The purpose of the Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is to provide military and civilian researchers a ready reference for issues of special interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense (DoD). Unlike other lists that generally reflect issues which are operational or tactical in nature, the focus of the KSIL is strategic. It highlights topics that senior Army and DoD leaders should consider in providing military advice and formulating military strategy. At present, the U.S. military is engaged in a changing situation in Iraq and an increasing presence in Afghanistan, as well as efforts to restore balance in force sizing and structure. With the publication of the 2009 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College invite all researchers to contribute to informing America's leaders of current and emerging challenges.

The effects of the information revolution are particularly profound in the realm of national security strategy. They are creating new opportunities for those who master them. The U.S. military, for instance, is exploring ways to seize information superiority during conflicts and thus gain decisive advantages over its opponents. But the information revolution also creates new security threats and vulnerabilities. No nation has made more effective use of the information revolution than the United States, but none is more dependent on information technology. To protect American security, then, military leaders and defense policymakers must understand the information revolution. The essays in this volume are intended to contribute to such an understanding. They grew from a December 1999 conference co-sponsored by the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and the University of Pittsburgh Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies. The conference brought together some of the foremost members of the academic strategic studies community with representatives of the U.S. Government and U.S. military. As could be expected when examining a topic as complex as the relationship between the information revolution and national security, the presentations and discussions were far-ranging, covering such issues as the global implications of the information revolution, the need for a national information security strategy, and the role of information in U.S. military operations. While many more questions emerged than answers, the conference did suggest some vital tasks that military leaders and defense policymakers must undertake.

The Clinton administration has proclaimed a strategy to engage and enlarge the democratic community of states. By virtue of their strategic location adjacent to Russia, the Middle East, and Europe s periphery, and their large-scale oil and natural gas deposits, Transcaucasia and Central Asia have become important testing grounds of this strategy. The U.S. goal of irrevocably integrating these states into the Western state system economically, politically, and militarily has made them an intensifying focus of international rivalry with Russia. Moscow still perceives these areas as part of its sphere of interest and deeply resents U.S. engagement there. Furthermore, Moscow's current war with the breakaway province of Chechnya demonstrates its willingness to contest expanding U.S. interests forcefully. Moreover, in this region many factors exist that could cause other conflicts. Accordingly, it is a sensitive place to test the strategic rationale of the engagement strategy and its military corollary, a strategy whose goal is to shape the emerging environment in directions that we wish to see. This monograph contributes to the debate that has just begun and which undoubtedly will last for a long time over what our strategy for the new states should be and how it should be carried out.

U.S. strategy in the Balkans and the Army s role there is examined. The author recommends continued U.S. involvement, consideration of a long-term American military presence in the region, and some significant changes in role of the U.S. Army. The goals that led the United States into the Balkans have not yet been fully met. To do so requires both sustained involvement in that region and a continued refinement at the Army s peace operations capabilities. From a broader perspective, he argues that, if U.S. political leaders decide that involvement in protracted peace operations will be an enduring part of American strategy, the Department of Defense should help form specialized joint and interagency peacekeeping organizations as an augmentation to the existing military. The Army should clearly play a leading role in this.

In a time of extraordinary fiscal and national security uncertainty, it seems naïve to assume that all, or even most, of a strategic leader¿s current assumptions will be just as relevant several years into the future. This monograph highlights the need for Army senior leaders, in the midst of change, to periodically question their deep-seated beliefs on critical issues¿and perhaps change their minds¿rather than relying solely on what they have long believed to be true.

The present volume was written as a supplement to a series of monographs authored by Casey Wardynski, David Lyle, and Mike Colarusso of the Army's Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, and published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College from 2009 to 2010. In those monographs, Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso adumbrated an officer corps strategy based on the theory of talent management. This volume aims to provide a historical context for their discussion of an officer strategy (and for what has passed for such a strategy in the past). Like the earlier monographs, this volume is organized around the functionally interdependent concepts of accessing, developing, retaining, and employing talent. Each chapter will take the reader up to the point where the earlier monographs began their story, which generally falls in the timeframe of the late-1980s and early-1990s. The purpose of the present volume is to supplement these OEMA (Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis) monographs by providing a historical context for their discussion of an officer strategy. First an overview is provided, outlining some key developments and assumptions that have guided and shaped the Officer Corps and the way it has been managed over the last century. Other historical products pertaining to the US Army History that may be of interest include the following: A Contemporary History of the U.S. Army Nurse Corps can be found at this link: http: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-023-00139-1 Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962 (Hardcover) can be found at this link: http: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00585-9?ctid=151 Forging the Shield (Paperback) can be found at this link: http: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00584-1?ctid=151 Don't forget to subscribe to Army History: The Professional Bulletin of Army History, which can be found at his link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/708-108-00000-6 This professional military magazine, published four times a year by the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), is devoted to informing the military history community about new work on the Army's history. Issues include illustrated articles, commentaries, book reviews, and news about Army history and the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Quarterly issues feature: Thoughtful illustrated articles about the history of the U.S. Army Incisive book reviews by experts in the field of military history Insightful commentaries News Notes providing the latest information about CMH activities and publications

The author examines historical and contemporary examples of military involvement in counterterrorism, outlining the specific roles which the armed forces of liberal democracies have performed in combating terrorism, both in a domestic and international context. He describes the political, strategic, conceptual, diplomatic, and ethical problems that can arise when a state's armed forces become engaged in counterterrorism, and argues that military power can only be employed as part of a coordinated counterterrorist strategy aimed at the containment and frustration -- rather than the physical elimination -- of the terrorist group(s) concerned.

The authors examine the utility of the U.S. Government's whole-of-government (WoG) approach for responding to the challenging security demands of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They specifically discuss the strategic objectives of interagency cooperation particularly in the areas of peacebuilding and conflict management. Discussions range from the conceptual to the practical, with a focus on the challenges and desirability of interagency cooperation in international interventions. The book shares experiences and expertise on the need for and the future of an American grand strategy in an era characterized by increasingly complex security challenges and shrinking budgets. All authors agree that taking the status quo for granted is a major obstacle to developing a successful grand strategy and that government, military, international and nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector are all called upon to contribute their best talents and efforts to joint global peace and security activities. Included are viewpoints from academia, the military, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and industry. Despite the broad range of viewpoints, a number of overarching themes and tentative agreements emerged.