The "balance (or imbalance) of conventional forces" is an expression of the degree to which the capabilities of the conventional military forces deployed by two sides are in some way equal. This balance is a central factor in determining the degree to which a given situation is stable. "Conventional stability" is a broader concept than balance; it also encompasses perceptions of the balance, differences in the nature of the operational tasks imposed on the forces of both sides, and other factors. Conventional stability rests on the degree to which both sides believe they could achieve their military objectives in wartime. The author suggests a new analytic framework relating measurements of military capabilities, balance assessment methodologies, and defense objectives to conventional stability. Application of the framework to the conventional balance in Europe suggests some tentative conclusions regarding the potential role of arms control in stabilizing the balance: the most productive use of arms control seems to be to decrease the offensive potential of the two sides' forces.

A RAND Corporation study undertook a literature review and analysis of several case studies to examine factors that could increase the likelihood of success in integrating active and reserve component military staff organizations. The resulting best practices can serve as a framework for undertaking and assessing these integrations.

The Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform asked RAND for an independent analysis of PPBE-like functions in selected countries and other U.S. federal agencies comparable to the U.S. Department of Defense. This executive summary distills key insights from seven case studies of budgeting processes, as detailed in two companion volumes, and compiles findings from all 16 case studies in the seven-volume series.

The authors assess the question of whether the Department of the Air Force (DAF) acquisition workforce management and development structures can meet the force modernization needs of both the U.S. Space Force (USSF) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF).

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) System is a key enabler for DoD to fulfill its mission. But in light of a dynamic threat environment, increasingly capable adversaries, and rapid technological changes, there has been increasing concern that DoD's resource planning processes are too slow and inflexible to meet warfighter needs. As a result, Congress mandated the formation of a legislative commission to (1) examine the effectiveness of the PPBE process and adjacent DoD practices, particularly with respect to defense modernization; (2) consider potential alternatives to these processes and practices to maximize DoD's ability to respond in a timely manner to current and future threats; and (3) make legislative and policy recommendations to improve such processes and practices for the purposes of fielding the operational capabilities necessary to outpace near-peer competitors, providing data and analytical insight, and supporting an integrated budget that is aligned with strategic defense objectives. The Commission on PPBE Reform asked RAND to provide an independent analysis of PPBE-like functions in selected countries and other non-DoD federal agencies. This report, part of a seven-volume set, presents case studies of PPBE functions in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to provide additional insights for improving DoD's PPBE processes.

Concepts for future joint operations call for higher levels of integration among the services than in the past. Therefore, the Air Force is considering how to increase airmen's levels of joint warfighting proficiency. Two fundamental building blocks of joint warfighting proficiency are being able to speak the joint language and adopting a joint mindset, both of which are outlined in joint doctrine. This report uses Air Force doctrine as an indicator of how much joint language and mindset are present in the Air Force today. Detailed document comparisons revealed that some Air Force doctrine documents are aligned with joint doctrine in both substance and tone. However, others have significant gaps, present alternative constructs, use different terms, offer little joint context, or reflect a service-centric mindset. Together, these findings suggest that Air Force acceptance of joint doctrine is uneven. This report also assesses the role of joint constructs in the Air Force today, including how they are taught and reinforced with practice. The report recommends ways to align Air Force doctrine with joint doctrine and ways to manage divergences that could be necessary because of the unique characteristics of airpower. The report recommends giving airmen more opportunities to use joint doctrine in practice, which will likely have a bigger effect on joint proficiency than simply revising doctrine. The report also recommends that, before adopting these proposals, the Air Force consider the overall priority it places on joint proficiency in relation to other Air Force priorities and decide how to manage potential trade-offs.