The ongoing economic and financial digitalization is making individual data a key input and source of value for companies across sectors, from bigtechs and pharmaceuticals to manufacturers and financial services providers. Data on human behavior and choices—our “likes,” purchase patterns, locations, social activities, biometrics, and financing choices—are being generated, collected, stored, and processed at an unprecedented scale.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) analyzed the retail payments markets of Jordan to identify pain points that retail Central Bank Digital Currency (rCBDC) could address. Retail payment systems in Jordan are highly integrated, enabling customers to make interoperable transactions between banks and non-bank Payment Service Providers (PSPs).1 The country’s cross-border remittance market is competitive, but may benefit from the reduced transactions cost associated with rCBDC. Despite generally accessible and appropriate product offerings and an enabling environment, various barriers prevent customers from extensively using digital means of payment. rCBDC might create an opportunity to overcome these barriers, thus making a cross-border rCBDC worth consideration. However, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) should rigorously evaluate benefits against risks and costs before forging ahead. Meanwhile, the CBJ should develop capacity to address technology, cybersecurity, financial integrity, and legal issues.

Digitalization of the economy provides both challenges and opportunities. Central banks should ensure that they have the capacity to continue to meet their policy objectives in the digital age. It is in this context that central bank digital currency (CBDC) should be evaluated. If designed appropriately, CBDCs could allow central banks to modernize payment systems and future-proof central bank money as the pace and shape of digitalization continues to evolve. However, the decision to proceed with CBDC exploration and an eventual launch would need to be jurisdiction specific, depending on the degree of digitalization of the economy, the legal and regulatory frameworks, and the central bank’s internal capacity. This paper proposes a dynamic decision-making framework under which the central bank can make decisions under uncertainty. A phased and iterative approach could allow central banks to adjust the pace, scale, and scope of their CBDC projects as the domestic and international environment changes.

This note offers a framework to help countries navigate, as well as tools to help them manage, the trade-offs between CBDC data use and privacy protection. It addresses retail CBDC, as data access and privacy-preserving considerations in a wholesale environment are similar to those of the traditional RTGS systems. It emphasizes the role of institutional arrangements, data collection, access and storage policies, design choices, and technological solutions. At a given level of preference for privacy, central banks can facilitate better use of CBDC data through robust transparency and accountability arrangements, sound policies, and judicious adoption of privacy-by-design approaches including the use of privacy-enhancing technologies.

The departmental paper, "Rise of Digital Money: Implications for Pacific Island Countries," delves into the fast-evolving landscape of digital money in a diverse region of extremes in size, remoteness and dispersion, highlighting its significant macroeconomic and financial consequences. It provides an overview of the development of digital money and payment systems in Pacific Island Countries (PICs), assessing potential benefits and risks, with a focus on how they can harness digital technology to enhance financial inclusion and payment efficiency while minimizing risks. To this end, the paper also examines the prerequisites for successfully adopting various forms of digital money and proposes a strategic framework for policy decisions. The paper underscores the potential of digital money in advancing public policy goals, like financial inclusion and improved cross-border connectivity – given the specific characteristics of the region – while cautioning against the risks of rapid and inadequately regulated adoption. Accordingly, it advocates a gradual, well-informed approach, tailored to PICs' unique monetary and financial circumstances, including the presence of national currencies and the maturity of payment systems. Moreover, the paper suggests that a regional approach could help address capacity and scalability challenges in introducing new digital money forms and payment methods in PICs.

The purpose of this note is to discuss the necessary anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures and provide examples of practical solutions to implement them. In June 2020, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) noted that both the public and private sectors have made progress in the implementation of the standards for virtual assets (VA), in particular through updates to national laws and the development of solutions to assist with the travel rule. However, challenges remain; many virtual asset service providers (VASPs) are only beginning to adopt the required AML/CFT measures, a number of jurisdictions are yet to implement the standards for VA and those that have are at the early stages of developing a supervisory regime for VASPs. At the time of drafting, no country had been assessed against the new standards and many country authorities were in the process of establishing how best to incorporate the new standards in their AML/CFT framework. For these reasons, this note does not refer to specific country examples. References to specific products and projects are made for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute an endorsement of these initiatives. This Fintech Note is based on the FATF standards and guidance, in particular those aspects that pertain to VA and VASPs.

The purpose of this note is to assist countries in their understanding and mitigation of the money laundering (ML), terror financing (TF), and financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (PF) risks related to virtual assets (VAs). This is the first of two Fintech Notes dedicated to VAs and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). This first note is broad in scope. It explains why VAs are vulnerable for misuse for ML/TF/PF purposes and clarifies which assets and service providers should be subject to AML/CFT measures. It discusses the measures that all countries should take, and the type of action necessary in instances of criminal misuse of VA. A second Fintech note focuses on the AML/CFT regulatory and supervisory framework for virtual asset service providers (VASPs). Both notes are based on Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards and draw heavily on the FATF’s 2019 “Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers.” They aim at providing policy makers and authorities with AML/CFT responsibilities with an overview of the legal and operational considerations that the implementation of a sound AML/CFT framework for VAs and VASPs raises. In some instances, the notes make reference to specific types of VAs, VASPs, and related products. These references are made for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an endorsement of the specific VAs, VASPs, and related products. Finally, at the time of drafting, no country had been assessed against the new standards and many country authorities were in the process of establishing how best to incorporate the new standards in their AML/CFT framework. For these reasons, this note does not refer to specific country examples.