Decarbonisation is the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions using low carbon power sources, lowering output of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. This is essential to meet global temperature standards set by international climate agreements. To limit global warming to 1.5°C, hence avoiding the worst-case scenarios predicted by climate science, the world economy must rapidly reduce its emissions and reach climate neutrality within the next three decades. This will not be an easy journey. Shifting away from carbon-intensive production will require a historic transformation of the structure of our economies. Written by a team of academics linked to the European think tank Bruegel, The Macroeconomics of Decarbonisation provides a guide to the macroeconomic fundamentals of decarbonisation. It identifies the major economic transformations, both over the long- and short-run, and the roadblocks requiring policy intervention. It proposes a macroeconomic policy agenda for decarbonisation to achieve the climate goals of the international community.

In an environment of record-breaking electricity prices driven by a gas supply shock and below-average electricity generation, reforming the design of the European electricity market is seen as a means to delink consumer costs from volatility in short-term power markets. Electricity markets should meet three objectives: fairness, optimal investment and optimal operation. The current market design has achieved these objectives to varying degrees. Faced with the unprecedented shock, the electricity system has operated well, but electricity markets have struggled to achieve fair outcomes and investments have not been driven by market-based cashflows. Further complicating market reform, the power system is being changed radically by decarbonisation. The electricity system is becoming more decentralised and digitalised, with an active demand side. These transformations will have consequences for the optimal electricity market design in the later stages of the energy transition. Reform proposals have focused on increasing the share of long-term contracts in the remuneration of generation technologies. Different long-term contracting regimes have structural implications for the functioning of electricity markets, especially in relation to the roles of the state and the market, and the responsibilities of national governments and European Union institutions. A phased approach should be taken to EU electricity market design reform. In the near-term, reform should seek to protect consumers and drive investment. An assessment should also be made of what market design will best meet the fairness, investment and operational objectives in a decarbonised system, and what the conceptual role of electricity markets should be during the transition. This process should start as soon as possible so well thought-through proposals are available when the next European Commission takes office.

This paper applies the literature on asymmetric price transmission to the emerging commodity market for EU emissions allowances (EUA). We utilize an error correction model and an autoregressive distributed lag model to measure the relationship between CO2 price changes and the development of wholesale electricity prices. Using data from the German market for electricity and EUAs, we find that the rising prices of EUAs have a stronger impact on wholesale electricity prices than falling prices -- the first empirical evidence of asymmetric cost pass-through for these new allowances.

A drastic change in the way we produce and consume energy is necessary to contain the risk of global environmental catastrophe. For its part, the EU has set agreed to a greenhouse gas reduction target of 80-95 percent by 2050, compared to 1990. However, with the current fuel mix, even the most ambitious improvements on incumbent technologies are unlikely to be sufficient for reaching the reduction targets. Meeting the targets requires low-carbon transition. However, the process of transition will likely be littered with market failures. Hundreds of more-or-less proven low-carbon technologies are competing for market share in the low-carbon system. In order to bring about the transition to a low-carbon energy and transport system at the lowest cost, policymakers should rely as much as possible on private action to choose, develop, and deploy low-carbon technologies. For those market failures that might only be overcome with technology-specific measures, governments should set up a transparent and predictable mechanism for selecting technologies.

Three quarters of the European Union's greenhouse gas emissions stem from burning coal, oil and natural gas to produce energy services, including heating for buildings, transportation and operation of machinery. The transition to climate neutrality means these services must be provided without associated emissions. It is not possible today to determine tomorrow's optimal clean energy system, largely because the cost, limitations and capability developments of competing technologies cannot be predicted. Energy systems with widely diverging shares of "green fuels", in the form of electricity, hydrogen and synthetic hydrocarbons, remain conceivable. We find the overall cost of these systems to be of the same order of magnitude, but they involve larger investments at different stages of value chains. A large share of synthetic hydrocarbons would require more investment outside the EU, but less in domestic infrastructure and demand-side appliances, while electrification requires large investment in domestic infrastructure and appliances. Current projections show an overall cost advantage for direct electrification, but projections will evolve and critical players may push hard for alternative fuels. Policy will thus play a major role in shaping this balance. Political decisions should, first, push out carbon-emitting technology, primarily through carbon pricing. The more credible and predictable this strategy is over the coming decades, the smoother will be both divestment from brown technologies and investment in green technologies. Second, policy needs to help ensure that enough climate-neutral alternatives are available in time. Clear public support should be given to three system decisions about which we are sufficiently confident: the massive roll-out of renewable electricity generation; the electrification of significant shares of final energy consumption; and rapid phase-out of coal from electricity generation. For energy services where no dominant system has yet emerged, policy should forcefully explore different solutions by supporting technological and regulatory experimentation. Given the size and urgency of the transition, the current knowledge infrastructure in Europe is insufficient. Data on the current and projected state of the energy system remains inconsistent, either published in different places or not at all. This impedes the societal discussion. The transition to climate neutrality in Europe and elsewhere will be unnecessarily expensive without a knowledge infrastructure that allows society to learn which technologies, systems, and polices work best under which circumstances.

Concern is growing in the European Union that a rapprochement between Russia and China could have negative implications for the EU. We argue that energy relations between the EU and Russia and between China and Russia influence each other. We analyse their interactions in terms of four areas: oil and gas trading, electricity exchanges, energy technology exports and energy investments. We discuss five key hypotheses that describe the likely developments in these four areas in the next decade and their potential impact on Europe: 1. There is no direct competition between the EU and China for Russian oil and gas; 2. China and the EU both have an interest in curbing excessive Russian energy rents; 3. The EU, Russia and China compete on the global energy technology market, but specialise in different technologies; 4. Intercontinental electricity exchange is unlikely; 5. Russia seems more worried about Chinese energy investments with strategic/political goals, than about EU investments. We find no evidence of a negative spillover for the EU from the developing Russia-China energy relationship.But, eventually, if these risks – and in particular the risk of structural financial disintermediation – do materialise, central banks would have various instruments to counter them.