When Josephs mother passed away, he discovers the farm his parents had owned was severely in debt due to his father borrowing heavily against the place. Marys grandfather had left her a small farm back in her Ohio hometown some years ago. With their current farm being foreclosed on, this was the perfect opportunity to start fresh. So having no other choice, the family heads to Ohio on a Greyhound bus to the second biggest Amish settlement in the US. Once they arrive at their new home, Joseph finds out that their farm is many miles from their Amish brethren. His neighbors dont want any Amish living that far down in the county. Joseph is afraid that they will try to drive his family from their farm. The place needs so much, the barn needs rebuilt, crops need to be planted, and firewood needs to be laid aside for winter. They must have everything running well by wintera daunting task, to be sure, since the Amish do not believe in electricity or any link to the outside world. Everything that needed to be done would have to be done the old fashion way, with a horsereal horse power. Rebecca, the daughter of the family, is also not very happy with the move. For one thing, she was thirteen, and she had always had her heart set on marrying David. Now they were so many miles apart. And she didnt know if their love could endure the test. Josephs heart wasnt into the trip. He longed for his home state, the land he had grown up on. Will their family come together as a family once again and call this foreign land home? Or would the family make the journey back to Pennsylvania to stay for good?

Since 9/11, Russia, China, and Iran have successfully exploited or stretched U.S. thresholds for high-order war in order to further their strategic ends and, in the process, undermine U.S. interests. Each of these countries has made expert use of some combination of measures short of war to enact its strategies. This report describes those measures and how these nation-states use them and explains why U.S. notions of thresholds might be outdated.

Presents findings from six historical case studies in which the mission of special operations forces in each of the six countries transitioned over time to include some level of inclusion in the U.S. embassy's Security Cooperation Office.

The U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and the resulting U.S. military doctrine emphasize the need for the United States to consolidate the gains it has realized on the battlefield. Recognizing this need, however, is much easier than understanding the measures necessary to succeed. Both U.S. decisionmakers and a variety of analysts have generally agreed that broad-based, inclusive governance and institutionalized capacity-building consistent with the rule of law are the long-term goals for stabilizing fragile states. The conditions under which these goals are realistic and how to realize them are much more contentious. This report summarizes research intended to advance at least partial answers to these questions, including a framework to help better understand when we expect U.S. leverage to be successful in nudging partners toward better governance practices. While there is no panacea for the difficulties of stabilizing countries after conflicts, this research offers guidance on how the United States might improve the odds of securing such hard-won gains and evidence to suggest that-at least under the right circumstances-it can do so.

Despite being in the United States' "neighborhood," Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has typically not been a priority region for U.S. national security objectives, and in recent decades threats emanating from the region have largely been perceived to be tied to narcotics and other illicit trafficking. This posture may need to be reassessed, especially in light of the increased activities and investments made in the region by adversaries in the context of great-power competition. In this report, the authors assess the sufficiency of resources available to pursue U.S. national security objectives in LAC, drawing on strategic guidance documents issued at the national and departmental levels, as well as by U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. State Department, and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The authors also provide an in-depth review of the goals and objectives of China, Russia, and Iran in the region and the ways in which each adversary is pursuing them.

"The U.S. strategic security environment has undergone a shift during the past decade: The regional focus on countering violent extremist organizations has given way to long-term global competition against near-peer adversaries Russia and China. Security cooperation, especially with our closest, most-capable (highly capable) allies, is emphasized as a high-priority tool for pursuing an extensive array of overlapping national interests. The United States and its allies recognize that, in a time of increasing requirements and limited resources, they must work in coalitions and engage regional stakeholders by bringing different strengths and perspectives to combined efforts. However, recent operations and efforts suggest that more can be done to create and sustain the mechanisms that increase the effectiveness of joint activities. In this report, researchers present recommendations for enabling the U.S. Army to better prioritize and coordinate its security cooperation activities with its allies for coalition operations and engagements in third countries, allowing it to meet its assigned objectives and strengthen combined capabilities to compete strategically and counter common threats around the world. Researchers adopted a mixed-method approach focused on Australia and the United Kingdom that combined a literature review of findings on security cooperation uses and effectiveness; a database analysis of recent U.S. security cooperation; a historical analysis of secondary sources documenting recent overseas contingency operations; and interviews with key stakeholders."--

The authors examined the reasons behind the inertia of the U.S. policy objective in Afghanistan through interviews with the senior leaders involved in policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016.

This report evaluates U.S. options for stabilizing conflict-affected states by incentivizing governance reforms through military and development assistance in the context of U.S. military interventions.

"The authors of this Perspective identify best practices in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration field; describe the conditions in Afghanistan under which such programs would need to be carried out; and recommend steps that the U.S. Army and other elements of the U.S. Government should take to prepare to advise and assist the Afghan government in negotiating and eventually implementing such arrangements" -- Publisher's web site.