Today the U.S. military is more nimble, mobile, and focused on rapid responses against smaller powers than ever before. One could argue that the Gulf War and the postwar standoff with Saddam Hussein hastened needed military transformation and strategic reassessments in the post–Cold War era. But the preoccupation with Iraq also mired the United States in the Middle East and led to a bloody occupation. What will American strategy look like after U.S. troops leave Iraq? Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy examines the ways in which the Gulf War, the WMD standoff, the Iraq War, and the ongoing occupation have driven broader changes in U.S. national security policy and military strategy. Steven Metz answers three overarching questions: 1. How did the conflict with Iraq drive and shape broader changes in national security and military strategy? 2. Did policymakers and military leaders interpret the conflict correctly and make the most effective responses? 3. What does this process tell us about the process of change in America's national security and military strategy and in the evolution of its strategic culture? Metz concludes that the United States has a long-standing, continuing problem “developing sound assumptions when the opponent operates within a different psychological and cultural framework.” He sees a pattern of misjudgments about Saddam and Iraq based on Western cultural and historical bias and a pervasive faith in the superiority of America's worldview and institutions. This myopia contributed to America being caught off guard by Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, then underestimating his longevity, and finally miscalculating the likelihood of a stable and democratic Iraq after he was toppled. With lessons for all readers concerned about America's role in the world, Dr. Metz's important new work will especially appeal to scholars and students of strategy and international security studies, as well as to military professionals and DOD civilians. With a foreword by Colin S. Gray.

U.S. strategy in the Balkans and the Army s role there is examined. The author recommends continued U.S. involvement, consideration of a long-term American military presence in the region, and some significant changes in role of the U.S. Army. The goals that led the United States into the Balkans have not yet been fully met. To do so requires both sustained involvement in that region and a continued refinement at the Army s peace operations capabilities. From a broader perspective, he argues that, if U.S. political leaders decide that involvement in protracted peace operations will be an enduring part of American strategy, the Department of Defense should help form specialized joint and interagency peacekeeping organizations as an augmentation to the existing military. The Army should clearly play a leading role in this.

In war, there are always differences between the opponents. At times these are insignificant, passing disparities with no bearing on the outcome. At other times, the differences between opponents are important, placing one in a position of advantage, the other at a disadvantage. This is a very simple observation, but from it flows one of the pressing issues faced by the United States today: strategic asymmetry. Strategic asymmetry is the use of some sort of difference to gain an advantage over an adversary. It is an idea as old as warfare itself, appearing under a number of guises. Among strategic theorists, Sun Tzu placed great stock in psychological and informational asymmetry, writing that: All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with an enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong. avoid him.

For strategic analysts, the ability to collect information rapidly and to evaluate its relevance and validity is a crucial skill. By allowing the nearly instantaneous transfer of information, computers are now helping to assure it is timely. The Internet offers access to millions of documents and files on a vast range of topics. But to make maximum use of it, researchers must understand its strengths and weaknesses. Analysts trained in library, archive, and word-of-mouth research must learn where to look for salient electronic information. The Strategist and the Web provides an Internet "Primer"--an introductory road map of the 'net explaining its most important features: the World-Wide Web, news groups, and electronic mail ("email"). Then it examines numerous Internet sources. From these it identifies both sites of current value to a strategic analyst, and those with the potential to become important resources after further development. Although sometimes valuable, the Internet today is not a solution to the analyst's need for relevant, timely information. New resources and methods appear and others fade away on a daily basis. Within a few years, though, presence on the web is likely to stabilize somewhat. Once that happens, an analyst's collection of Internet "bookmarks" will be nearly as valuable as a rolodex of personal contacts is now. The astute analyst will prepare for this. By exploring the web today and developing effective methods for finding and using electronic information, he or she will be ready when the Internet finally does make the leap from luxury to necessity. To help make this exploration easier, Appendix A provides the URLs (electronic addresses) for all the sites reviewed in the essay. Alternatively, look for SSI's "Strategic Hotlist" on the Strategic Outreach Program page at: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssioutp/.

The Strategic Studies Institute's XXI Annual Strategy Conference, held at Carlisle Barracks from April 6-8, 2010, addressed the topic of the meaning of war. While it did not seek to produce a definitive answer to questions about the nature and definition of war, it did highlight the crucial questions and their implications, including issues such as whether the cause of war is shifting, whether all forms of organized, politically focused violence constitute war, and the distinction between passive and active war. In the report which follows, Steven Metz and Philip Cuccia of SSI have summarized the presentations and debates at the conference and placed them in their wider intellectual and strategic context,