This paper quantifies the direct impact of taxes on income distribution at the household level in Chile and estimates the distributional effect of several changes in the tax structure. We find that income distributions before and after taxes are very similar (Gini coefficients of 0.448 and 0.496, respectively). Moreover, radical modifications of the tax structure, such as raising the value added tax from 18 to 25% or substituting a 20% flat tax for the present progressive income tax affect the after-tax distribution only slightly. We present some arithmetic showing that the scope for direct income redistribution through progressivity of the tax system is rather limited. By contrast, for parameter values observed in Chile, and possibly in most developing countries, the targeting of expenditures and the level of the average tax rate are far more important determinants of income distribution after government transfers. Thus, a high-yield proportional tax can have a far bigger equalizing impact than a low-yield progressive tax. Moreover, a simple model shows that the optimal tax system is biased against progressive taxes and towards proportional taxes, with a bias that grows with the degree of inequality of pre-tax incomes.

"This paper presents new data from 150 countries showing that former cabinet members, central bank governors, and financial regulators are many orders of magnitude more likely than other citizens to become board members of banks. Countries where the politician-banker phenomenon is more prevalent have higher corruption and more powerful yet less accountable governments, but not better functioning financial systems. Regulation becomes more pro-banker where this happens more often. Furthermore, a higher fraction of the rents that are created accrue to bankers, former politicians are not more likely to be directors when their side is in power, and banks are more profitable without being more leveraged. Rather than supporting a public interest view, the evidence is consistent with a capture-type private interest story where, in exchange for a non-executive position at a bank in the future, politicians provide for beneficial regulation. "--World Bank web site.

This paper contributes to explain the cross-country heterogeneity of the poverty response to changes in economic growth. It does so by focusing on the structure of output growth. The paper presents a two-sector theoretical model that clarifies the mechanism through which the sectoral composition of growth and associated labor intensity can affect workers' wages and, thus, poverty alleviation. Then in presents cross-country empirical evidence that analyzes first, the differential poverty-reducing impact of sectoral growth at various levels of disaggregation, and the role of unskilled labor intensity in such differential impact. The paper finds evidence that not only the size of economic growth but also its composition matters for poverty alleviation, with the largest contributuons from labor-intensive sectors (such as agriculture, construction, and manufacturing). The results are robust to the influence of outliers, alternative explanations, and various poverty measures.

"A well developed financial system enhances competition in the industrial sector by allowing easier entry. The impact varies across industries, however. For some, small changes in financial development quickly induce entry and dissipate incumbents' rents, generating strong incentives to oppose improvement of the financial system. In other sectors incumbents may even benefit from increased availability of external funds. The relative strength of promoters and opponents determines the political equilibrium level of financial system development. This may be perturbed by the effect of trade liberalization in the strength of each group. Using a sample of 41 trade liberalizers Braun and Raddatz conduct an event study and show that the change in the strength of promoters vis--̉vis opponents is a very good predictor of subsequent financial development. The result is not driven by changes in demand for external funds, or by the success of the trade policy. The relationship is mediated by policy reforms, the kind that induces competition in the financial sector, in particular. Real effects follow not so much from capital deepening but mainly through improved allocation. The effect is stronger in countries with high levels of governance, suggesting that incumbents resort to this costly but more subtle way of restricting entry where it is difficult to obtain more blatant forms of anti-competitive measures from politicians. This paper--a product of the Investment and Growth Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the relation between finance and the macroeconomy"--World Bank web site.

External shocks, such as commodity price fluctuations, natural disasters, and the role of the international economy, are often blamed for the poor economic performance of low-income countries. The author quantifies the impact of these different external shocks using a panel vector autoregression (VAR) approach and compares their relative contributions to output volatility in low-income countries vis-à-vis internal factors. He finds that external shocks can only explain a small fraction of the output variance of a typical low-income country. Internal factors are the main source of fluctuations. From a quantitative perspective, the output effect of external shocks is typically small in absolute terms, but significant relative to the historic performance of these countries.

The authors examine empirically how domestic structural characteristics related to openness and product- and factor-market flexibility influence the impact that terms-of-trade shocks can have on aggregate output. For this purpose, they apply an econometric methodology based on semi-structural vector auto-regressions to a panel of 90 countries with annual observations for the period 1974-2000. Using this methodology, the authors isolate and standardize the shocks, estimate their impact on GDP, and examine how this impact depends on the domestic conditions outlined above. They find that larger trade openness magnifies the output impact of external shocks, particularly the negative ones, while imporvements in labor market flexibility and financial openness reduce their impact. Domestic financial depth has a more nuanced role in stabilizing the economy. It helps reduce the impact of external shocks particularly in environments of high exposure, that is, when trade and financial openness are high, firm entry in unrestricted, and labor markets are rigid.

Raddatz provides evidence of a causal and economically important effect of financial development on volatility. In contrast to the existing literature, the identification strategy is based on the differences in sensitivities to financial conditions across industries. The results show that sectors with larger liquidity needs are more volatile and experience deeper crises in financially underdeveloped countries. At the macroeconomic level, the results suggest that changes in financial development can generate important differences in aggregate volatility. The author also finds that financially underdeveloped countries partially protect themselves from volatility by concentrating less output in sectors with large liquidity needs. Nevertheless, this insulation mechanism seems to be insufficient to reverse the effects of financial underdevelopment on within-sector volatility. Finally, Raddatz provides new evidence that:ʼn Financial development affects volatility mainly through the intensive margin (output per firm).ʼn Both the quality of information generated by firms, and the development of financial intermediaries have independent effects on sectoral volatility.ʼn The development of financial intermediaries is more important than the development of equity markets for the reduction of volatility.This paper - a product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the determinants of macroeconomic volatility.

"The authors examine the empirical evidence in support of the poverty trap view of underdevelopment. They calibrate simple aggregate growth models in which poverty traps can arise due to either low saving or low technology at low levels of development. They then use these models to assess the empirical relevance of poverty traps and their consequences for policy. The authors find little evidence of the existence of poverty traps based on these two broad mechanisms. When put to the task of explaining the persistence of low income in African countries, the models require either unreasonable values for key parameters, or else generate counterfactual predictions regarding the relations between key variables. These results call into question the view that a large scaling-up of aid to the poorest countries is a necessary condition for sharp and sustained increases in growth. "--World Bank web site.