There have been systematic attempts over the last twenty-five years to explore the implications of decision making with incomplete information and to model an 'economic man' as an information-processing organism. These efforts are associated with the work of Roy Radner, who joins other analysts in this collection to offer accessible overviews of the existing literature on topics such as Walrasian equilibrium with incomplete markets, rational expectations equilibrium, learning, Markovian games, dynamic game-theoretic models of organization, and experimental work on mechanism selection. Some essays also take up relatively new themes related to bounded rationality, complexity of decisions, and economic survival. The collection overall introduces models that add to the toolbox of economists, expand the boundaries of economic analysis, and enrich our understanding of the inefficiencies and complexities of organizational design in the presence of uncertainty.

Theoretical study of maintenance policies and methodology in respect thereof - covers mathematical models, operational research and the maintenance of armed forces equipment. Bibliography pp. 215 to 219.

A report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

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The paper represents an application of the modern theory of competitive equilibrium to the case of uncertainty. Two theorems are presented: the first sets forth sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium for the case in which each economic agent has a given structure of information available and the second sets forth sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium for the case in which any available structure of information may be used. However, if the costs of obtaining information are included in the analysis, the conditions of the theorem may not be met. This is also true if the costs necessary to perform computations are included. In addition if part of the information available to economic agents concerns the behavior of other agents rather than concerning environmental variables, the conditions of the theorem may not be fulfilled. (Author).

The relation between equilibrium and optimum under uncertainty is explored in a model of an economy with spot markets at each date and with an incomplete system of futures markets for delivery contingent on future events. An equilibrium is a consistent set of plans, spot prices, and conditional forecasts of future prices. For the economy to achieve an optimum relative to a given structure of information, economic agents must be able to buy insurance against changes in spot prices. The role of spot prices as information signals is emphasized. (Author).