This is a reproduction of an important Department of Defense (DOD) strategy document describing in broad terms how joint forces will operate in response to emerging antiaccess and area-denial security challenges. From the foreword by Martin Dempsey: Due to three major trends - the growth of antiaccess and area-denial capabilities around the globe, the changing U.S. overseas defense posture, and the emergence of space and cyberspace as contested domains - future enemies, both states and nonstates, see the adoption of antiaccess/area-denial strategies against the United States as a favorable course of action for them. The JOAC describes how future joint forces will achieve operational access in the face of such strategies. Its central thesis is Cross-Domain Synergy-the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others-to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide the freedom of action required by the mission. The JOAC envisions a greater degree of integration across domains and at lower echelons than ever before. Embracing cross-domain synergy at increasingly lower levels will be essential to generating the tempo that is often critical to exploiting fleeting local opportunities for disrupting the enemy system. The JOAC also envisions a greater degree and more flexible integration of space and cyberspace operations into the traditional air-sea-land battlespace than ever before. Each Service has an important role in ensuring Joint Operational Access. The JOAC was developed by representatives from each of the Services and the Joint Staff in coordination with the combatant commands, multinational partners, and other stakeholders. The JOAC development was supported by an experimentation campaign including a multi-scenario wargame, multiple Service-sponsored events, and other concept development venues. The strategic challenge is clear: the Joint Force must maintain the freedom of action to accomplish any assigned mission. The Joint Operational Access Concept is a critical first step in ensuring the joint force has the requisite capabilities to do so. This paper proposes a concept for how joint forces will achieve operational access in the face of armed opposition by a variety of potential enemies and under a variety of conditions, as part of a broader national approach. Operational access is the ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. Operational access does not exist for its own sake, but rather serves our broader strategic goals, whether to ensure access to commerce, demonstrate U.S. resolve by positioning forces overseas to manage crisis and prevent war, or defeat an enemy in war. Operational access is the joint force contribution to assured access, the unhindered national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace. Enduring requirement for force projection. Distinction between antiaccess and area-denial. Importance of preconditions.

This research looks at the financial transactions that occurred within United States Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) between fiscal years 2012-2016. It analyzes over 180 thousand transactions with a total value in excess of 146 billion dollars. NAVAIR uses the Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system to process its financial transactions and, since its implementation, there has been an increase in the overall number of transactions. As a result, there is an effort underway to reduce the number of transactions. This research provides insights into NAVAIR business practices, develops a metric with which to gauge efficiency and benchmark performance, and provides a few simple linear regression equations to determine adherence to the newly established benchmarks. We conclude that 55% of NAVAIR financial transactions are intergovernmental and that they are responsible for 80% of all transactions requiring amendments. We were also able to determine that the number of line items on a purchase request grows by 39% for intergovernmental transactions when requiring amendments. These findings indicate that intergovernmental transactions are easy to amend. Therefore, we recommend placing more purchase request line items on a single purchase request and working to reduce the number of intergovernmental transactions requiring amendments. I. INTRODUCTION * A. BACKGROUND * B. PURPOSE AND EXPECTED BENEFITS FROM RESEARCH * C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS * 1. Primary Question * 2. Secondary Questions * D. SCOPE AND LIMITATION * E. FINDINGS * F. ORGANIZATION * II. LITERATURE REVIEW * A. NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND * B. NAVY ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PLANNING * C. OVERVIEW OF BUDGET EXECUTION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE * 1. Investment vs. Expenditure Accounts * 2. Types of Funding Transactions * D. NAVAIR FUNDING DOCUMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW * 1. ZSPS * 2. ZFD * E. SUMMARY * III. METHODOLOGY * A. INTRODUCTION * B. DATA COLLECTION PHASE * C. DATA ANALYSIS PHASE * D. DATA ANALYSIS APPLICATION PHASE * IV. ANALYSIS OF NAVAIR FUNDING DOCUMENTS * A. BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NAVAIR PRS * 1. Data Analysis * 2. Data Analysis Application * B. METRIC AND BENCHMARK DEVELOPMENT * 1. Data Analysis * 2. Data Analysis Application * C. SIMPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS * 1. Data Analysis * 2. Data Analysis Application * V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH * A. CONCLUSIONS * B. RECOMMENDATIONS * C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The mission of the Office of Industrial Policy (INDPOL) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is to ensure robust, secure, resilient, and innovative industrial capabilities upon which the Department of Defense (DoD) can rely to fulfill current and future warfighter requirements in an era of great power competition. The U.S. aerospace and defense (A&D) sectors continue to outperform the broader U.S. equity market, suggesting investors remain optimistic about the overall health, profitability, and long-term prospects of the sector.