Focusing on ways that markets work with, rather than against, governments to enhance public welfare. The optimal mix of market forces and government intervention to allocate resources is one of the longest-standing problems facing human civilization. At the theoretical extremes, resources in centrally planned economies are allocated by the government, while resources in capitalist economies are allocated by private markets. In practice, market forces and government interventions co-exist to allocate goods and services in a political environment with shifting pressures to give one approach more responsibility than the other. Current public attitudes toward markets are at a low point in the wake of the Great Recession and the growth in income inequality that began in the 1970s. However, in this book, noted Brookings economist Clifford Winston argues that it is a serious mistake to overlook that markets will be a critical part of the solution to any public objective whether it be to reduce inequality, stimulate long-term growth, slow climate change, or eliminate COVID 19. In Winston's view, policymakers should be much more aware of the many ways that markets help government to achieve economic and social goals and the potential that markets have to provide greater assistance in achieving those goals. Winston synthesizes the empirical evidence on the efficacy of markets in helping to protect consumers against anti-competitive behavior and when technology appears to prevent price competition; to enable individuals to make more informed decisions; and to reduce negative externalities, improve public production, and encourage innovations. Importantly, Winston presents evidence indicating how markets can also help to reduce poverty, promote fairness in labor markets, and provide merit goods. Winston subjects his assessment to a robustness test by explaining how market forces have helped to address the COVID-19 pandemic by, for example, finding new ways for people to work safely and providing incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop safe and effective vaccines. Winston takes a proactive approach in his conclusion by suggesting the formation of a major Commission composed of academics, policymakers, and businesspeople. Such a panel could explore how market forces could provide greater help to government to address economic and social problems and could provide specific recommendations to facilitate market solutions where appropriate.

A Brookings Institution Press and American Enterprise Institute publication When should government intervene in market activity and when is it best to let market forces take their natural course? How does the existing empirical evidence about government performance guide our answers to these questions? In this clear, concise book, Clifford Winston offers his innovative analysis shaped by thirty years of evidence to assess the efficacy of government interventions. Markets fail when it is possible to make one person better off without making someone else worse off, thus indicating inefficiency. Governments fail when an intervention is unwarranted because markets are performing well or when the intervention fails to correct a market problem efficiently. Winston concludes from existing research that the cost of government failure may actually be considerably greater than the cost of market failure: ""My search of the evidence is not limited to policy failures. I will report success stories, but few of them emerged from my search."" The prevalence of market failure is due to a lack of conviction in favor of markets, the inflexibility of intervening government agencies, and political forces that enable certain interest groups to benefit at the expense of society as a whole. Winston suggests that government policy can be improved by making greater use of market-oriented solutions that have already produced benefits in certain situations.

Although the airline, railroad, telecommunications, and electric power industries are at very different stages in adjusting to regulatory reform, each industry faces the same critical public policy question: Are policymakers taking appropriate steps to stimulate competition or are they turning back the clock by slowing the process of deregulation? This volume addresses that issue and identifies the next steps that policymakers should take to enhance public welfare in the provision of these services. Each chapter identifies the central policy issues that have arisen in each industry as it undergoes transformation to a deregulated environment. The authors reveal the flaws in the residual regulations and make the case for faster and more comprehensive deregulation. A concluding chapter identifies how interest groups continue to exert influence on regulatory agencies and on Congress, potentially undermining deregulation. The papers included here were initially presented in December 1999 at a conference sponsored and organized by the AEI–Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.

The choice of whether to recommend a market solution or a government intervention to address an economic or social problem is the eternal issue of public policy analysis. Throughout the decades, academics, policymakers, and the public have alternated between market-friendly and market-skeptical perspectives. But do these shifting views accurately reflect our knowledge about market and government performance? In this book, Clifford Winston examines the extensiveness as well as the persistence of government failures in the US economy and the potential for market corrections to address those failures. He provides contemporary empirical evidence that strongly questions the effectiveness of government interventions, and he explores whether markets can self-correct to solve economic and social problems more efficiently. Offering a comprehensive overview of government failures, the book includes key definitions and classifications. Winston synthesizes the available empirical evidence and analyzes the findings, which reveal persistent losses in economic welfare, despite the positive theoretical expectations of government interventions. Theoretical explanations of government failures are then evaluated and found to lack the ability to guide efficient policy reforms. Finally, the robustness of markets to overcome their inefficiencies or failures is characterized in terms of market corrections. Empirical evidence is presented to show that, in contrast to government failures, markets have often corrected their failures. The implications of the book for academics and policymakers are twofold. First, when they are considering the efficacy of a market solution or a government intervention to address an economic or social problem, they should be much more cognizant of the potential for government failure and for this failure to persist. Second, they should also take a long-run view of markets and account for their ability to self-correct. Thus, the book calls for a more stable perspective toward markets and government—one where market corrections, not government interventions, are envisioned as offering a path for improving the US economy.

In Last Exit Clifford Winston reminds us that transportation services and infrastructure in the United States were originally introduced by private firms. The case for subsequent public ownership and management of the system was weak, in his view, and here he assesses the case for privatization and deregulation to greatly improve Americans' satisfaction with their transportation systems.

An efficient transportation system reduces the cost of distance by moving people and goods from their origins to their destinations as cheaply, quickly, and safely as possible. By enabling individuals and firms to be more productive, transportation provides the foundation for the development and growth of industries and an entire economy. Clifford Winston, Jia Yan, and Associates argue that competition and innovation are the key drivers of an efficient transportation system. The authors provide new evidence that transportation deregulation and privatization that spur additional competition among carriers and infrastructure providers, as well as new innovations that create autonomous transportation services, have the potential to rid the US transportation system of its major inefficiencies and revitalize the nation.

