The paper assesses, using seven structural models used heavily by policymaking institutions, the effectiveness of temporary fiscal stimulus. Models can, more easily than empirical studies, account for differences between fiscal instruments, for differences between structural characteristics of the economy, and for monetary-fiscal policy interactions. Findings are: (i) There is substantial agreement across models on the sizes of fiscal multipliers. (ii) The sizes of spending and targeted transfers multipliers are large. (iii) Fiscal policy is most effective if it has some persistence and if monetary policy accommodates it. (iv) The perception of permanent fiscal stimulus leads to significantly lower initial multipliers.

In this paper, we provide compelling evidence that cyclical factors account for the bulk of the post-2007 decline in the U.S. labor force participation rate. We then proceed to formulate a stylized New Keynesian model in which labor force participation is essentially acyclical during “normal times” (that is, in response to small or transitory shocks) but drops markedly in the wake of a large and persistent aggregate demand shock. Finally, we show that these considerations can have potentially crucial implications for the design of monetary policy, especially under circumstances in which adjustments to the short-term interest rate are constrained by the zero lower bound.

A salient feature of the post-COVID inflation surge is that economic activity has remained resilient despite unfavorable supply-side developments. We develop a macroeconomic model with nonlinear price and wage Phillips curves, endogenous intrinsic indexation and an unobserved components representation of a cost-push shock that is consistent with these observations. In our model, a persistent large adverse supply shock can lead to a persistent inflation surge while output expands if the central bank follows an inflation forecast-based policy rule and thus abstains from hiking policy rates for some time as it (erroneously) expects inflationary pressures to dissipate quickly. A standard linearized formulation of our model cannot account for these observations under identical assumptions. Our nonlinear framework implies that the standard prescription of "looking through" supply shocks is a good policy for small shocks when inflation is near the central bank's target, but that such a policy may be quite risky when economic activity is strong and large shocks drive inflation well above target. Moreover, our model implies that the economic costs of "going the last mile" – i.e. a tight stance aimed at returning inflation quickly to target – can be substantial.

Trade-offs between price and financial stability can occur when inflation is above target and financial stress is rising. Use of central bank liquidity tools and other financial stability policies may, under some circumstances, allow central banks to maintain their inflation fighting stance, while addressing financial stress. However, challenges in deploying these tools and specific country characteristics may hinder central banks’ ability to achieve both price and financial stability. In such circumstances, central banks should account for financial stress increasing downside risks to activity, allow for slower disinflation using monetary policy flexibility, and communicate that deviations from the medium-term inflation target are temporary. Countries with weak central bank credibility, high exposure to exchange rate movements, and limited fiscal space face extra challenges in managing these trade-offs and might have to rely on foreign exchange interventions, macroprudential policies, capital flow measures, and international liquidity tools.

Many central banks have relied on a range of policy tools, including foreign exchange intervention (FXI) and capital flow management tools (CFMs), to mitigate the effects of volatile capital flows on their economies. We develop an empirically-oriented New Keynesian model to evaluate and quantify how using multiple policy tools can potentially improve monetary policy tradeoffs. Our model embeds nonlinear balance sheet channels and includes a range of empirically-relevant frictions. We show that FXI and CFMs may improve policy tradeoffs under certain conditions, especially for economies with less well-anchored inflation expectations, substantial foreign currency mismatch, and that are more vulnerable to shocks likely to induce capital outflows and exchange rate pressures.

This paper examines the ability of a simple stylized general equilibrium model that incorporates nominal wage rigidity to explain the magnitude and persistence of the Great Depression in the United States. The impulses to our analysis are money supply shocks. The Taylor contracts model is surprisingly successful in accounting for the behavior of major macroaggregates and real wages during the downturn phase of the Depression, i.e., from 1929:3 through mid-1933. Our analysis provides support for the hypothesis that a monetary contraction operating through a sticky wage channel played a significant role in accounting for the downturn, and also provides an interesting refinement to this explanation. In particular, both the absolute severity of the Depression's downturn and its relative severity compared to the 1920-21 recession are likely attributable to the price decline having a much larger unanticipated component during the Depression, as well as less flexible wage-setting practices during this latter period. Another finding casts doubt on explanations for the 1933-36 recovery that rely heavily on the substantial remonetization that began in 1933.

Quantitative easing (QE) has been criticized for helping fuel the post-COVID inflation boom and causing large central bank losses. In this paper, we argue that QE should be evaluated mainly on its ability to achieve core macro-objectives as well for its effects on the consolidated fiscal position of the government and central bank, although central bank losses can matter to the extent that they may weaken central bank credibility. Using a DSGE model with segmented asset markets, we show how QE can provide a sizeable boost to output and inflation in a deep liquidity trap and can reduce public debt substantially. This contrasts to the rise in public debt that occurs under fiscal expansion and makes QE an attractive tool in a high debt environment. There is more reason for caution in using QE in a “shallow" liquidity trap in which the notional interest rate is only slightly negative: QE runs more risk of causing the economy to overheat, especially if forward guidance has a strong element of commitment, and is more likely to generate sizeable central bank losses. Some refinements in strategy, including the use of escape clauses, can help mitigate overheating risks.

We study alternative approaches to the withdrawal of prolonged unconventional monetary stimulus (“exit strategies”) by central banks in large, advanced economies. We first show empirically that large-scale asset purchases affect the exchange rate and domestic and foreign term premiums more strongly than conventional short-term policy rate changes when normalizing by the effects on domestic GDP. We then build a two-country New Keynesian model that features segmented bond markets, cognitive discounting and strategic complementarities in price setting that is consistent with these findings. The model implies that quantitative easing (QE) is the only effective way to provide monetary stimulus when policy rates are persistently constrained by the effective lower bound, and that QE is likely to have larger domestic output effects than quantitative tightening (QT). We demonstrate that “exit strategies” by large advanced economies that rely heavily on QT can trigger sizeable inflation-output tradeoffs in foreign recipient economies through the exchange rate and term premium channels. We also show that these tradeoffs are likely to be stronger in emerging market economies, especially those with fixed exchange rates.

We develop a microfounded New Keynesian model to analyze monetary policy and financial stability issues in open economies with financial fragilities and weakly anchored inflation expectations. We show that foreign exchange intervention (FXI) and capital flow management tools (CFMs) can improve monetary policy tradeoffs under some conditions, including by reducing the need for procyclical tightening in response to capital outflow pressures. Moreover, they can be used in a preemptive way to reduce the risk of a “sudden stop” through curbing a buildup in leverage. While these tools can materially improve welfare, mainly by dampening inefficient fluctuations in risk premia, our analysis also highlights potential limitations, including the possibility that their deployment may forestall needed adjustment in the external balance. Finally, our results also emphasize the power of FXIs to provide domestic stimulus in a liquidity trap.