This paper aims to evaluate the economic impact of legislation from the creation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861 to the end of World War II. This historical analysis attempts to prove that the process of institutional unification of the states that existed before the creation of the Kingdom of Italy had a positive impact on the growth of the Italian GDP, due to the fact that legislative uniformity helped to simplify economic exchange and development, by establishing certain rules over the entire territory of the Kingdom, instead of the piecemeal legislation existent prior to unification.

In this paper we use a dynamic model to investigate the macroeconomic impact of legislative complexity on growth and welfare, in comparison with political corruption. After a careful review of the economic literature on corruption and legislative complexity, we set up the model. The main theoretical findings of the analysis are that legislative complexity, like corruption, constitutes a constraint to growth and determines a redistribution of income in favor of politicians. To check if the previsions of the model are verified we introduce a simple indicator of legislative complexity, built in a way that makes it internationally comparable, and consider the data for sixty-seven countries; using OLS and 2SLS econometric models we estimate the effects of legislative complexity and corruption on the growth rate of per capita income. The results of the econometric analysis support the hypothesis that legislative complexity is a constraint to growth, and that in countries with a long history of liberal democracy legislative complexity determines a redistribution to the detriment of the more poor social classes.

We study the effects of an international increase in the legal protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), on technological progress and the development of the financial market. In particular, we demonstrate that the international agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs for short) promotes technological progress and stock market capitalization at the same time.

In this paper we study both exhaustible and renewable resources in an endogenous growth model. In particular, we consider the hypotheses in which the rate of technical substitution (RTS) between those two inputs is or is not equal to one. Moreover, we depart from a basic theoretical framework to account for the negative externality constituted by waste accumulation. Finally, a comparative analysis is made between Pigouvian tax and waste recycling, as an environmental policy to correct market failure represented by refuse accumulation.

This paper investigates econometrically the relationship between corruption and legislative complexity, and their impact on growth rate, welfare and distribution of the per capita income. We perform econometric analysis using new indicators and index of legislative complexity, built in a way that makes them internationally comparable. In the data set sixty-seven countries are considered, for a period of twenty-one years from 1995 to 2015. To estimate the effects of legislative complexity and political corruption on the growth rate of per capita income, OLS and 2SLS estimates are provided. The results of the econometric analysis support the hypothesis that legislative complexity is a constraint to growth, and that in countries with a long history of liberal democracy legislative complexity determines an income redistribution to the detriment of the poorer social classes.

In this paper we remark on the existence of a link between monetary income constraint and price elasticity of demand. This finding allows us to rewrite, and extend, the standard Engel Aggregation Condition, in terms of price elasticity, and not only with regard to income elasticity of demand.

In this paper the impact of legislation on the GDP growth rate is investigated, both before and after the great economic and financial crisis of 2007-2008. The analysis has been performed using data from the twenty Italian regions from 1995 to 2016. Using several econometric models, the most significant result shows that flows of legislation can push economic growth into a recovery phase of the business cycle, while they should be reduced during recession phases, as they constitute a constraint to economic growth.

This paper comes in the wake of the literature considering technological progress as the main device to offset air pollution caused by economic activity. The issue has been extensively studied in general, but there is no previous research on the effects that an international strengthening of legal protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) due to the Uruguay Round Agreement and the Annex on Trade-Related aspects of the IPR (TRIPs, for short), underwritten in 1994, may have had on worldwide emissions, as a result of the discovery of new or more efficient air pollution abatement technologies. Different econometric models are used to give a quantitative measure of the TRIPs agreement to reduce air pollution. In particular, the impact of the TRIPs is addressed using a dummy variable and the index of Ginarte and Park (Ginarte and Park 1997) that is one of the more commonly used indicators of TRIPs enforcement employed in economic literature. The findings of this research partially support the idea that the strengthening of a uniform minimum standard protection level of IPR, among the member countries of the World Trade Organization, may help to reduce air pollution emissions.

The aim of this paper is to shed light on the way the legal systems of different countries can explain the discrepancies in their pollution levels. In particular, we underline the factors of capital accumulation and the financial market development, that are driven, among other things, by the various levels of protection accorded by the legal system to both shareholders and creditors. The research develops in two directions. Firstly, we supply a theoretical analysis to explain how constraints on the process of capital accruement affect the pollution level. In the model, a crucial role is assigned to the rate of interest, and its relationship with discount rates, which constitutes an important variable in decisions to implement antipollution devices. Secondly, we perform an econometric analysis using the data of eighty-five countries belonging to the legal family of civil law, for the period from 1992 to 2003, adopting four pollution indicators as dependent variables. Our main findings are that legal families and financial market development can help to explain the differences in environmental indicators observed among nations.

In this paper we study the problem of exhaustible resources and renewable resources in a theoretical endogenous growth framework, under various assumptions. In particular, we consider the hypotheses that those two inputs are or are not technologically perfect substitutes of each other. Moreover, we develop the starting model accounting for the negative externality of waste accumulation. Finally, a comparative analysis is made between Pigouvian tax and waste recycling as an environmental policy to internalize the negative externality represented by refuse accumulation.