Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War began as two questions from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What were the costs and benefits of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the strategic lessons of these campaigns? The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors composed a volume that assesses the war and analyzes the costs, using the Institute's considerable in-house talent and the dedication of the NDU Press team. The audience for this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and the students in joint professional military education courses-the future leaders of the Armed Forces. Other national security professionals should find it of great value as well.The volume begins with an introduction that addresses the difficulty of learning strategic lessons and a preview of the major lessons identified in the study. It then moves on to an analysis of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from their initiation to the onset of the U.S. Surges. The study then turns to the Surges themselves as tests of assessment and adaptation. The next part focuses on decisionmaking, implementation, and unity of effort. The volume then turns to the all-important issue of raising and mentoring indigenous security forces, the basis for the U.S. exit strategy in both campaigns. Capping the study is a chapter on legal issues that range from detention to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The final chapter analyzes costs and benefits, dissects decisionmaking in both campaigns, and summarizes the lessons encountered. Supporting the volume are three annexes: one on the human and financial costs of the Long War and two detailed timelines for histories of Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S. campaigns in those countries. The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior officers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them.

This paper presents an analytic framework that builds from previous work to yield the systematic and defendable readiness analysis that must underlie decisions ranging from budget allocation to force employment and even strategy development. To manage readiness, the Department of Defense (DOD) must balance the supply and demand of deployable forces around the world. The readiness of an individual unit is the result of a series of time-intensive force generation processes that ultimately combine qualified people, working equipment, and unit training to produce military capabilities suitable for executing the defense strategy. Therefore, managing readiness is as much about understanding the complexities of human resource management and the technical details of weapons system availability as it is about measuring the ability of U.S. forces to support the national security strategy. Policymakers, military members and command leaders, plus senior Department of Defense team staff, ROTC, military science, and human resource management students may be interested in this illustrated resource about military readiness prior to national security situation deployments. Related products: Military Engagement and Forward Presence: Down But Not Out as Tools to Shape and Win is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/military-engagement-and-forward-presence-down-not-out-tools-shape-and-win Russian Military Power: Building a Military To Support Great Power Aspirations is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/russian-military-power-building-military-support-great-power-aspirations The Armed Forces Officer is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/armed-forces-officer Other products produced by the US Army, National Defense University Press can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/national-defense-university-ndu

Thanks in large part to Russia's military intervention, Syrian president Bashar al-Asad'sfortunes have made a remarkable recovery since May/June 2015. Russia, together with the LebaneseHizballah, Iran, and Iranian-organized Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, andelsewhere, has succeeded in averting Asad's military defeat. What Russian president VladimirPutin has accomplished in Syria is important for American national security interests and policyin the region because it frames some of the hard choices Washington must now make.Russia has profited from a hard core of Alawite and Christian support for Asad insideSyria. At the same time, U.S. reluctance to become militarily involved in Syria facilitated themove of Russian forces into the country. Russia also benefited from the disunity among thediverse opposition to Asad and their external patrons. While Saudi Arabia and Turkey wereboth early proponents of ousting Asad, Saudi Arabia is now more focused on defeating Houthirebels in Yemen, and Turkey on fighting Kurdish separatist forces in northern Syria. In returnfor help from Putin in resolving its Kurdish problem, Turkey in 2016 helped Putin resolve Russia'sAleppo problem.As President Donald Trump considers and implements a way forward on working withRussia in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and toward peace in Syria,events of the past several years underscore several fundamental constraints under which Putinwill be operating and some challenges that have been overstated.First, Russia will find it hard to deliver Asad's agreement to any political arrangement thatrequires him to step aside to bring the conflict to an end. Asad plays Russia off against Iran andthe Lebanese Hizballah, placing them all on the same level and extending no preference to Putinfor Russia's contribution to his survival.Second, Tehran will not be keen to see its leverage in Damascus diminish and that of Moscowgrow. Tehran will support Asad in his resistance to any Russian pressure that would impactwhat Tehran sees as its existential interests in Syria as a vital link in Iran's land bridge to theLebanese Hizballah.Third, while working with Iran militarily in Syria, Russia has successfully pursued engagementwith most major Sunni powers in the Middle East, most interestingly Saudi Arabia, as wellas with Israel. However unpopular on "the street," Putin and Gulf Sunni royals appear to haveno complexes about dealing with each other.Fourth, Putin does not want Syria to be a "negative" issue going into the next Russianpresidential elections, scheduled for March 2018. This may be the major reason he has wanted to "solve" Aleppo so quickly in 2016 and pivot again to peacemaking efforts more prominence.Cooperation with the Trump administration and renewed American treatment of Russia as a"respected equal" would make Syria a more manageable electoral issue for Putin.As Washington continues to formulate and fine-tune a new approach to fighting ISIS andterrorism under the Trump administration, this study makes the following policy recommendations.First, the United States must cast aside sentiment and strictly prioritize its objectivesand preferred or acceptable outcomes.Second, the United States should work toward a Syria that remains unified even as theAmerican fight against ISIS benefits from Syrian Kurdish military prowess. The Kurds should bepart of the mix in political negotiations going forward but only in the context of a unified Syriaat the end of the process.