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.1. Office of Industrial Policy Introduction * 1.1. Mission * 1.2. Organization Structure * 2. National Defense Strategy * 2.1. Build a More Lethal Force * 2.2. Strengthen Alliances and Attract New Partners * 2.3. Reform the Department of Defense for Greater Performance and Affordability * 2.3.1. Changes to DoD Organizational Structure * 2.3.2. Business Reforms to Improve Performance and Increase Affordability * 3. Defense Industry Outlook * 3.1. The Defense Industrial Base is Profitable and Expanding * 3.2. Supplier Assessment * 3.3. Changes in DoD Obligations and Vendor Composition * 3.4. Outlook and Challenges * 4. U.S. Position in the Global Defense Markets * 4.1. United States Contribution to Global Defense Spending * 4.2. Defense Exports and Foreign Military Sales * 4.3. Competitor Nations * 5. Executive Order 13806-Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States * 5.1. Aircraft * 5.1.1. Sector Overview * 5.1.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear * 5.2.1. Sector Overview * 5.2.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.3. Ground Systems * 5.3.1. Sector Overview * 5.3.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.4. Munitions and Missiles * 5.4.1. Sector Overview * 5.4.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.5. Nuclear Matter Warheads * 5.5.1. Sector Overview * 5.5.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.6. Radar and Electronic Warfare * 5.6.1. Sector Overview * 5.6.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.7. Shipbuilding * 5.7.1. Sector Overview * 5.7.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.8. Soldier Systems * 5.8.1. Sector Overview * 5.8.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.9. Space * 5.9.1. Sector Overview * 5.9.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.10. Materials * 5.10.1. Sector Overview * 5.10.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.11. Cybersecurity for Manufacturing * 5.11.1. Sector Overview * 5.11.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.12. Electronics * 5.12.1. Sector Overview * 5.12.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.13. Machine Tools * 5.13.1. Sector Overview * 5.13.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.14. Organic Defense Industrial Base * 5.14.1. Sector Overview * 5.14.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.15. Software Engineering * 5.15.1. Sector Overview * 5.15.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.16. Workforce * 5.16.1. Sector Overview * 5.16.2. Sector Risks and Mitigation Strategy * 5.17. Executive Order 13806 Action Plan and Next Steps * 6. Critical New Technologies * 6.1. Industrial Base Assessment of Critical New Technologies * 6.2. Assessments and Technologies * 6.2.1. Hypersonics * 6.2.2. Directed-Energy Weapons * 6.2.3. Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning * 6.2.4. Quantum Science * 6.2.5. Microelectronics * 6.2.6. Fully Networked Command Control and Communications * 6.2.7. Space * 6.2.8. Autonomy * 6.2.9. Cyber * 7. Conclusion

Gen Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, US Army Air Forces (AAF) Chief of Staff during World War II, maintained diaries for his several journeys to various meetings and conferences throughout the conflict. While volume 1 introduces Hap Arnold, the setting for five of his journeys, the diaries he kept, and evaluations of those journeys and their consequences, volume 2 encompasses General Arnold's final seven journeys and the diaries he kept therein. This volume has richly enhanced General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold's reputation as the father of today's United States Air Force. Major General John W. Huston, himself an Army Air Forces combat veteran of the war, has edited each of Arnold's World War II diaries and placed them in their historical context while explaining the problems Hap faced and evaluating the results of his travels. General Huston, a professional historian, has taught at both the US Air Force Academy and the US Naval Academy. A former Chief of the Office of Air Force History and an experienced researcher both here and abroad in the personal and official papers of the war's leaders, he has been careful to let Hap speak for himself. The result is an account of the four-year odyssey that took Arnold to every continent but one as he took part in deliberations that involved Allied leaders in major diplomacy/strategy meetings with Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, Winston Churchill, Josef Stalin, Charles de Gaulle, and Chiang Kai-shek. At those meetings, Hap recorded the comments of the various participants. His 12 diaries contain his own thoughts, which