The authors examine areas of convergence and divergence in the Belarus-Russia relationship, particularly regarding foreign and domestic policies, military and security cooperation, and economic and defense industrial ties. They also consider the regional perspectives of Belarus’s neighbors—Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine—and how the Belarus-Russia relationship poses an evolving threat to those countries’ security.

This report is the overview in a series that seeks to answer questions about the future of warfare, including who might be the United States' adversaries and allies, where conflicts will be fought, and how and why they might occur.

Researchers explored whether and to what degree trust in intelligence predictions has degraded over time and what factors might have driven any perceived or real changes in the relationship between U.S. policymakers and the intelligence community.

In view of new and increasingly sophisticated threats from peer and near-peer adversaries, the authors suggest reforms to the processes by which intelligence informs the U.S. Air Force acquisition enterprise.

The United States has considerable interests in the Arctic and is one of just eight countries with territory in the region. It also has a responsibility to prepare and protect its armed forces that could be called upon to secure its Arctic interests as the region becomes an increasingly active security environment. Russia continues to maintain and upgrade large-scale, credible Arctic military capabilities. Moreover, China's growing economic and scientific activities in the region could enable it to expand its influence and capabilities there. Beyond strategic competition and growing concerns over the possibility of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russia clash, the armed forces of the United States--particularly the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)--continually contend with safety, law enforcement, legal, other national security, and environmental issues in the region. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 requires a report on the Arctic capabilities of the armed forces. This report summarizes the findings of this research and is intended to, at a minimum, address the congressional request and could also contribute related, independent findings about needs and issues.

In this volume, the authors of several translated articles, which were published between 2002 and 2020, provide insight into the evolution of military-scientific thinking in both Russia and Ukraine on the concept of information confrontation. The authors detail the impact of the rapid development of information technologies and information weapons over the past two decades on the military-scientific literature of Russia and Ukraine. The articles in this volume provide insight into the varying definitions and subtypes of information confrontation, its historical evolution and application, the technical tools used in the conduct of information confrontation, and the relationship between the connected yet distinct concepts of information confrontation and information warfare.

In this report, the authors draw on a framework developed by the Russian military science community to gain insight into the likelihood and character of future war and the correlation of military potential between Russia and potential adversaries.

The Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform asked RAND for an independent analysis of PPBE-like functions in selected countries and other U.S. federal agencies comparable to the U.S. Department of Defense. This executive summary distills key insights from seven case studies of budgeting processes, as detailed in two companion volumes, and compiles findings from all 16 case studies in the seven-volume series.

Information confrontation, with historical roots in Russian (and Soviet) military thinking, is an important element of Russian military strategy. The Ukrainian experience offers insights into Russia's present-day and future use of information confrontation and hybrid warfare.

Rapidly and efficiently sharing information across networks, platforms, systems, and security classifications and with mission partners is vital to enabling all-domain awareness and executing nonkinetic and kinetic warfighting operations. Accelerating change toward a digital backbone that allows for seamless information-sharing is limited not just by technology but also by nonmateriel issues, such as culture and policy. These impediments to progress are preventing the Department of the Air Force from realizing Joint All-Domain Command and Control/Advanced Battle Management System and sensing-grid goals. Technical solutions and capabilities are only one piece of a very complex equation. In this summary report, the authors highlight information-sharing challenges and explore near-term and nonmateriel courses of action (COAs) that the U.S. Air Force could take to better prepare the force for information-sharing at speed and at scale in the European theater. Given that the rules governing information-sharing will change quickly before and during a transition to war, the authors examined how U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) can rapidly adapt to such changes.