A Sino-U.S. war could take various, and unintended, paths. Because intense, reciprocal conventional counterforce attacks could inflict heavy losses and costs on both sides, leaders need options and channels to contain and terminate fighting.

This report analyzes international and domestic factors that will affect China's approach to nuclear deterrence, how those drivers may evolve over the next 15 years, and what impact they are likely to have.

"China's approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first nuclear test in 1964. Key elements are its no-first-use policy and reliance on a small force of nuclear weapons capable of executing retaliatory strikes if China is attacked. China has recently accelerated nuclear force building and modernization, and both international and domestic factors are likely to drive faster modernization in the future. Chinese nuclear planners are concerned by strategic developments in the United States, especially the deployment of missile defenses. Within the region, Beijing is also an actor in complex multilateral security dynamics that now include several nuclear states, and the improving nuclear capabilities of China's neighbors, especially India, are a growing concern for Beijing. Constituencies for nuclear weapons have gained in bureaucratic standing within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). With few, if any, firewalls between China's conventional and nuclear missile forces, new technologies developed for the former are already being applied to the latter, a trend that will almost certainly continue. Given these changes, China is likely to increase emphasis on nuclear deterrence, accelerate nuclear force modernization, and make adjustments (although not wholesale changes) to policy"--Publisher's description.

This report analyzes key trends and themes in China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) surface-to-air missile (SAM) unit training. After providing background information on China's air defense forces, the report introduces the basics of PLAAF SAM training, including training requirements, trends in recent training activities, and analysis of training themes.

Few studies have systematically tracked how China is using gray zone tactics-coercive activities beyond normal diplomacy and trade but below the use of kinetic military force-against multiple U.S. allies and partners. Lacking a foundational empirical baseline, it is difficult to determine patterns and trends in Chinese activities to develop effective counters to them. The authors developed a framework to categorize China's use of gray zone tactics against five U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and to identify the most problematic People's Republic of China (PRC) tactics that the United States could prioritize countering. Based on open-source material, this report provides a more in-depth understanding of Chinese operations in the gray zone. Among other conclusions, the authors observe that China views gray zone activities as natural extensions of how countries exercise power. China employs such tactics to balance maintaining a stable, favorable external environment with efforts to alter the status quo in China's favor without triggering major pushback or conflict. It has used nearly 80 such tactics on its neighbors, often in relation to territorial disputes.

The authors examine three case studies among the United States' competitors to help anticipate what Chinese overseas access and basing might look like in the 2030s while assessing U.S. risks and opportunities posed by Chinese military expansion.

This report synthesizes insights from two longer RAND Arroyo Center reports on China's development of basing, access and military capabilities over the next two decades. Overseas military access and basing is a critical component of China's global military ambitions. Faced with this uncertainty about long-term Chinese basing and access ambitions, what should U.S. decisionmakers and military planners do? This short report draws on Chinese sources and historical case studies to address four key questions about China's future overseas basing and access plans.

This report assesses how China may react to U.S. military activities in the Indo-Pacific. It provides a framework of factors likely to determine Chinese responses and advises how the characteristics of activities may affect the risk of escalation.

The People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) ability to project and sustain power relies on its logistics capabilities. The authors examine the PLA's approach to maintenance to inform a broader understanding of PLA plans to operate and sustain its forces.

The administration of President Donald Trump pursued an enhanced-and, in some ways, novel-set of policies designed to confront China over its transgressive and anticompetitive economic behaviors, such as theft of technology and intellectual property and limitations on market access for U.S. businesses. How did the U.S. business community view these policies, and did it broadly support increased U.S. efforts to counter problematic Chinese economic behavior? If not, how could the U.S. government implement policy to better achieve policy goals while also addressing corporate concerns? In this report, the authors address these questions, which are central to determining whether the U.S. government has crafted an overall economic strategy or approach toward China that is sustainable and feasible. How the business community thinks the United States should deal with China is an overlooked and underappreciated topic, and the United States might find it difficult to compete against China without support from the business community. The authors assess how the U.S. business community-focusing on the manufacturing, technology, and financial sectors-viewed the Trump administration's China policies through several different lenses: from the perspective of individuals, from the perspective of different firms over time, and from the perspective of specific industry sectors and subsectors. The analysis focuses on Trump administration actions toward China from 2017 through fall 2020.