This paper investigates the currency reforms undertaken subsequent to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. The reforms were motivated by the lack of coordination of monetary policy and the absence of a rule for sharing seigniorage. Because the Successor States’ reforms were not carried out simultaneously, individuals could choose where to convert their crowns based on where their real value was greatest. The cross-border flows of notes was substantial, to the detriment of Hungary which was last to reform. The Austrian and Hungarian currencies were stabilized only with the help of League of Nations financial programs.

Evidence from the past three years indicates that the exchange rate between the private ECU and the official ECU Basket can deviate substantially from par. The value of the private ECU is driven by expectations that a future European Central Bank will enforce par convertibility between the private ECU and the official ECU basket of currencies. Meanwhile, no existing institutional arrangement limits the private ECU’s value in terms of the Basket. This paper addresses the question of what determines the values of the private ECU and of private ECU interest rates. We show that an anticipation of a future fixing of the private ECU’s value, together with the interest rate setting mechanism of the large-value ECU payment and clearing system, are sufficient to determine its value. The determination of the private ECU exchange rate provides the template for how to determine the value of any private composite currency, such as, for example, a private SDR.

The IMF Working Papers series is designed to make IMF staff research available to a wide audience. Almost 300 Working Papers are released each year, covering a wide range of theoretical and analytical topics, including balance of payments, monetary and fiscal issues, global liquidity, and national and international economic developments.

This paper reviews the ongoing efforts to reduce the risks inherent in the world’s principal wholesale payment systems. The paper assesses the major policy proposals to contain the growth in intraday credit exposures that arises in net settlement wholesale payment systems and in the real-time gross systems in which the central bank provides daylight overdrafts. It also discusses the benefits of these risk-management policies, and we assess the adverse impact of applying interest charges for intraday central-bank credit or of collateralizing such credit on liquidity in financial markets.