Digitalization is reshaping economic activity, shrinking the role of cash, and spurring new digital forms of money. Central banks have been pondering wheter and how to adapt. One possibility is central bank digital currency (CBDC)-- a widely accessible digital form of fiat money that could be legal tender. This discussion note proposes a conceptual framework to assess the case for CBDC adoption from the perspective of users and central banks. It discusses possible CBDC designs, and explores potential benefits and costs, with a focus on the impact on monetary policy, financial stability, and integrity. This note also surveys research and pilot studies on CBDC by central banks around the world.

We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of payment instruments dependent on the number of their users. CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest-bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank's tradeoff.

Ukraine’s economic performance has been anemic since the early 1990s. A major impediment to productivity growth has been low investment, held back by lack of strong and independent institutions. This paper aims to assess the major areas of institutional weakness in Ukraine and quantify the long-term growth impact of catching-up to Poland in terms of the quality of major economic institutions and market development. Our analysis identifies the legal system as the area where the institutional quality is weakest compared to Poland, followed distantly by market competition, openness to trade and financial depth. Using a methodology that accounts for positive spillovers between the structural reform areas, we estimate that even under the most optimistic scenario, where institutional gaps are fully addressed, Ukraine would need 15 years to catch up to Poland’s current income level.

This paper presents a new dataset on the dynamics of non-performing loans (NPLs) during 88 banking crises since 1990. The data show similarities across crises during NPL build-ups but less so during NPL resolutions. We find a close relationship between NPL problems—elevated and unresolved NPLs—and the severity of post-crisis recessions. A machine learning approach identifies a set of pre-crisis predictors of NPL problems related to weak macroeconomic, institutional, corporate, and banking sector conditions. Our findings suggest that reducing pre-crisis vulnerabilities and promptly addressing NPL problems during a crisis are important for post-crisis output recovery.

This paper analyzes whether structural changes in the aftermath of the pandemic have steepened the Phillips curves in advanced economies, reversing the flattening observed in recent decades and reducing the sacrifice ratio associated with disinflation. Particularly, analysis of granular price quote data from the UK indicates that increased digitalization may have raised price flexibility, while de-globalization may have made inflation more responsive to domestic economic conditions again. Using sectoral data from 24 advanced economies in Europe, higher digitalization and lower trade intensity are shown to be associated with steeper Phillips curves. Post-pandemic Phillips curve estimates indicate some steepening in the UK, Spain, Italy and the euro area as a whole, but at magnitudes that are too small to explain the entire surge in inflation in 2021–22, suggesting an important role for outward shifts in the Phillips curve.

The qualitative and granular nature of most structural indicators and the variety in data sources poses difficulties for consistent cross-country assessments and empirical analysis. We overcome these issues by using a machine learning approach (the partial least squares method) to combine a broad set of cross-country structural indicators into a small number of synthetic scores which correspond to key structural areas, and which are suitable for consistent quantitative comparisons across countries and time. With this newly constructed dataset of synthetic structural scores in 126 countries between 2000-2019, we establish stylized facts about structural gaps and reforms, and analyze the impact of reforms targeting different structural areas on economic growth. Our findings suggest that structural reforms in the area of product, labor and financial markets as well as the legal system have a significant impact on economic growth in a 5-year horizon, with one standard deviation improvement in one of these reform areas raising cumulative 5-year growth by 2 to 6 percent. We also find synergies between different structural areas, in particular between product and labor market reforms.

We use a decomposition methodology to analyze the factors underlying the differentiated output losses of European countries in 2020. Our findings are fourfold: First, 2020 growth outcomes can be explained by differences in mobility, underlying growth trends, and pre-pandemic country fundamentals. Second, fiscal and monetary policies helped alleviate output losses during the pandemic in all European countries but to a varying extent. Third, shallower recessions in emerging market economies in Europe can be attributed to higher underlying growth and younger populations. Fourth, fiscal multipliers were higher in countries where above-the-line measures accounted for a larger share of the total fiscal package, the size of the total fiscal package was smaller, and inequality and informality were greater, as well as in countries with IMF-supported program during the pandemic.

We present a model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. Depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. With costly commitment, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We bring the model to bear on the 2008 financial crisis in the United States, during which shadow banks experienced a sudden dry-up of funding and liquidated their assets. We derive an equilibrium in which the shadow banking sector expands to a size where its liquidation causes a fire-sale and exposes traditional banks to liquidity risk. Higher deposit rates in compensation for liquidity risk also weaken threats of early withdrawal and traditional banks pursue risky portfolios that may leave them in default. Policy interventions aimed at making traditional banks safer such as liquidity support, bank regulation and deposit insurance fuel further expansion of shadow banking but have a net positive impact on financial stability. Financial stability can also be achieved with a tax on shadow bank profits.

We test whether foreign demand matters for local house prices in the US using an identification strategy based on the existence of “home bias abroad” in international real estate markets. Following an extreme political crisis event abroad, a proxy for a strong and exogenous shift in foreign demand, we show that house prices rise disproportionately more in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of population originating from the crisis country. This effect is strong, persistent, and robust to the exclusion of major cities. We also show that areas that were already expensive in the late 1990s have experienced the strongest foreign demand shocks and the biggest drop in affordability between 2000 and 2017. Our findings suggest a non-trivial causal effect of foreign demand shocks on local house prices over the last 20 years, especially in neighbourhoods that were already rather unaffordable for the median household.

Is the seniority structure of sovereign debt neutral for a government's decision between defaulting and raising surpluses? In this paper, we address this question using a model of debt crises where a discretionary government endogenously chooses distortionary taxation and whether to apply an optimal haircut to bondholders. We show that when the size of senior tranches is small, a version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds: tranching just redistributes government revenues from junior to senior bondholders, while taxes and government borrowing costs remain unchanged. However, as senior tranches become sufficiently large, default costs on senior debt transpire into a stronger commitment to repay not only the senior tranche, but also the junior one. We show that there is a lower threshold for senior bonds above which tranching can eliminate default on both junior and senior debt, and an upper threshold beyond which the government defaults also on senior debt.