range from being lost over the Himalayas to comforting the wounded as they were airlifted from the Normandy beaches. He experienced an air raid in London and viewed the carnage in recently liberated Manila. Arnold recorded his honest impressions, from private meetings with King George VI in Buckingham Palace to eating from mess kits with his combat crews in the North African desert-all while perceptively commenting on the many issues involved and assessing the people, the culture, and the surroundings. This volume offers the best assessment we have of Hap as he survived four wartime heart attacks and continued to work tirelessly for proper recognition of airpower. It will also continue my emphasis while Chief of Staff of the US Air Force on encouraging professional reading through making historical accounts available to personnel of the finest air force in the world, a success achieved in large part because of Hap Arnold. Contents * FOREWORD * PREFACE * EDITORIAL NOTES * Notes * HAP AT MIDPOINT * Notes * Chapter 6 * ENGLAND * 31 AUGUST-8 SEPTEMBER 1943 * Introduction * The Diary * Postscript * Notes * Chapter 7 * CAIRO, TEHRAN, PALESTINE, CAIRO, ITALY * 11 NOVEMBER-15 DECEMBER 1943 * Introduction * The Diary * Postscript * Notes * Chapter 8 * ENGLAND, NORMANDY BEACHES, ITALY * 8 JUNE-21 JUNE 1944 * Introduction * The Diary * Postscript * Notes * Chapter 9 * QUEBEC * 11 SEPTEMBER-16 SEPTEMBER 1944 * Introduction * The Diary * Postscript * Notes * Chapter 10 * PARIS, CANNES, ITALY, NORTH AFRICA, SOUTH AMERICA * 31 MARCH-8 MAY 1945 * Introduction * The Diary * Postscript * Notes * PHOTO SECTION * Chapter 11 * HAWAII, GUAM, IWO JIMA, PHILIPPINES * 6 JUNE-24 JUNE 1945 * Introduction * The Diary * Postscript * Notes * Chapter 12 * PARIS AND GERMANY * 10 JULY-30 JULY 1945 * Introduction * The Diary * Postscript * Notes * EPILOGUE * Notes

This Army history publication provides details and analysis of the Civil War from its beginnings in 1816 through its conclusion. Contents include: Secession, Sumter, and Standing to Arms * The Balloon Experiment * The Baltimore Riots * The Opponents * Anaconda Plan * First Bull Run (First Manassas) * Shield of the Capital: The Washington Forts * The Second Uprising in 1861 * The War in the East: The Army of the Potomac Moves South * Jackson's Valley Campaign * Peninsula Campaign * The Seven Days' Battles * Second Bull Run * Lee Invades Maryland * The Emancipation Proclamation * Fiasco at Fredericksburg * The War in the West: The Twin Rivers Campaign * Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson * Confederate Counterattack at Shiloh * Perryville to Stones River * Hardee's Tactics * The War West of the Mississippi * The East: Hooker Crosses the Rappahannock * General Orders 100 * Chancellorsville: Lee's Boldest Risk * The Death of Stonewall Jackson * Lee's Second Invasion of the North * James Longstreet (1821-1904) * Gettysburg * Joshua L. Chamberlain (1828-1914) * "Pickett's" Charge * The West: Confusion over Clearing the Mississippi * Grant and Headquarters * Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg * Railroads in the Civil War * Chickamauga Campaign * The New York Draft Riots * Snodgrass Hill * Grant at Chattanooga * Unity of Command * Sherman * Lee Cornered at Richmond * Cold Harbor * The Crater * Sherman's Great Wheel to the East * Atlanta to the Sea and into the Carolinas * Thomas Protects the Nashville Base * Lee's Last 100 Days * Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885) * Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) * Andersonville and Elmira Prison Camps * Dimensions of the WarExcerpted from the CMH volume American Military History: The Office of the Chief of Military History has prepared this historical survey of the organization and accomplishments of the United States Army primarily for use in the American Military History course usually given in the sophomore year of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program in civilian colleges and universities.Although over one hundred fifty years have passed since the start of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues to matter. The forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the significant issues involved: the existence of the Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. The war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle.Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American Civil War was no exception. The seeds of the conflict were sown in the earliest days of the republic's founding, primarily over the existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict can begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that was dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limit its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed "half slave and half free," and that could not stand.Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring states' rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic of being convinced that they were "worth" three of the soldiers on the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went to war to prove their manhood. This has been, and continues to be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but often stay in the fight because of their comrades and because they do not want to seem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink to nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and minie ball.

