undernutrition manifests itself in various ways including stunting, wasting, underweight, and micronutrient deficiencies. Stunting (being too short for the child’s age) captures a state of linear growth retardation and cumulative growth impairment due to chronic nutritional deficiency and illness that deprive a fetus and child of required nutrients. Despite the global decline in stunting prevalence by over 25% since 1990, an estimated 22% of the 150 million children are currently stunted with significant regional and within region disparity. Stunting is largely an irreversible outcome that stifles individuals from fulfilling their full development and economic potential. It increases the risk of impaired brain development with implications for cognitive and non-cognitive functions, educational performance, productivity, and chronic diseases later in life. It also increases the frequency and severity of exposure to common infections with one in seven under 5 deaths linked to it. Stunting and other forms of undernutrition costs countries billions of dollars in lost revenue and healthcare outlays. This report presents results from a cost benefit analysis (CBA) of a package of nutrition-specific investments studied as part of The Lancet Series on Maternal and Child Undernutrition and Copenhagen Consensus exercise. The investments tackle the immediate causes of child undernutrition ─ inadequate intake of nutrients, diseases, and infections and include behavior change communication programs to promote breastfeeding and complementary feeding; supplementation of crucial micronutrients to pregnant women and young children; provision of complementary foods to children; and management of severe acute malnutrition. We focus on two developing regions with the highest burden of stunting globally ─ Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara (SSA). Economic benefits are modelled for a cohort of children born between 2015 and 2030 who will join the workforce at 18 years of age and retire when 60 years old. Two benefit streams (the value of avoided premature child mortality and lifetime earnings gains) and two costs elements (the cost of the nutrition investments and of delivering schooling) are considered. Benefit-cost (BC) ratios are estimated under alternative scenarios based on the returns to stunting reductions and cost elements considered. Besides discount rates previously used in the nutrition and economics literature (between 3% and 6%), we consider a 10% discount rate used by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for the sake of comparability of economic returns to these nutritional investments with that of other sectoral investments by MCC.

Climate change is projected to cause an increase in average temperatures in Zambia and a decline in rainfall, particularly in the southern and western regions. The country experiences high rainfall variability, which climate change is expected to exacerbate, resulting in likely higher frequency and intensity of already reoccurring extreme weather events, such as droughts and floods. The combined effect of the temperature and precipitation projections is anticipated to cause a decrease in water availability at national level and to adversely affect the Zambezi, Kafue, and Luangwa River Basins. Overall, these trends will exacerbate existing vulnerabilities in southwestern Zambia, as the region is already prone to droughts (as well as floods in some parts). On the other hand, the northern parts of the country are projected to experience a slight increase in rainfall and to be overall relatively positively affected by climate change. The key sectors most likely to be significantly affected by climate change in Zambia include agriculture, road infrastructure, and energy. In agriculture, the key risk stemming from climate change is the projected lower maize yields, as this is the country’s staple crop. Other crops are also expected to be adversely affected by higher temperatures, reduced rainfall, and increased occurrence of extreme events, particularly in southern and western Zambia. That said, changing climate conditions could create new agricultural opportunities in the north. Climate change is projected to negatively affect the livestock subsector, which will increase food security risks, particularly for subsistence farmers. In road infrastructure, the projected higher occurrence of flooding, especially in Lusaka Province, could have a knock-on effect for the rest of the economy, particularly if it damages key international corridors passing through this region and/or affects domestic supply chains. Zambia is significantly reliant on hydropower and is already experiencing severe power cuts due to drought. The risks in the sector are exacerbated by the location of key hydropower plants in the southern parts of the country and the projected drying up of main river basins. The electricity shortages have spillover effects on the rest of the economy, including the copper industry, Zambia’s key export. This has international implications, as Zambia is a top copper producer worldwide, and demand for copper is expected to increase significantly due to its crucial role in various green technologies. Thus, absent adaptation measures, the adverse impact of climate change in Zambia could affect global mitigation efforts and strategies.

This paper considers different approaches to modelling the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic/lockdown shocks. We review different modelling strategies and argue that, given the nature of the bottom-up recession caused by the pandemic/lockdowns, simulation models of the shocks should be based on a social accounting matrix (SAM) that includes both disaggregated sectoral data and the national accounts in a unified framework. SAM-based models have been widely used to analyze the impact of natural disasters, which are comparable to pandemic/lockdown shocks. The pandemic/lockdown shocks occurred rapidly, in weeks or months, not gradually over a year or more. In such a short period, adjustments through smooth changes in wages, prices and production methods are not plausible. Rather, initial adjustments occur through changes in quantities, altering demand and supply of commodities and employment in affected sectors. In this environment, we use a linear SAM-multiplier model that specifies a fixed-coefficient production technology, linear demand system, fixed savings rates, and fixed prices. There are three different kinds of sectoral shocks that are included in the model: (1) changes in demand due to household lockdown, (2) changes in supply due to industry lockdown, and (3) changes in demand due to induced macro shocks. At the detailed industry level, data are provided for all three shocks and the model imposes the largest of the three. We applied the model on a monthly time step for the period March to June 2020 for four countries: US, UK, Mexico, and South Africa. The models closely replicate observed macro results (GDP and employment) for the period. The results provide detailed structural information on the evolution of the different economies month-by-month and provide a framework for forward-looking scenario analysis. We also use the SAM-multiplier model to estimate the macro stimulus impacts of policies to support affected households. The model focuses attention on the structural features of the economy that define the multiplier process (who gets the additional income and what do they do with it) and provides a more nuanced analysis of the stimulus impact of income support programs than can be done with aggregated macro models.

Substantial model variability exists regarding the likely meteorological impact of climate change on Kenya, particularly with respect to future precipitation levels. Significant regional differences are expected, largely due to Kenya’s diverse climate profile. Overall, temperatures are projected to increase while future precipitation levels are highly uncertain. Climate change is expected to significantly affect coastal areas, including because of sea level rise risks, stronger winds, and an overall warmer and drier climate. This will likely harm important ecosystems, including wetlands, mangroves, and coral reefs. Some models project that arid and semi-arid areas may become drier and hotter, which would exacerbate preexisting water scarcity and agricultural challenges for the already vulnerable communities living there. That said, these projections are not corroborated by all models. The climate change impact on other areas, particularly south and west of Mount Kenya, could generally be positive, as it would provide even better conditions for agriculture. The key climate change risk for Kenya is from extreme events, in particular droughts and floods. The frequency and intensity of such events is likely to increase because of climate change. They also often lead to adverse knock-on effects, such as soil erosion, land degradation, and pest breakouts. Overall, Kenya’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) (2020) estimates that between 2010 and 2020, adverse climate change-related events led to annual socioeconomic losses of 3–5 percent of total gross domestic product (GDP).