This book applies Multicriteria Decision Making (MCDM) tools and techniques to problems in location analysis. It begins with a generic model for MCDM and subsequently develops specific versions of the technique for particular location problems. Throughout the book, MCDM is understood to encompass all tools and techniques that choose or rank existing or feasible solutions, including discrete multi-attribute decision making (MADM) problems, which typically include an attribute table that specifies the consequences of each decision with regard to the given criteria, as well as multi-objective linear problems (MOLPs), which incorporate all objectives in a single optimization problem. The book is organized as follows: the first four chapters introduce readers to the basic tools and techniques used in single-objective optimization, multicriteria decision making, location analysis, and other tools, such as statistical regression and geographical information systems. This is followed by ten chapters on model applications, each of which introduces readers to a specific location problem and applies one technique to solve it. The book is then wrapped up in a closing chapter that looks at the location process from a practitioner’s point of view. This book is intended as a textbook for upper-undergraduate and master-level courses on location analysis. It will also benefit decision-makers who actually need to locate facilities.

This paper considers the well studied problem of the existence of an undominated point, under the assumption of lexicographic preferences of voters, as espoused by Taylor in [24]. We extend Taylor's model to situations were we allow for (i) voters to have different ranings of the issues in n-dimensional issue space and (ii) a candidate to be disregarded by a voter if his stand on any one or more of the issues involved in the election is perceived to be too extreme by the voter and (iii) combinations of (i) and (ii). We extend the results of Taylor by demonstrating the non-existence of an equilibrium point in these models in general and then showing that under special circumstances, specialized variants of the "median" point(s) represent equilibrium or undominated points in these models too. Thus a model of voting behavior results that is closer approximation of reality in that historically incumbents tend to win. The primary conclusion of the paper is to suggest that incumbents tend to have an advantage when the election process is characterized by a large presence of special interests or as information becomes more expensive to acquire.