During peacetime and wartime, the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for moving units, people, equipment, and households by ship, aircraft, rail, and truck for the Department of Defense. The peacetime and wartime movements are interrelated, because many, but not all, customer movements in peacetime are crucial for preparing USTRANSCOM and its components for future wartime requirements. USTRANSCOM utilizes a hybrid working-capital fund (WCF) approach to recover its costs, called the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF). USTRANSCOM charges rates to customers for specific services, such as moving a container by surface transportation or chartering an aircraft to move personnel; these rates include some fixed costs. How these rates are determined varies by the service provided. USTRANSCOM receives revenue from other sources to cover additional costs. Recent efforts by a USTRANSCOM working group found that customers perceive the cost of movements as being too high. This report analyzes adjustments to TWCF cost recovery that could better align customer peacetime decisions with the wartime mission. To recommend a cost-recovery approach that meets this objective and improves transparency, the authors reviewed literature on commercial WCF best practices, analyzed budget and cost data, and interviewed stakeholders. The authors applied lessons learned in these analyses to recommend changes to TWCF cost recovery and examined these changes in the context of five deep-dive case studies.

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) depends on its fleet of more than 1,600 boats to conduct its most critical operations, which span all 11 of the USCG's statutory missions. These boats must be replaced frequently, given the harsh environments and challenging operations in which they are used. To keep up with this demand in a cost-effective way, the USCG has determined that it needs an enduring Program Management Office to manage boats acquisition efforts. The RAND Corporation's Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) was asked to conduct a 90-day study to identify best practices and lessons learned for improving boats acquisition by reviewing the current boats acquisition program and similar programs inside and outside the USCG and make recommendations for the structure, funding strategy, and processes of a future enduring boats acquisition program. We review the current boats acquisition program and similar organizations inside and outside the USCG, assess possible funding and structural strategies, and make recommendations on these topics for USCG leadership.

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) mandated a pilot test of a program in which Army recruiters were authorized to recruit individuals into any of the three components and to receive credit for an enlistee for a period of not less than three years. This report provides the following: details about the design of the pilot test; a three-year analysis of the effects that consolidated recruiting efforts had on the ability of recruiters to attract and place qualified candidates; a determination of the extent to which consolidating recruiting efforts affected efficiency; and a discussion of challenges associated with a recruiter working to recruit individuals to enlist in a component in which the recruiter may not have served and of the satisfaction of recruiters with the pilot program. Overall, the program's effects on contracts and efficiency were small and not statistically meaningful. Given the absence of statistically or substantively meaningful effects on contract production or recruiting efficiency, as well as certain stakeholder concerns, the Army decided to terminate the pilot program after the third year. Weaknesses in the implementation of the program are highly likely to have contributed to the absence of meaningful differences in production between the test and comparison sites. But on balance, considering the organizational and operational changes required and related costs, the study team concluded that it is not likely that the Army can, particularly in the near term, overcome the challenges to launch a successful cross-component recruiting program.

This report documents a framework for estimating the costs of general and flag officers (G/FOs) and their support personnel and applies it to estimate these costs for fiscal year 2018. This cost-estimating framework is consistent with the requirements of Section 596 of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. The authors estimate average annual total costs of typical G/FOs as well as the annual total costs of specific G/FO positions. G/FO positions differ in several key characteristics, including location, nature of position, organizational type, and function. These differences can substantially influence cost estimates of G/FOs and their support personnel. The authors find that average total direct costs of typical G/FOs and their support staff increases with pay grade from $600,000 for O-7 pay grades up to $3 million for O-10 pay grades. The cost increase primarily reflects staff increases in roles that support general or flag officers in the execution of their duties and responsibilities. We find costs of specific G/FO positions vary substantially by nature of position, organizational type, and functional area. Estimated costs range from $270,000 for O-7 pay grades with no staff or travel to more than $10 million for O-10 pay grades that receive continuous protection and are required to use government aircraft for official travel. If consistently and repeatedly collected, these average annual cost estimates can be used to identify trends in G/FO costs over time.

Violent nonstate actors (VNSAs)-terrorist groups, drug trafficking organizations, and others-are increasingly part of the environment in which the Army and other government forces operate. Such organizations pose durable and direct threats to U.S. security interests. The capacity of VNSAs to wage war, inflict violence, and engage in vast transnational criminal activity make them a persistent danger. Countering these organizations is difficult because they are generally flexible and structured in ways that facilitate their ability to adapt to changes occurring within their operational environments and, in some cases, beyond. This report summarizes research into how VNSAs adapt to changes in their operational environments and provides recommendations on how the Army might anticipate such adaptations and mitigate them before they occur. The authors have drawn from a series of historical case studies and relevant literature to offer insights on the most common VNSA adaptations and means of detecting and mitigating each. Among other observations, the authors note that VNSAs reach their peak adaptive capacity within the first five years of their existence but that not all VNSAs have the same level of adaptive capacity.

This report offers actions to improve the efficacy, effectiveness, and ability to plan for the future of the Department of Homeland Security Joint Requirements Council.

To respond effectively to a competitor's activities in the gray zone, it is important to understand how they leverage information, the ends that gray zone activities serve, and the capabilities and authorities needed to respond. A detailed enumeration of these activities, a synthesis of expert consensus on challenges to gray zone competition, and a dynamic menu of solutions can enhance the U.S. competitive position in the gray zone and beyond.

In Independent Evaluation of the Transportation Working Capital Fund, RAND researchers reviewed the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) to meet the requirements of Section 1716 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. They recommended that U.S. Transportation Command implement variable cost pricing for several business lines that are financed by the TWCF. The business and economics literature emphasizes variable cost pricing as the best way to guide customer decisionmaking to support enterprise objectives. In the variable cost pricing model, customers pay for the costs to the defense transportation system associated with their requirements (variable costs); other costs should be recovered separately through appropriations or service-level bills. In this companion report, researchers identify next steps toward implementing variable cost pricing for selected TWCF business lines. These business lines include Air Mobility Command's Channel Cargo, Channel Passenger, Special Assignment Airlift Mission/Contingency, and Joint Exercise Training Program business lines; U.S. Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command's Liner Operations and Port Operations business lines; and Military Sealift Command's Army and Air Force Prepositioned Ships business lines.

The authors assess the financial viability and current structure of the Transportation Working Capital Fund, which funds U.S. Transportation Command operations, and recommend ways to restructure the fund to improve its effectiveness and efficiency.