The paper develops a simple, integrated methodology to project public pension cash flows and healthcare spending over the long term. We illustrate its features by applying it to the LAC5 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico), where public spending pressures are expected to increase significantly over 2015-50 due to demographic trends and rising healthcare costs. We simulate alternative pension reforms, including the transition from a defined benefit to a defined contribution pension system and the fiscal burden of a minimum guaranteed pension under the latter. We also analyze public healthcare outlays in the LAC5, which is likewise expected to increase significantly over 2015-50 due to aging and the so-called excess cost growth factor of healthcare services, showing that curbing the evolution of the latter (e.g., through enhanced competition in the healthcare sector) could aid in containing spending pressures. Despite its simplicity, the methodology yields projections that compare well with other approaches. It therefore provides a good benchmark for assessing alternative reform scenarios, particularly in data-constrained countries.
· 2020
This departmental paper marks the 10th anniversary of the IMF Financial Access Survey (FAS). It offers a retrospective of the FAS database, along with some reflections as to its future directions. Since its 2009 launch, the FAS has provided granular data on access to and use of financial services. It is a supply-side database with annual global coverage based on data sourced directly from financial service providers—aimed at supporting policymakers to target and evaluate financial inclusion policies. Its data collection has kept pace with financial innovation, such as the rise of mobile money and growing demand for gender-disaggregated data—and the FAS must continue to evolve.
This relatively simple model attempts to capture and integrate four widely held views about financial crises. [1] Interconnectedness among financial institutions (banks) can play a major role in precipitating systemic financial crises. [2] Lack of information about the quality of bank portfolios also plays a role in precipitating systemic crises. [3] Financial crises, particularly systemic ones, are often followed by severe, lengthy recessions. [4] Loss of confidence in the financial system is partly responsible for the length and severity of these recessions. In the model, banks make decisions about initiating and liquidating risky loans. Interconnectedness among their asset portfolios can obscure information about these portfolios, causing them to make inefficient decisions about liquidation, and about retention of the managers who assess credit risk. These decisions can increase the depth of recessions, and they can produce systemic financial crises. They can also reduce the effectiveness of future bank risk assessment, increasing the probability of lengthy, severe recessions. The government, acting in the interest of current and future depositors, may wish to increase the transparency of bank portfolios by limiting interconnectedness. The optimal degree of regulation, which may depend on depositors’ degree of risk aversion, may not eliminate financial crises.
Effective cross-border financial surveillance requires the monitoring of direct and indirect systemic linkages. This paper illustrates how network analysis could make a significant contribution in this regard by simulating different credit and funding shocks to the banking systems of a number of selected countries. After that, we show that the inclusion of risk transfers could modify the risk profile of entire financial systems, and thus an enriched simulation algorithm able to account for risk transfers is proposed. Finally, we discuss how some of the limitations of our simulations are a reflection of existing information and data gaps, and thus view these shortcomings as a call to improve the collection and analysis of data on cross-border financial exposures.
This paper investigates empirically the pass-through of money market interest rates to retail banking interest rates in Chile, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and five European countries. Overall, Chile''s pass-through does not appear atypical. Based on a standard error-correction model, we find that, as in most countries considered, Chile''s measured pass-through is incomplete. But Chile''s pass-through is also faster than in many other countries considered and is comparable to that in the United States. While we find no significant evidence of asymmetry in Chile''s pass-through across states of the interest rate or monetary policy cycle, we do find some evidence of parameter instability, around the time of the Asian and Russian crises. However, we do not find evidence that the switch to a more flexible exchange rate regime in 1999 and the "nominalization" of Chile''s interest rate targets in 2001 have affected significantly the pass-through process.
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· 2015
This paper reviews the Mexican experience with the securitization of residential mortgages. It highlights the key legislative and institutional reforms leading to the development of primary and secondary mortgage markets and reports the main features and valuation practices of the RMBS markets. The paper identifies areas warranting close attention to improve the outlook for the Mexican RMBS market and draws some lessons from the recent U.S. subprime mortgage market problems.
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· 2014
A number of developing countries have adopted deficit- finance regimes involving multiple reserve requirements. One question the previous literature on this phenomenon has not addressed is whether multiple-reserves regimes can improve on regimes involving single-currency-reserve requirements if the policy settings of the latter regimes are assumed to be chosen optimally. We find that a quot;conventionalquot; multiple- reserves regime a regime with positive nominal rates on reservable bonds cannot Pareto-improve an optimal single- currency-regime but can, in some cases, increase social welfare over such a regime.