Not many Americans think of the legal profession as a monopoly, but it is. Abraham Lincoln, who practiced law for nearly twenty-five years, would likely not have been allowed to practice today. Without a law degree from an American Bar Association–sanctioned institution, a would-be lawyer is allowed to practice law in only a few states. ABA regulations also prevent even licensed lawyers who work for firms that are not owned and managed by lawyers from providing legal services. At the same time, a slate of government policies has increased the demand for lawyers' services. Basic economics suggests that those entry barriers and restrictions combined with government-induced demand for lawyers will continue to drive the price of legal services even higher. Clifford Winston, Robert Crandall, and Vikram Maheshri argue that these increased costs cannot be economically justified. They create significant social costs, hamper innovation, misallocate the nation's labor resources, and create socially perverse incentives. In the end, attorneys support inefficient policies that preserve and enhance their own wealth, to the detriment of the general population. To fix this situation, the authors propose a novel solution: deregulation of the legal profession. Lowering the barriers to entry will force lawyers to compete more intensely with each other and to face competition from nonlawyers and firms that are not owned and managed by lawyers. The book provides a much-needed analysis of why legal costs are so high and how they can be reduced without sacrificing the quality of legal services.

Since the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, questions that had been at the heart of the ongoing debate about the industry for eighty years gained a new intensity: Is there enough competition among airlines to ensure that passengers do not pay excessive fares? Can an unregulated airline industry be profitable? Is air travel safe? While economic regulation provided a certain stability for both passengers and the industry, deregulation changed everything. A new fare structure emerged; travelers faced a variety of fares and travel restrictions; and the offerings changed frequently. In the last fifteen years, the airline industry's earnings have fluctuated wildly. New carriers entered the industry, but several declared bankruptcy, and Eastern, Pan Am, and Midway were liquidated. As financial pressures mounted, fears have arisen that air safety is being compromised by carriers who cut costs by skimping on maintenance and hiring inexperienced pilots. Deregulation itself became an issue with many critics calling for a return to some form of regulation. In this book, Steven A. Morrison and Clifford Winston assert that all too often public discussion of the issues of airline competition, profitability, and safety take place without a firm understanding of the facts. The policy recommendations that emerge frequently ignore the long-run evolution of the industry and its capacity to solve its own problems. This book provides a comprehensive profile of the industry as it has evolved, both before and since deregulation. The authors identify the problems the industry faces, assess their severity and their underlying causes, and indicate whether government policy can play an effective role in improving performance. They also develop a basis for understanding the industry's evolution and how the industry will eventually adapt to the unregulated economic environment. Morrison and Winston maintain that although the airline industry has not reached long-run equilibrium, its evolution is proceeding in a positive direction one that will preserve and possibly enhance the benefits of deregulation to travelers and carriers. They conclude that the federal government's primary policy objective should be to expand the benefits from unregulated market forces to international travel. Brookings Review article also available

Deregulating the legal profession will benefit society by improving access to legal services and the efficacy of public policies. Lawyers dominate a judicial system that has come under fire for limiting access to its services to primarily the most affluent members of society. Lawyers also have a pervasive influence throughout other parts of government. This is the first book offering a critical comprehensive overview of the legal profession's role in failing to serve the majority of the public and in contributing to the formation of inefficient public policies that reduce public welfare. In Trouble at the Bar, the authors use an economic approach to provide empirical support for legal reformers who are concerned about their own profession. The authors highlight the adverse effects of the legal profession's self-regulation, which raises the cost of legal education, decreases the supply of lawyers, and limits the public's access to justice to the point where, in general, only certified lawyers can execute even simple contracts. At the same time, barriers to entry that limit competition create a closed environment that inhibits valid approaches to analyzing and solving legal problems that are at the heart of effective public policy. Deregulating the legal profession, the authors argue, would allow more people to provide a variety of legal services without jeopardizing their quality, reduce the cost of those services, spur competition and innovation in the private sector, and increase the quality of lawyers who pursue careers in the public sector. Legal practitioners would enjoy more fulfilling careers, and society in general and its most vulnerable members in particular would benefit greatly.

Urban transportation problems abound across America, including jammed highways during rush-hours, deteriorating bus service, and strong pressures to build new rail systems. Most solutions attempt either to increase transportation capacity (by building more roads and expanding mass transit) or to manage existing capacity (through HOV restrictions, exclusive bus lanes, and employer-based policies such as flexible work hours). This book develops an alternative solution to urban transportation problems based on economic analysis, but well aware of the political constraints on policymakers. The authors estimate that efficient pricing and service policies could save more than $10 billion in annual net benefits over current practices, but argue that powerful, entrenched political and institutional forces will continue to thwart efficient economic solutions to improve urban transportation. They believe, however, that some form of privatization would likely improve social welfare more than an efficient public sector system. Facing fewer operating restrictions, greater economic incentives, and stronger competitive pressures, private suppliers could substantially improve the efficiency of urban operations and offer services that are more responsive to the needs of all types of travelers. The authors conclude that policymakers have bestowed huge benefits on the public by allowing the private sector to play a leading and unencumbered role in the provision of intercity transportation. Public officials should take the next step and allow the private sector to play a leading role in the provision of urban transportation.