QUOTEWe live in an increasingly interconnected world. Trade flows worldwide are growing rapidly and global production patterns are shifting as countries follow their comparative advantage in production via trade. At the same time, however, there is growing concern about potential adverse environmental impacts from increasing trade.QUOTE--John A. Dixon, Lead Economist, The Environment Department, World BankInterest in the trade and environment debate has intensified as a result of international trade agreements and because many proposed solutions to the climate change problem have potential implications for the global trading system. Clearly more empirical work is needed to inform the debate, guide policymakers toward solutions, and help set priorities.This volume is an attempt to further our understanding of the empirical links between trade and the environment. Thirteen chapters, which were presented as papers at a World Bank conference in April 1998, focus on three main themes:1. Effects of trade liberalization and growth on the environment2. The QUOTEpollution havenQUOTE hypothesis3. Economic instruments for resolving global environmental problemsThe papers address a number of different issues within each of the themes, offering new data or new questions and approaches. They are devoted to deepening our understanding and empirical knowledge of the various effects of trade liberalization. Only through a firm understanding of the linkages involved can well-founded policy advice be formulated.

This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to resist legal reforms designed to improve judicial efficiency and eliminate corruption. The analysis predicts that in politically unstable regimes, the institutions necessary to monitor and enforce compliance are weak. In such countries, corruption is more pervasive and the compliance with regulations is low. The empirical results support the predictions of the model.

Empirical evidence suggesting that a considerable amount of horizontal strategic interaction exists amongst governments is important in light of recent devolutionary trends of many important public programs. The empirical approach in these studies typically relies on estimating reaction functions in a uni-dimensional policy framework, where a nonzero slope estimate is interpreted as evidence in support of strategic interactions. While this framework is a useful representation within certain contexts, it is potentially too restrictive; for example, in models of resource competition, localities may use multiple instruments in their recruiting pursuits, leading to potential strategic interactions across policy instruments. In this study, we first develop a simple theoretic construct that includes resource competition in a world of three-dimensional policy choice. The model suggests that while a zero-sloped reaction function may exist for any particular policy, this does not necessarily imply the absence of strategic interactions. We examine the implications of the model empirically using US state-level panel data over the period 1977-1994. The results suggest that important cross-policy strategic interactions exist, lending support in favor of the multi-dimensional framework, and indicate that uni-dimensional frameworks may present lower bound estimates of the degree of strategic interaction.

This paper seeks to contribute to the unresolved issue of the effect of economic integration on environmental policy. In particular, we discuss the joint impact of trade openness and political uncertainty. Our theory predicts that the effect of trade integreation on the environment is conditional on the degree of political uncertainty. Trade integration raises the stringency of environmental policies, but the effect is reduced when the degree of political uncertainty is great. Political uncertainty has a positive effect on environmental policy as it reduces lobbying efforts. Applying our model to a unique data set of primarily developing countries, the empirical findings support the theory and are robust under alterntive specifications.