In Sharing Success - Owning Failure, Colonel Goldfein discusses several themes central to a successful command tour. He expresses ideas and puts forth questions to spark your imagination as you begin preparing for the task ahead of you-squadron commander. He shares stories from other squadron commanders that include both success and failure. Because, as Colonel Goldfein states, "it is from studying our failures that we learn, grow, and improve as officers and leaders." In the Foreword, Maj Gen Charles D. Link, USAF, Retired, says "this book is a must-read, not only for those selected to command a squadron but for all our young officers." Command is the ultimate service. It is a time when we have the singular responsibility to create and lead strong Air Force units. A time when our passion for our Air Force and our vision for its future must be overwhelmingly clear. Early in the "Developing Aerospace Leaders" initiative, we began to focus on the way in which the institution teaches leadership and prepares airmen for command. What we found was a wide range of practices and a wide range of expectations-a complicating factor in today's Expeditionary Aerospace Force. We realize that preparing our officers to command effective, mission-oriented units must be a deliberate process. It must develop our unique airman perspective, creating commanders who are able to communicate the vision, have credibility in the mission area, and can lead our people with inspiration and heart. The foundation of our institution's effectiveness has always been its leaders. Colonel Goldfein's work provides valuable lessons learned and serves as a worthwhile tool to optimize your effectiveness as a squadron commander. This book is a must-read, not only for those selected to command a squadron but for all our young officers, helping them understand what the requirements of squadron command will be. Remember, command is a unique privilege-a demanding and crucial position in our Air Force. Contents * Foreword * PREFACE * ABSTRACT * 1 EXPECTATIONS OF COMMAND * What Does the Boss Expect? * What Do the Troops Expect? * What Do You Expect? * Notes * 2 VISION AND ENVIRONMENT * Developing and Communicating Your Vision * Building the Environment * Notes * 3 WALKING THE WALK * Notes * 4 HANDLING JUSTICE * 5 GREAT IDEAS * Take Responsibility for Fun * Sponsor Program * Celebrate Heroes-Not Machines * Mentoring Program * Notes * CONCLUSION * BIBLIOGRAPHY

Two authoritative reports are included in this unique reproduction. The notion of a "Thucydides Trap" that will ensnare China and the United States in a 21st century conflict--much as the rising power of Athens alarmed Sparta and made war "inevitable" between the Aegean superpowers of the 5th century BCE--has received global attention since entering the international relations lexicon 6 years ago. Scholars, journalists, bloggers, and politicians in many countries, notably China, have embraced this beguiling metaphor, coined by Harvard political science professor Graham Allison, as a framework for examining the likelihood of a Sino- American war. Allison's active promotion has given Thucydides (ca. 460-ca. 399 BCE), historian of the Peloponnesian War, new cachet as a sage of U.S.-China relations. References in academic journals, politicians' speeches, and political cartoons have become ubiquitous across the Indo- Pacific region. Allison examines this historical metaphor at length in his May 2017 book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? This case study examines the Thucydides Trap metaphor and the response it has elicited. Hewing closely to what the historian of the Peloponnesian War actually says about the causes and inevitability of war, it argues that, while Thucydides' text does not support Allison's normative assertion about the "inevitable" result of an encounter between "rising" and "ruling" powers, the History of the Peloponnesian War (hereafter, History) does identify elements of leadership and political dynamic that bear directly on whether a clash of interests between two states is resolved through peaceful means or escalates to war.Contents: 1. Introduction * 2. From the Aegean to the South (and East) China Sea * 3. Reactions to the Thucydides Trap * 4. Power Transition Theory before the Thucydides Trap * 5. What Does Thucydides Actually Say about the Origins of the War? * 6. In Search of Causality and Necessity: Aitiai and Prophasis * 7. Fear, Honor, and Interest, and Thucydides' other "Traps" * 8. Trap 1: National Character * 9. Trap 2: Governing System * 10. Trap 3: Domestic Tranquility * 11. Trap 4: Economic Power * 12. Trap 5: Leaders * 13. Trap 6: Allies and Alliances * 14. Trap 7: The Role of Tykē (Chance) in Peace and War * 15. Assessing the "Allison Trap" * 16. Conclusions: Destined for Difficult Diplomacy, Not for War * 17. Geography, History, DestinyThis compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Additional content: CRS Report, Human Rights in China - Thirty years after the June 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Communist Party of China (CCP) remains firmly in power. People's Republic of China (PRC) leaders have maintained political control through a mix of repression and responsiveness to some public preferences, delivering economic prosperity to many citizens, co-opting the middle and educated classes, and stoking nationalism to bolster CCP legitimacy. The party is particularly wary of unsanctioned collective activity related to sensitive groups, such as religious and labor groups, ethnic minorities, political dissidents, and human rights activists. PRC authorities have implemented particularly harsh policies against Tibetans, Uyghurs, and followers of the Falun Gong spiritual exercise. Under the previous PRC leader, Hu Jintao (2002-2012), the CCP tolerated limited public criticism of state policies, relatively unfettered dissemination of news and exchange of opinion on social media on some topics, and some human rights advocacy around issues not seen as threatening to CCP control.

This important Marine Corps book discusses vital battlefield ethical issues using real-world war examples. Chapter 1 - Marines Fight Only Enemy Combatants * 1.1 Combat and Risk * 1.2 Airpower * 1.3 Proportionate Response * Chapter 2 - Marines Do Not Harm Enemy Soldiers Who Surrender * 2.1 Uncertain Environments and Deadly Force * Chapter 3 - Marines Do Not Torture or Kill Enemy Prisoners of War or Detainees * 3.1 Judge and Jury * 3.2 Mercy Killing * Chapter 4 - Marines Collect and Care For the Wounded, Whether Friend or Foe * 4.1 Taking No Chances * Chapter 5 - Marines Destroy No More Than The Mission Requires * 5.1 Car Crushers * 5.2 Hasty Vehicle Checkpoint: Escalation of Force (EOF) * Chapter 6 - Marines Treat All Civilians Humanely * 6.1 Teaching the Kids A Lesson * 6.2 Shields * Chapter 7 - Marines Do Not Steal; They Respect Private Property and Possessions * 7.1 Baksheesh * 7.2 War Trophies * Chapter 8 - Marines Do Their Best To Prevent Violations of the Law of War, and Report All Violations To Their Superiors * 8.1 Vigilante Justice * 8.2 Detainee Handling * 8.2 Responsible for All That Happens * 8.3 Joint Patrol

This thesis asks to what extent and why Chinese engagement has influenced the Latin American economic outlook and foreign policy changes in the twenty-first century and uses Chile and Mexico as case studies. The extent of Chinese engagement is established first because it is variable by country. Economic and foreign policy changes are then examined through the lens of Chinese engagement. This research found that economic and foreign policy changes were influenced by a mixture of domestic agency and growing Chinese hegemony, with Chinese engagement and influence being commensurate with the level of economic compatibility.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. Introduction * A. Major Research Question * B. Significance of the Research Question * C. Research Design * D. Potential Explanations and Hypotheses * 1. Hypothesis #1: The Case for Chinese hegemony * 2. Hypothesis #2: The Case for LATAM agency * E. Structure of the Research Project * F. Literature Review * * II. A Case Study of Chinese Engagement in Chile * A. Synopsis * B. Establishing the Independent Variable: The Extent of Chinese Engagement in Chile * C. Analyzing the Dependent Variable: Change Due to China * 1. Changes in the Economic Outlook * 2. Changes in the Foreign Policy * D. Agency vs. Hegemony * 1. Chinese Hegemony: Hypothesis #1 * 2. Chilean Agency: Hypothesis #2 * III. A Case Study of Chinese Engagement In Mexico * A. Synopsis * B. Establishing the Independent Variable: The Extent of Chinese Engagement in Mexico * C. Analyzing the Dependent Variable: Change Due to China * 1. Changes in the Economic Outlook * 2. Changes in the Foreign Policy * D. Agency vs. Hegemony * 1. Mexican Agency: Hypothesis #2 * 2. Chinese Hegemony: Hypothesis #1 * IV. Conclusion * A. Implications * B. Areas for Future ResearchThe 2018 National Defense Strategy asserts that "the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by... revisionist powers." The revisionist powers, namely China and Russia, "want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model--gaining veto authority