A major re-examination of Habsburg decision-making from 1912 to July 1914, the study argues that Austria-Hungary and not Germany made the crucial decisions for war in the summer of 1914. Based on extensive new archival research, the book traces the gradual militarization of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy during the Balkan Wars. The disasters of those wars and the death of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir-apparent and a force for peace in the monarchy, convinced the Habsburg elite that only a war against Serbia would end the South Slav threat to the monarchy's existence. Williamson also describes Russia's assertive foreign policy after 1912 and stresses the unique linkages of domestic and foreign policy in almost every issue faced by Habsburg statesmen.

For the past 100 years some of the greatest historians and political scientists of the twentieth century have picked apart, analyzed and reinterpreted this sequence of events taking place within a single month in July/early August 1914. The four years of fighting during World War I destroyed the international system put into place at the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15 and led to the dissolution of some of the great old empires of Europe (Austrian-Hungarian, Ottomon, Russian). The 100th anniversary of the assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo unleashed the series of events that unleashed World War I. The assassination in Sarajevo, the spark that set asunder the European powder keg, has been the focus of a veritable blizzard of commemorations, scholarly conferences and a new avalanche of publications dealing with this signal historical event that changed the world. Contemporary Austrian Studies would not miss the opportunity to make its contribution to these scholarly discourses by focusing on reassessing the Dual Monarchy's crucial role in the outbreak and the first year of the war, the military experience in the trenches, and the chaos on the homefront.

The volume comprises several studies by distinguished students of World War I focusing on the origins of the war and, particularly on problems related to war prisoners.

The United States took almost a decade after Hiroshima and Nagasaki to develop a coherent strategy of nuclear deterrence. This comprehensive study by two careful and well-informed historians provides the best explanation we have of why this process took so long; it also suggests the inherent difficulties of relying on nuclear weapons to provide security in the first place. Required reading for anyone interested in the early history of the nuclear era.

Historians have long sought to explain how the world descended into war in the wake of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife on June 28, 1914. Focusing on the interactions between two key leaders — one civilian and one military — in each of the Great Powers and Serbia, this documentary history explores how individuals, not monolithic governments and impersonal forces, contributed to the rapidly escalating crisis leading to World War I. A brief introduction outlines the background for July 1914, followed by seven chapters on events in each of the major nations involved, interwoven with over 70 documents — including memoirs, diaries, telegrams, press reports, and private letters — to illustrate how the crisis developed. An epilogue addresses the relative roles and influence of civilian and military leaders in leading the nations inexorably along the path to war. The volume also contains 14 images and two maps, a chronology, a glossary of key figures, Selected Bibliography, Questions for Consideration, and an index.