The question of how China's rise will affect the post-World War II international order carries considerable significance for the future of global politics. This report evaluates the character and possible future of China's engagement with the postwar order. The resulting portrait is anything but straightforward: China's engagement with the order remains a complex, often contradictory work in progress. This report offers four major findings about the relationship of China to the international order. First, China's behavior over the past two decades does not mark it as an opponent or saboteur of the order, but rather as a conditional supporter. Since China undertook a policy of international engagement in the 1980s, the level and quality of its participation in the order rivals that of most other states. Second, looking forward, the posture China takes toward the institutions, norms, and rules of a shared order is now in significant flux; various outcomes--from continued qualified support to more-aggressive challenges--are possible. Third, partly because of this uncertainty, a strengthened and increasingly multilateral international order can provide a critical tool for the United States and other countries to shape and constrain rising Chinese power. Finally, modifications to the order on the margins in response to Chinese preferences pose less of a threat to a stable international system than a future in which China is alienated from that system. However, these modifications must be governed by strictly articulated end-points.

This study explores U.S. policy options for managing cyberspace relations with China via agreements and norms of behavior. It considers two questions: Can negotiations lead to meaningful agreement on norms? If so, what does each side need to be prepared to exchange in order to achieve an acceptable outcome? This analysis should interest those concerned with U.S.-China relations and with developing norms of conduct in cyberspace.

China has always viewed itself as a vulnerable underdeveloped country. In the 1990s, it began negotiating economic agreements and creating China-centric institutions, culminating in the 2000s in numerous institutions and ultimately the Belt and Road Initiative. The authors analyze China’s political and diplomatic, economic, and military engagement with the Developing World and discuss specific countries that are most important to China.

In the event of a Sino-U.S. war, intense conventional counterforce attacks could inflict heavy losses and costs on both sides, so leaders need options to contain and terminate fighting. As it takes steps to reduce the likelihood of war with China, the United States must prepare for one by reducing force vulnerabilities, increasing counter–anti-access and area-denial capabilities, and using economic and international effects to its advantage.

"Since 1945, the United States has pursued its global interests by building and maintaining various alliances, economic institutions, security organizations, political and liberal norms, and other tools--often collectively referred to as the international order. In this first report of a series on the emerging international order, RAND researchers offer several lenses to understand the character of the existing post–World War II liberal order. In addition to outlining the broad scope of the issue and the tools through which the order affects state behavior, the report categorizes and outlines the causal mechanisms that lead states to strengthen and work within the order. The report then reviews how U.S. policymakers have consistently viewed the international order as a key means of achieving U.S. interests in the world. Finally, the report concludes with potential questions for a research agenda that explores what type of international order--and, thus, what type of world--the United States should seek over the coming decade"--Publisher's description.

As part of a larger study on the future of the post–World War II liberal international order, RAND researchers analyze the health of the existing order and offer implications for future U.S. policy. The study’s overall conclusion is that the postwar order continues to enjoy many elements of stability but is increasingly threatened by major geopolitical and domestic socioeconomic trends that call into question the order’s fundamental assumptions.

Since 1945, the United States has pursued its global interests by building and maintaining various alliances, economic institutions, security organizations, political and liberal norms, and other tools - often collectively referred to as the international order. In this first report of a series on the emerging international order, RAND researchers offer several lenses to understand the character of the existing post-World War II liberal order. In addition to outlining the broad scope of the issue and the tools through which the order affects state behavior, the report categorizes and outlines the causal mechanisms that lead states to strengthen and work within the order. The report then reviews how U.S. policymakers have consistently viewed the international order as a key means of achieving U.S. interests in the world. Finally, the report concludes with potential questions for a research agenda that explores what type of international order - and, thus, what type of world - the United States should seek over the coming decade.

This report examines options for future U.S. policies regarding international economic institutions, bilateral and regional security organizations, and liberal political norms.

Psycholinguistic analysis of Chinese-language social media can help provide insight into the attitudes of Twitter and Sina Weibo users toward local government, national government, and Western companies. Because the issue of food safety engages important themes in Chinese domestic politics—including the watchdog role of the press and the challenges of effective oversight in an authoritarian system—this analysis focused on social media content discussing the July 2014 “Husi incident,” a food safety scandal involving expired meat in McDonalds and KFC. Results suggested that Chinese-language social media users expressed more anger and sadness—but also used more words indicating positive emotions or feelings of kinship—when discussing the national government than when discussing the local government. Discussions on openly accessible Chinese microblogging platforms may thus offer an avenue through which to gauge public opinion on issues of domestic politics, although their value may wane as a result of government attempts to curb the use of social media to mobilize individuals online into organized, politically motivated groups offline. This exploration of Chinese-language social media regarding food safety traces a preliminary road map to conduct such analysis, including a methodology for analyzing Chinese-language social media as well as a discussion of the promises and limitations of social media analysis in this unique context.