Within its inflation-targeting framework, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) has frequently adjusted its monetary operations. This has raised questions about their internal consistency, appropriateness, and effectiveness. A broader assessment, implying a comparison to a counterfactual, is outside the scope of this paper. Our prior is agnostic. We find that the changes were generally well-motivated within the MNB statutory powers; prioritized, transparently explained, and monitored; and promptly adjusted, when they no longer served their purpose. Occasionally, some tools have worked at cross purposes. Government policies have at times hampered monetary policy. Simplicity comes with a premium, as complexity can blur signals.

Macroprudential policy in Europe aligns with the objective of limiting systemic risk, namely the risk of widespread disruption to the provision of financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and that can cause serious negative consequences for the real economy.

This paper reviews the empirical relationships between credit growth, economic recovery, and bank profitability in Europe after the global financial crisis (GFC). We find that the post-GFC recoveries in Europe have been weaker than previous recoveries, with the “double-dip” recessions in 2011–12 in many countries and the worldwide reach of the GFC explaining the underperformance. Bank lending has been subdued as well, but this appears to have only held back the recovery relatively moderately. A 10 percent increase in bank credit to the private sector is associated with a rise of 0.6–1 percent in real GDP and 2–21⁄2 percent in real private investment. These relationships have not changed significantly during and after the GFC. Loan quality, customer deposits, bank equity price index, and bank capital appear to be closely linked to bank lending. As expected, bank profitability is positively and significantly influenced by credit growth, but this relationship has weakened after the GFC.

This paper focuses on EU structural and cohesion funds assistance to Bulgaria during the 2007–13 program period. Initial weaknesses resulted in a low absorption rate, which was mitigated by increasing advance payments; applying electronic application and reporting procedures; simplifying and unifying tender processes; and strengthening the role of international financial institutions and banks in project preparation, evaluation and monitoring. The possible impact on growth and potential output is briefly discussed, while the risks of improper absorption are acknowledged. Valuable lessons have been learned, but it is recommended that additional steps be taken for the next program period 2014–20.

Several emerging market central banks in Europe deployed asset purchase programs (APPs) amid the 2020 pandemic. The common main goals were to address market dysfunction and impaired monetary transmission, distinct from the quantitative easing conducted by major advanced economy central banks. Likely reflecting the global nature of the crisis, these APPs defied the traditional emerging market concern of destabilizing the exchange rate or inflation expectations and instead alleviated markets successfully. We uncover some evidence that APPs in European emerging markets stabilized government bond markets and boosted equity prices, with no indication of exchange rate pressure. Examining global and domestic factors that could limit the usability of APPs, in the event of renewed market dysfunction we see a potential scope for scaling up APPs in most European emerging markets that used APPs during the pandemic, provided that they remain consistent with the primary objective of monetary policy and keep a safe distance from the risk of fiscal dominance. As central banks in the region move towards monetary policy tightening, the tapering, ending, and unwinding of APPs must also be carefully considered. Clear and transparent communication is critical at each step of the process, from the inception to the closure of APPs, particularly when a large shock hits and triggers a major policy shift.

This paper argues that better governance practices can reduce the costs, risks and uncertainty of financial intermediation. Our sample covers high-, middle- and low-income countries before and after the global financial crisis (GFC). We find that net interest margins of banks are lower if various governance indicators are better. More cross-border lending also appears conducive to lower intermediation costs, while the level of capital market development is not significant. The GFC seems not to have had a strong impact except via credit risk. Finally, we estimate the size of potential gains from improved governance.

A payment system encompasses a set of instruments and means generally acceptable in making payments; the institutional and organizational framework governing such payments, including prudential regulation; and the operating procedures and communications network used to initiate and transmit payment information from payer to payee and to settle payments. This book, by Omotunde E.G. Johnson, with Richard K. Abrams, Jean-Marc Destresse, Tony Lybek, Nicholas Roberts, and Mark Swinburne, identifies main policy and strategic issues in payment system reform, describes the structure of payment systems in selected countries, highlights areas of consensus, and suggests the direction for future policy analysis.

This study takes stock of progress made so far in the financial sectors of sub-saharan African countries. It recommends further reforms and specific measures in the areas of supervision, development of monetary operations and financial markets, external sector liberalization, central bank autonomy and accountability, payments system, and central bank accounting and auditing.