This paper highlights the importance of debt composition in setting optimal fiscal and monetary policy over short-run business cycles and in the long run. Nominal debt as state-contingent debt can be a significant policy tool to reduce the volatility of distortionary government policy, thereby reducing macroeconomic volatility while increasing equilibrium output and consumption. The welfare gain from using nominal debt to hedge against shocks to the government budget is as large as the welfare gain from the ability to issue debt.

This paper argues that the stock market is an important channel of monetary policy. Monetary policy affects real economic activity because inflation levies a property tax on stocks in addition to an income tax on dividend payments. Inflation thus taxes stocks more heavily than it does bonds. Households alter their required rate of return as inflation changes, and firms adjust production in order to satisfy their shareholders’ demands. As the stock market channel grows in importance, the appropriate intermediate target for the central bank is the price level, with price stability being the ultimate goal.

This paper uses a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate the influence of countercyclical remittances on the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy and trace their effects on real and nominal variables in a business cycle setting. We show that remittances raise disposable income and consumption, and insure against income shocks, thereby raising household welfare. However, remittances increase the correlation between labor and output, thereby producing a more volatile business cycle and increasing output and labor market risk. Optimal monetary policy in the presence of remittances deviates from the Friedman rule, highlighting the need for independent government policy instruments.

Investors seek to hedge against interest rate risk by taking long or short positions on bonds of different maturities. We study changes in risk taking behavior in a low interest rate environment by estimating a market stochastic discount factor that is non-linear and therefore consistent with the empirical properties of cashflow valuations identified in the literature. We provide evidence that non-linearities arise from hedging strategies of investors exposed to interest rate risk. Capital losses are amplified when interest rates increase and risk averse investors have taken positions on instruments with longer maturity, expecting instead interest rates to revert back to their historical average.

The recent fnancial crisis highlighted the role of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in exacerbating the crisis and in transmitting monetary policy beyond the local economy to global markets. Yet, little is known about their behavior, as most models of banking typically focus on banks with a loan desk. We develop a dynamic model of a BHC that encompasses both a trading desk and a loan desk, and explore the role of risk attitude and overleveraging by the trading desk. We trace the impact of monetary policy and market innovations on bank behavior in the presence of Basel III type regulations. To our knowledge, this is a first such exercise. We show that the value of the BHC is enhanced by operating both desks, even if they both are subject to common market shocks. We explore alternative regulatory remedies to ongoing efforts to ring-fence the proprietary trading business, and show that regulations that target bank governance can mitigate possible rogue trading and the overleveraging problem.

This paper examines the role of bank capital in decision-making by bank holding companies (BHCs) in the United States. Following Chami and Cosimano’s (2001) call option approach to bank capital, BHCs optimally choose the amount of capital to insure the bank against becoming capital constrained in the future. We provide empirical support for this model, and find that a higher optimal level of capital leads to higher loan rates. Furthermore, higher loan rates result in lower amounts of lending. Thus, an increase in capital requirements is likely to lead to higher loan rates and a significant reduction in lending.

This paper compares the current regulatory capital requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) and the 10-percent leverage ratio, as proposed by the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. House of Representatives' Financial CHOICE Act (FCA). We find that the majority of U.S. banks would not qualify for an "off-ramp"option—where regulatory relief is offered to FCA qualifying banks (QBOs)—unless considerable amounts of capital are added, and that large banks are much closer to the proposed leverage threshold and, therefore, are more likely to stand to gain from regulatory relief. The paper identifies an important moral hazard problem that arises due to the QBO optionality, where banks are likely to increase the riskiness of their asset portfolio and qualify for the FCA “off-ramp” relief with unintended effects on financial stability.

Financial instruments are subject to inflation taxes on the wealth they represent and on the nominal income flows they provide. This paper explicitly introduces financial instruments into the standard stochastic growth model with money and production and shows that the value of the firm in this case is equal to the firm’s capital stock divided by inflation. The resulting asset-pricing conditions indicate that the effect of inflation on asset returns differs from the effects found in other papers by the addition of a significant wealth tax.

This paper investigates the impact of the new capital requirements introduced under the Basel III framework on bank lending rates and loan growth. Higher capital requirements, by raising banks’ marginal cost of funding, lead to higher lending rates. The data presented in the paper suggest that large banks would on average need to increase their equity-to-asset ratio by 1.3 percentage points under the Basel III framework. GMM estimations indicate that this would lead large banks to increase their lending rates by 16 basis points, causing loan growth to decline by 1.3 percent in the long run. The results also suggest that banks’ responses to the new regulations will vary considerably from one advanced economy to another (e.g. a relatively large impact on loan growth in Japan and Denmark and a relatively lower impact in the U.S.) depending on cross-country variations in banks’ net cost of raising equity and the elasticity of loan demand with respect to changes in loan rates.