The global financial crisis experience shone a spotlight on the dangers of financial systems that have grown too big too fast. This note reexamines financial deepening, focusing on what emerging markets can learn from the advanced economy experience. It finds that gains for growth and stability from financial deepening remain large for most emerging markets, but there are limits on size and speed. When financial deepening outpaces the strength of the supervisory framework, it leads to excessive risk taking and instability. Encouragingly, the set of regulatory reforms that promote financial depth is essentially the same as those that contribute to greater stability. Better regulation—not necessarily more regulation—thus leads to greater possibilities both for development and stability.

The global financial crisis experience shone a spotlight on the dangers of financial systems that have grown too big too fast. This note reexamines financial deepening, focusing on what emerging markets can learn from the advanced economy experience. It finds that gains for growth and stability from financial deepening remain large for most emerging markets, but there are limits on size and speed. When financial deepening outpaces the strength of the supervisory framework, it leads to excessive risk taking and instability. Encouragingly, the set of regulatory reforms that promote financial depth is essentially the same as those that contribute to greater stability. Better regulation—not necessarily more regulation—thus leads to greater possibilities both for development and stability.

Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents helped coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Unlike CACs, exit consents can be exploited to force high haircuts on creditors, but the ability of creditors to coordinate to block exit consents can limit overly aggressive use.

This paper provides a general framework to assess the output and debt dynamics of an economy undertaking multi-year fiscal adjustment. The framework allows country-specific assumptions about the magnitude and persistence of fiscal multipliers, hysteresis effects, and endogenous financing costs. In addition to informing macro projections, the framework can also shed light on the appropriate phasing of fiscal consolidation—in particular, on whether it should be front- or back-loaded. The framework is applied to stylized advanced and emerging economy examples. It suggests that for a highly-indebted economy undertaking large multi-year fiscal consolidation, high multipliers do not always argue against frontloaded adjustment. The case for more gradual or back-loaded adjustment is strongest when hysteresis effects are in play, but it needs to be balanced against implications for debt sustainability. Application to actual country examples tends to cast doubt on claims that very large multipliers have been operating post-crisis. It seems that the GDP forecast errors for Greece may have been due more to over-optimism on potential growth estimates than to underestimating fiscal multipliers.

This paper provides a general framework to assess the output and debt dynamics of an economy undertaking multi-year fiscal adjustment. The framework allows country-specific assumptions about the magnitude and persistence of fiscal multipliers, hysteresis effects, and endogenous financing costs. In addition to informing macro projections, the framework can also shed light on the appropriate phasing of fiscal consolidation—in particular, on whether it should be front- or back-loaded. The framework is applied to stylized advanced and emerging economy examples. It suggests that for a highly-indebted economy undertaking large multi-year fiscal consolidation, high multipliers do not always argue against frontloaded adjustment. The case for more gradual or back-loaded adjustment is strongest when hysteresis effects are in play, but it needs to be balanced against implications for debt sustainability. Application to actual country examples tends to cast doubt on claims that very large multipliers have been operating post-crisis. It seems that the GDP forecast errors for Greece may have been due more to over-optimism on potential growth estimates than to underestimating fiscal multipliers.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have pursued ambitious digitalization strategies as part of their broader economic transformation agenda. This paper provides a thorough review of the GCC's significant acceleration in digital transformation, particularly since the onset of the pandemic, highlighting progress in digital infrastructure, GovTech (government technology) maturity, and fintech activities. By constructing a novel composite index—the Enhanced Digital Access Index (EDAI)—and benchmarking the GCC's achievements against those of advanced and other emerging market economies, the paper finds that the GCC, on average, has closed its gap with AEs on the overall EDAI, with strengths particularly in digital infrastructure and affordability. Based on a global sample, the paper’s empirical analysis highlights a positive correlation between digitalization advancement and enhanced financial inclusion, strengthened banking sector resilience during crises, improved government effectiveness, and faster corporate sector recoveries following economic downturns. To complement the sectoral analysis of the impact of digitalization, the paper also examines the relationship of economic growth and resilience with economy-wide digitalization and find a positive association. Our findings point to additional economic gains from further advancing digitalization in the GCC, which would require comprehensive strategies to further leverage digitalization to enable a more effective and transparent public sector, balance opportunities and risks associated with fintech, enhance digital skills and digital adoption, with adequate social safety nets and appropriate training to strengthen social protection and labor market inclusion, and create an enabling environment to further digital penetration.

Delays in debt restructuring negotiations are widely regarded as inefficient. This paper argues that delays can allow the economy to recover from a crisis, make more resources available for debt settlement, and enable the negotiating parties to enjoy a larger "cake". Within this context, therefore, delays may be "beneficial". This paper explores this idea by constructing a dynamic model of sovereign default in which debt renegotiation is modeled as a stochastic bargaining game based on Merlo and Wilson's (1995) framework. Quantitative analysis shows that this model can generate an average delay length comparable to that experienced by Argentina in its most recent debt restructuring.

La crisis financiera mundial puso de relieve los peligros de los sistemas financieros que han crecido demasiado con demasiada rapidez. En este documento se reexamina la profundización financiera, centrándose el análisis en lo que pueden aprender los mercados emergentes de la experiencia de las economías avanzadas. En él se observa que los beneficios de la profundización financiera para el crecimiento y la estabilidad siguen siendo importantes en el caso de la mayoría de los mercados emergentes, pero hay límites en cuanto a su tamaño y velocidad. Cuando la profundización financiera sobrepasa la fortaleza del marco de supervisión, lleva a una excesiva asunción de riesgo e inestabilidad. Algo alentador es que las reformas regulatorias que promueven la profundidad del sector financiero son esencialmente las mismas que aquellas que contribuyen a una mayor estabilidad. Una mejor regulación —no necesariamente más regulación— determina entonces mayores posibilidades de lograr tanto desarrollo como estabilidad.