Develops a general equilibrium model for a small open economy in which the extent of variety of specialized service links affects the extent of international production fragmentation in manufacturing.

In this paper, we take another approach to accounting for the sources of Singapore's economic growth by being explicit about the channels through which Singapore, as a technological follower, benefits from international R&D spillovers. Taking into account the channels through which technology developed in the G5 countries diffuses to technological followers, we show that 57.5 percent of Singapore GDP per worker growth rate over the 1970-2002 period is due to multifactor productivity growth. In particular, about 52 percent of the growth is accounted for by an increase in the effectiveness of accessing idea developed by the technology leaders through improvement in our educational quality and increase in machinery imports and foreign direct investment from the G5 countries. We also find that the capital accumulation that takes the form of imports of machinery as well as foreign direct investment from the G5 countries enhances the effectiveness of technology transfer thus raising the rate of return to capital. Compared to the rate of return to capital inferred from the traditional Solow growth model with purely exogenous technological progress of 10.8 percent, taking into account the technology transfer channel raises the implied rate of return to 13 percent.

This study compared intergenerational earnings mobility in Singapore and the United States by replicating the limitations in the Singapore National Youth Survey on the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The mean estimated earnings elasticities are almost identical: 0.26 in Singapore and 0.27 in the United States. Transformed to 0.45 and 0.47 respectively to reflect permanent status, mobility in the two countries is moderately low compared internationally. The finding of similar mobility is not surprising given that the economic realities, welfare systems, education regimes, and labor structures in the two countries are similar. Policy makers face the daunting challenge of overcoming immobility and inequality while maintaining global competitiveness.

Singapore had been experiencing high income inequality and a very recent drop in income disparity. As an economy competing for international top talents and investment, Singapore faced worldwide long-term forces raising income inequality; as a democratic city-state responding to heterogeneous demand of its voters, recently strengthened redistributive policies benefiting the poor might strain the national pride and sense of belonging of the middle income class as compared to the relatively more mobile top income class. Using the World Values Survey Singapore 2012, this paper provides evidence that given the long-term trend of income disparity and the recent strengthening of redistribution, the middle income class was indeed squeezed in terms of national pride, feeling as part of the Singapore nation, and attitude towards income redistribution, and suggests that the perception of low social mobility is also a reason for the findings among others.

Youth participation in social groups is important in developing skills and experience for successful transition to adulthood. What kinds of families do youth who are active in social groups and who take on leadership positions come from? Using data from the National Youth Survey 2005, this research studies the social participation of Singaporean youth aged 15-18. Through probit regression analysis, it examines how youth participation in Singapore is associated with two types of family characteristics. First, it examines the role of maternal education. As a proxy for social class, maternal education represents the roles of cultural capital formation and concerted involvement by middle class parents. Second, it studies the role of family challenge and support. Maternal education is found to predict both high participation and leadership. While additional family challenge induces greater participation, family support increases participation only when the level of support is high.

In this paper, we take another approach to accounting for the sources of Singapore's economic growth by being explicit about the channels through which Singapore, as a technological follower, benefits from international Ramp;D spillovers. Taking into account the channels through which technology developed in the G5 countries diffuses to technological followers, we show that 57.5 percent of Singapore's real GDP per worker growth rate over the 1970-2002 period is due to multifactor productivity growth. In particular, about 52 percent of the growth is accounted for by an increase in the effectiveness of accessing ideas developed by the technology leaders through improvement in our educational quality and increase in machinery imports and foreign direct investment from the G5 countries. We also find that capital accumulation that takes the form of imports of machinery as well as foreign direct investment from the G5 countries enhances the effectiveness of technology transfer thus raising the rate of return to capital. Compared to the rate of return to capital inferred from the traditional Solow growth model with purely exogenous technological progress of 10.8 percent, taking into account the technology transfer channel raises the implied rate of return to 13 percent.

This paper analyzes the gradual shift in the technological paradigm of an economy as it approaches the world technology frontier. The model developed in this paper consists of firms which employ skilled workers as an important input in technological advancement, but the novel feature here is the entrepreneur, who is the brain of technological progress. The entrepreneur has to decide to undertake either imitative or innovative activities, of which decision both affects and is affected by the country's distance to frontier. Specifically, the entrepreneur needs to have a minimum ability threshold level in order to carry out innovation. This endogenous threshold level falls as the economy moves closer to the technological frontier, enabling more entrepreneurs to be engaged in an innovation-based strategy, and consequently, moving the economy from a technological structure that is based on imitation of foreign technologies to one where domestic innovation dominates. The transitional dynamics of the model shows that there exists a steady state distance from the world frontier that countries will eventually converge to. We also find that it is possible for countries under certain conditions, to be trapped in a regime carrying out only imitation of world technologies.