We argue that the U.S. personal saving rate’s long stability (from the 1960s through the early 1980s), subsequent steady decline (1980s - 2007), and recent substantial increase (2008 - 2011) can all be interpreted using a parsimonious ‘buffer stock’ model of optimal consumption in the presence of labor income uncertainty and credit constraints. Saving in the model is affected by the gap between ‘target’ and actual wealth, with the target wealth determined by credit conditions and uncertainty. An estimated structural version of the model suggests that increased credit availability accounts for most of the saving rate’s long-term decline, while fluctuations in net wealth and uncertainty capture the bulk of the business-cycle variation.

This paper studies the effects of quantitative easing on income and wealth of individual euro area households. The aggregate effects of quantitative easing are estimated in a multi-country VAR model of the four largest euro area countries, in which key variables affecting household income and wealth are included, such as the unemployment rate, wages, interest rates, house prices and stock prices. The aggregate effects are distributed across the individual households by means of a reduced-form simulation on micro data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, capturing the income composition, the portfolio composition and the earnings heterogeneity channels of transmission. We find that the earnings heterogeneity channel plays a key role: quantitative easing compresses the income distribution since many households with lower incomes become employed. In contrast, monetary policy has only negligible effects on wealth inequality.

This paper evaluates the impact of quantitative easing on income and wealth of individual euro area households. We first estimate the aggregate effects of a QE shock, identified by means of external instruments, in a multi-country VAR model with unemployment, wages, interest rates, house prices and stock prices. We then distribute the aggregate effects across households using a reduced-form simulation on micro data, which captures the portfolio composition, the income composition and the earnings heterogeneity channels of transmission. The earnings heterogeneity channel is important: QE compresses the income distribution since many households with lower incomes become employed. In contrast, monetary policy has only negligible effects on the Gini coefficient for wealth: while high-wealth households benefit from higher stock prices, middle-wealth households benefit from higher house prices.

We measure the heterogeneous welfare effects of the recent inflation surge across households in the Euro Area. A simple framework illustrating the numerous channels of the transmission mechanism of surprise inflation to household welfare guides our empirical exercise. By combining micro data and aggregate time series, we conclude that: (i) country-level average welfare costs--expressed as a share of 2021-22 income--were larger than a typical recession, and heterogeneous, e.g., 3% in France and 8% in Italy; (ii) this inflation episode resembles an age-dependent tax, with the elderly losing up to 20%, and roughly half of the 25-44 year-old winning; (iii) losses were quite uniform across consumption quantiles because rigid rents served as a hedge for the poor; (iv) nominal net positions are the key driver of heterogeneity across-households; (v) the rise in energy prices generated vast variation in individual-level inflation rates, but unconventional fiscal policies were critical in shielding the most vulnerable households.

To predict the effects of the 2020 U.S. "CARES" act on consumption, we extend a model that matches responses of households to past consumption stimulus packages. The extension allows us to account for two novel features of the coronavirus crisis. First, during the lockdown, many types of spending are undesirable or impossible. Second, some of the jobs that disappear during the lockdown will not reappear when it is lifted. We estimate that, if the lockdown is short-lived, the combination of expanded unemployment insurance benefits and stimulus payments should be sufficient to allow a swift recovery in consumer spending to its pre-crisis levels. If the lockdown lasts longer, an extension of enhanced unemployment benefits will likely be necessary if consumption spending is to recover.

We show that an estimated tractable 'buffer stock saving' model can match the 30-year decline in the U.S. saving rate leading up to 2007, the sharp increase during the Great Recession, and much of the intervening business cycle variation. In the model, saving depends on the gap between 'target' and actual wealth, with the target determined by measured credit availability and measured unemployment expectations. Following financial deregulation starting in the late 1970s, expanding credit supply explains the trend decline in saving, while fluctuations in wealth and consumer-survey-measured unemployment expectations capture much of the business-cycle variation, including the sharp rise during the Great Recession.

We show that an estimated tractable 'buffer stock saving' model can match the 30-year decline in the U.S. saving rate leading up to 2007, the sharp increase during the Great Recession, and much of the intervening business cycle variation. In the model, saving depends on the gap between 'target' and actual wealth, with the target determined by measured credit availability and measured unemployment expectations. Following financial deregulation starting in the late 1970s, expanding credit supply explains the trend decline in saving, while fluctuations in wealth and consumer-survey-measured unemployment expectations capture much of the business-cycle variation, including the sharp rise during the Great Recession.

Macroeconomic models often invoke consumption "habits" to explain the substantial persistence of aggregate consumption growth. But a large literature has found no evidence of habits in microeconomic datasets that measure the behavior of individual households. We show that the apparent conflict can be explained by a model in which consumers have accurate knowledge of their personal circumstances but 'sticky expectations' about the macroeconomy. In our model, the persistence of aggregate consumption growth reflects consumers' imperfect attention to aggregate shocks. Our proposed degree of (macro) inattention has negligible utility costs, because aggregate shocks constitute only a tiny proportion of the uncertainty that consumers face.

This paper formulates a back of the envelope approach to study the effects of monetary policy on household consumption expenditures. We analyze several transmission mechanisms operating through direct, partial equilibrium channels -- intertemporal substitution and net interest rate exposure -- and indirect, general equilibrium channels -- net nominal exposure, as well as wealth, collateral and labor income channels. The strength of these forces varies across households depending on their marginal propensities to consume, their balance sheet composition, the sensitivity of their own earnings to fluctuations in aggregate labor income, and the responsiveness of aggregate earnings, asset prices and inflation to monetary policy shocks. We quantify all these channels in the euro area by combining micro data from the HFCS and the EU-LFS with structural VARs estimated on aggregate time series. We find that the indirect labor income channel and the housing wealth effect are strong drivers of the aggregate consumption response to monetary policy and explain the cross-country heterogeneity in these responses.

We estimate the degree of 'stickiness' in aggregate consumption growth (sometimes interpreted as reflecting consumption habits) for thirteen advanced economies. We find that, after controlling for measurement error, consumption growth has a high degree of autocorrelation, with a stickiness parameter of about 0.7 on average across countries. The sticky-consumption-growth model outperforms the random walk model of Hall (1978), and typically fits the data better than the popular Campbell and Mankiw (1989) model. In several countries, the sticky-consumption-growth and Campbell-Mankiw models work about equally well.