This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.

Introduces domestic and global macroeconomic developments, policies, and data for business professionals and students with no background in economics.

A central tenet of the Maastricht Treaty is that a successful European Monetary Union requires sustainable public finances of its member states, yet there is no clear definition of sustainability. This book develops a concept of sustainability focusing on the controllability of public finances. After reviewing the theoretical and empirical arguments for a disaggregate and institutions-oriented approach to correcting non-sustainable deficits, the authors propose a practical procedure to assess the sustainability of a country's public finances.

The fiscal policy framework of the EMU is in a states of crisis. Since the start of EMU, fiscal conditions in some member states have slipped considerably beyond the limits set by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. It is clear that the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact has failed to preclude excessive deficits. There is no shortage of proposals to reform the current fiscal framework in this crisis situation. They range from calls for softening their implementation, and to proposals for closer coordination of national fiscal policies. None of these proposals offers a convincing solution to the problem at the heart of the current crisis: how to balance the need for effective long-run fiscal stability in EMU with the need for short-run flexibility of fiscal policy in the member states. After a detailed analysis of the virtues and defects of the current fiscal framework, this report presents a proposal for reform that addresses this issue. The authors argue that EMU should move away from rigid fiscal rules for annual deficits towards a more judgmental process of monitoring the sustainability of fiscal policies. This approach is guided by three principles: independence, transparency, and legitimacy. Together wit the ability to assess the fiscal situation and outlook of each euro-area member state, they are the keys to designing a framework that provides enough flexibility and, at the same time, can build the required credibility and political support. The authors propose the creation of a Sustainability Council for the EMU, and independent body with the sole statutory task of safeguarding the sustainability of public finances in the euro area. The Sustainability Council regularly and openly reports to the public and the European Parliament its assessment of the member states' fiscal policies, taking into account past performance, current perspectives and the future course of fiscal policies. Its mandate is the counterpart of the ECB's principal task of maintaining price stability. However, the Sustainability Council has no operative role in fiscal policy; it relies solely on the pressure of informed public opinion to discipline national governments. The use of the instruments of fiscal policy is entirely left to the national governments, and the Sustainability Council can only be conceived as a judge of national public finances.

This paper develops a political-economy model of the budget process focusing on the common pool problem of the public budget. We show that the externality arising from the fact that public spending tends to be targeted at individual groups in society while the tax burden is widely dispersed creates a bias towards excessive expenditures and debt. This bias can be reduced by introducing elements of centralization in the budget process, that is, institutional structures that strengthen a comprehensive view of the budget over the particularistic view of the spending ministers and the members of parliament. Using examples from EC countries, we show how budget processes lack or possess such elements. We then present empirical evidence supporting the claim that centralizing elements reduce the deficit bias. The last section concludes with models for reform of the budget process.