In A Model Discipline, Kevin A. Clarke and David M. Primo turn a critical eye to the methodological approach that dominates modern political science. Clarke and Primo contend that the field's emphasis on model testing has led to a distortion of both the modeling process and the art of data analysis and cannot be logically justified. The authors argue that models should be seen as "objects" and thus regarded as neither true nor false. Models should instead be evaluated for their usefulness for a particular purpose. Divided into two parts, the book first establishes that current practice is not philosophy-free and rests on a number of questionable assumptions. The second part focuses on the different ways that theoretical and statistical models can be useful, and closes with a defensible justification for integrating theoretical and statistical models. A novel work of methodology, A Model Discipline offers a new perspective on long-held assumptions about the way research in the social sciences should be conducted.

Political scientists use models to investigate and illuminate causal mechanisms, generate comparative data, and more. But how do we justify and rationalize the method? Why test predictions from a deductive, and thus truth-preserving, system? Primo and Clarke tackle these central questions in this novel work of methodology.

Glance at the index of any book on the United States intelligence community and under failure there are bound to be pages and pages of entries. Since the beginning of modern intelligence work during World War I, the history of American intelligence has been one of failure. Pearl Harbor in 1941, the first Soviet test of an atomic bomb in 1949, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War in 1950, the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968, the Egyptian attack against Israel in the Sinai in 1973, the OPEC oil embargo also in 1973, the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 are just the major examples of American intelligence failure in the last fifty years. Literally hundreds of books and articles have been written in an attempt to understand where the roots of intelligence failure lie. Once these roots are identified, just as much paper is expended attempting to devise and implement reforms aimed at rectifying those deficiencies. By and large, these efforts have failed to affect seriously the level of intelligence being generated by the American Intelligence community.