When quality attributes of a product are not directly observable, third-party certification (TPC) enables buyers to purchase the quality they are most interested in and reward sellers accordingly. Beyond product characteristics, buyers’ use of TPC services also depends on market conditions. We study the introduction of TPC in typical smallholder-based agriculture value chains of low-income countries, where traders must aggregate products from many small-scale producers before selling in bulk to downstream processors, and where introduction of TPC services has oftentimes failed. We develop a theoretical model identifying how different market conditions affect traders’ choice to purchase quality-certified output from farmers. Using a purposefully designed lab-in-the-field experiment with rural wheat traders in Ethiopia, we find mixed support for the model’s prediction: traders’ willingness to specialize in certified output does increase with the share of certified wheat in the market, and this effect is stronger in larger markets. It, however, does not decrease with the quality of uncertified wheat in the market. We further analyze conditions where traders deviate from the theoretically optimal behavior and discuss implications for future research and public policies seeking to promote TPC in smallholder-based food value-chains.

Efforts to promote the development and agricultural value chains area common element of strategies to stimulate economic growth in low-income countries. Since the world food price crisis in 2007-2008, developing country governments, international donor agencies, and development practitioners have placed additional focus on trying to make agricultural value chains work better for the poor. As value chains evolve to serve new markets, they tend to become less inclusive. For example, if a value chain for high quality rice arises within an economy, it is inherently easier for those who sell rice to retailers to source that high quality rice from larger farms with the ability to control quality than from dozens of smallholder farms. As a result, the normal path of value chain evolution can be biased against smallholders; hence it is important to understand what types of interventions can make value chains more inclusive while also making them more efficient.

Efforts to promote the development of agricultural value chains are a common element of strategies to stimulate economic growth in low-income countries. Since the world food price crisis in 2007-2008, developing country governments, international donor agencies, and development practitioners have placed additional emphasis on making agricultural value chains work better for the poor. As value chains evolve to serve new markets, they tend to become less inclusive. For example, if a market for high quality rice arises within an economy, it is inherently easier for traders who sell rice to retailers to source that high quality rice from larger farms that are better able to control its quality than from dozens of smallholder farms. As a result, the normal path of value chain evolution can be biased against smallholders; hence, it is important to understand what types of interventions can make value chains more inclusive while also making them more efficient. In this brief, we summarize studies on five types of value chain interventions that were supported by the CGIAR’s Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM) through its Flagship 3 on Inclusive and Effective Value Chains. Figure 1 illustrates a “typical” agricultural value chain, including the five intervention types (in orange). These include interventions that attempt to deal with multiple production constraints; certification; contract farming; public-private partnerships; and “other” services related to trading and marketing agricultural products. Apart from the last category, these interventions all involve production. This reflects the fact that smallholder producers can be considered, in some ways, the weakest link in evolving agricultural value chains (de Brauw and Bulte 2021). Hence, it is sensible to target interventions either at or close to smallholders. However, in some cases, the best way to overcome smallholder constraints may be to help actors at other points in the value chain overcome constraints. Many interventions share a focus on reducing transaction costs to promote smallholder market integration. Ideally, interventions increase both efficiency and inclusion, but we observe that such win-win outcomes are rare. Trade-offs appear to be more common than synergies, and some value chain interventions involve clear winners and losers.

In many developing countries, gift expenses account for a substantial share of total household expenditures. As incomes rise, gift expenses are escalating in several developing countries. We develop a theoretical model to demonstrate how (unequal) income growth may trigger “gift competition” and drive up the financial burden associated with gift exchange. We use unique census-type panel data from rural China to test our model predictions and demonstrate that (1) the value of gifts responds to the average gift in the community, (2) the escalation of gift giving may have adverse welfare implications (especially for the poor), and (3) escalating gift expenses crowd out expenditures on other consumption items.