We consider the implications of a specific alternative to the classical measurement error model, in which the data are optimal predictions based on some information set. One motivation for this model is that if respondents are aware of their ignorance they may interpret the question what is the value of this variable?' as what is your best estimate of this variable?', and provide optimal predictions of the variable of interest given their information set. In contrast to the classical measurement error model, this model implies that the measurement error is uncorrelated with the reported value and, by necessity, correlated with the true value of the variable. In the context of the linear regression framework, we show that measurement error can lead to over- as well as under-estimation of the coefficients of interest. Critical for determining the bias is the model for the individual reporting the mismeasured variables, the individual's information set, and the correlation structure of the errors. We also investigate the implications of instrumental variables methods in the presence of measurement error of the optimal prediction error form and show that such methods may in fact introduce bias. Finally, we present some calculations indicating that the range of estimates of the returns to education consistent with amounts of measurement error found in previous studies. This range can be quite wide, especially if one allows for correlation between the measurement errors.

In the Self Sufficiency Program (SSP) welfare demonstration, members of a randomly assigned treatment group could receive a subsidy for full time work. The subsidy was available for three years, but only to people who began working full time within 12 months of random assignment. A simple optimizing model suggests that the eligibility rules created an 'establishment' incentive to find a job and leave welfare within a year of random assignment, and an 'entitlement' incentive to choose work over welfare once eligibility was established. Building on this insight, we develop an econometric model of welfare participation that allows us to separate the two effects and estimate the impact of the earnings subsidy on welfare entry and exit rates among those who achieved eligibility. The combination of the two incentives explains the time profile of the experimental impacts, which peaked 15 months after random assignment and faded relatively quickly. Our findings suggest that about half of the peak impact of SSP was attributable to the establishment incentive. Despite the extra work effort generated by SSP the program had no lasting impact on wages, and little or no long run effect on welfare participation.