over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions." With respect to China, the National Defense Strategy says that it "is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage... that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future." Latin America is beyond the traditional Indo-Pacific region, but has nonetheless felt the impact of China's rise. In fact, Chinese engagement in LATAM increased substantially in the twenty-first century. With respect to the National Defense Strategy, the research question is significant because it can help identify if China's actions to alter the international order spans the entirety of the Pacific and includes revising LATAM in accordance with its authoritarian model. The research project asks to what extent and why Chinese engagement influenced the economic outlook and foreign policy of LATAM. In doing so, this research project fills a void in the academic literature which largely analyzes one particular aspect of the China-LATAM relationship, and does not adequately address the degree of Chinese influence.

This is a book about strategy and war fighting in the midst of a revolution in military affairs as the world moves into the twenty-first century. Its 11 essays examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state or NASTT (NBC-arming sponsor of terrorism and intervention) state; the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states; the revolutionary potential of information warfare; the lethal possibilities of biological warfare; and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA). The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies, and threats that will confront US national security decision makers in the twenty-first century. The participating authors are either professional military officers or civilian professionals who specialize in national security issues. Two of the architects of the US air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War have contributed essays that discuss the evolving utility of airpower to achieve decisive results and the lessons that might portend for the future of warfare. In "Principles of War on the Battlefield of the Future," which sets the tone for the book, Dr. Barry Schneider examines how traditional principles of war may have to be reassessed in light of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among third world states. Regarding the principle of "mass," traditional theory dictated that forces be massed for an offensive breakthrough. But Schneider argues that, against an enemy armed with WMD, dispersed of one's forces may, in fact, be more prudent, and fighting by means of "disengaged combat" prior to a decisive strike may be necessary. This requires high coordination and "superior targeting and damage assessment intelligence, combined with superior high-tech weapons." Still, the United States and its allies would not likely be able to dominate a future battlefield even with advanced conventional arms if they did not have close-in air bases to operate from and thereby to achieve air dominance over the battle space. Therefore, while it sounds good, striking from outside the enemy's range is not a real option for long if the enemy is mounting a ground campaign that is closing in on vital areas. Local air, sea, and ground power will be needed to contain the adversary forces and roll them back. This means local air bases and seaports must be available and protected. Contents * Introduction * 1 Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future * Barry R. Schneider * Overview: New Era Warfare? A Revolution In Military Affairs? * 2 New-Era Warfare * Gen Charles A. Horner, USAF, (Ret.) * 3 The Revolution in Military Affairs * Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill * Overview: Future Airpower and Strategy Issues * 4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century * Col John A. Warden III, USAF * 5 Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness? * Col Richard Szafranski, USAF * Overview: Information Warfare Issues * 6 Information War - Cyberwar - Netwar * George Stein * 7 Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns * Col James W. McLendon, USAF * Overview: Biological Warfare Issues * 8 The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction * Lt Col Terry N. Mayer, USAF * 9 Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare * Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF * 10 Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare * Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF * 11 On Twenty-First Century Warfare * Lawrence E. Grinter and Dr. Barry R. Schneider