In this paper we compare non-enforceable and enforceable measures of labor rigidities as a measure of the quality of labor institutions and test whether such labor labor rigidites are conducive to long run growth. We find than non-enforceable labor regulations do not have a bearing in economic growth but enforceable labor regulations do. In fact, when using a GMM-IV method for a panel data of countries during the period 1970-2000 that accounts for weak endogeneity we find that such link is negative and statistically significant. It appears that excessive labor rigidities are thus negative linked with long run economic growth.

This paper exploits an unusual transportation setting to estimate the value of a statistical life (VSL). We estimate the trade-offs individuals are willing to make between mortality risk and cost as they travel to and from the international airport in Sierra Leone (which is separated from the capital Freetown by a body of water), and choose from among multiple transport options - namely, ferry, helicopter, hovercraft, and water taxi. The setting and original dataset allow us to address some typical omitted variable concerns, and to compare VSL estimates for travelers from different countries, all facing the same choice situation. The average VSL estimate for African travelers in the sample is US$577,000 compared to US$924,000 for non-African travelers. Individual job earnings can largely account for this difference: Africans in the sample typically earn less than non-Africans. The data implies an income elasticity of the VSL of 1.77. These revealed preference VSL estimates from a developing country fill an important gap in the existing literature, and can be used for public policy purposes, including in current debates within Sierra Leone regarding the desirability of constructing new transportation infrastructure.

Does the allocation of incentives across the hierarchy of an organization matter for its performance? In a field experiment with a large public-health organization in Sierra Leone, we find that healthcare provision is highly affected by how incentives are allocated between frontline workers and their supervisors. Sharing incentives equally between these two layers raises completed health visits by 61% compared to the unilateral allocations that are typical in public-health organizations. Also, the shared incentives uniquely improve overall health service provision and health outcomes. We provide reduced form and structural evidence that these results are driven by a combination of effort complementarities and contractual frictions, and we explore the implications of these forces for the optimal design of incentive policies in multi-layered organizations.

We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fine leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full fine reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger fine are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run effects following an adjustment to the value of the fine point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes

Using several cross-sectional and panel data methodologies, this paper provides evidence of the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between international remittances and income inequality in a cross section of 78 countries. Our analysis supports previous theoretical work that describes how, at the first stages of migration history, there is an inequality-increasing effect of remittances on income inequality. Then, as the opportunity cost of migrating decreases due to this effect, remittances tends to lower inequality. We also show how education and the development of the financial sector can help countries reach faster the inequality-decreasing section of the curve.

A recent large firm-level dataset is analysed to compare labour indicators of privatised, private, and public firms around the world, in particular differences relating to wages, benefits, labour composition, education and training, unionisation, and quality of management. We find that labour productivity and the ratio of permanent to temporary workers increase after privatisation.

I combine a field experiment with a change in voting laws reducing the fine for abstention to assess the effects of monetary incentives to encourage voter participation. In a real world election, using experimental variation in the perceived reduction of the fine for abstention I estimate that receiving information about a reduction in the fine by 50 (75) percent causes a decrease in turnout of 2.6 (5.3) percentage points. These estimates imply a cost elasticity of voting of -0.22. The reduction in turnout is driven by voters who are in the center of the political spectrum, hold less political information and have lower subjective value of voting. The increase in abstention does not change aggregate preferences for specific policies. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire political information, is independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that the reduction in the fine reduces the incidence of vote buying and increases the price paid for a vote.