We test two hypotheses, based on sexual selection theory, about gender differences in costly social interactions. Differential selectivity states that women invest less than men in interactions with new individuals. Differential opportunism states that women's investment in social interactions is less responsive to information about the interaction's payoffs. The hypotheses imply that women's social networks are more stable and path dependent and composed of a greater proportion of strong relative to weak links. During their introductory week, we let new university students play an experimental trust game, first with one anonymous partner, then with the same and a new partner. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that women invest less than men in new partners and that their investments are only half as responsive to information about the likely returns to the investment. Moreover, subsequent formation of students' real social networks is consistent with the experimental results: being randomly assigned to the same introductory group has a much larger positive effect on women's likelihood of reporting a subsequent friendship.

This paper examines how networks of professional contacts contribute to the development of the careers of executives of North American and European companies. We build a dynamic model of career progression in which career moves may both depend upon existing networks and contribute to the development of future networks. We test the theory on an original dataset of nearly 73 000 executives in over 10 000 _rms. In principle professional networks could be relevant both because they are rewarded by the employer and because they facilitate job mobility. Our econometric analysis suggests that, although there is a substantial positive correlation between network size and executive compensation, with an elasticity of around 20%, almost all of this is due to unobserved individual characteristics. The true causal impact of networks on compensation is closer to an elasticity of 1 or 2% on average, all of this due to enhanced probability of moving to a higher-paid job. And there appear to be strongly diminishing returns to network size.

The present working paper aims to describe the data sources and methods used to develop the Territorial Economic Data viewer (TEDv), as well as to explain the purpose and usefulness of the different dashboards available in the current version of the tool. Additionally, this paper includes practical examples with policy lessons that can be drawn from the available information, as well as a glossary of the indicators within the TEDv.

This thesis investigates one factor that may differ across men and women and may contribute to their differentlabor market outcomes: social networks. The objective of this work is twofold. On the one hand, it is important tounderstand whether men and women differ in the way they form their social networks. On the other hand, it isnecessary to pay particular attention to how men and women use their social networks for job-related benefits, inorder to understand whether social networks form part of the explanation behind persistent gender differences inthe labor market.The first chapter tries to assess whether men and women differ in terms of their social network formation. It teststwo hypotheses, based on sexual selection theory, about gender differences in individual choices with respect tosocial interactions that require investment (of time or economic resources). The differential selectivity hypothesispredicts that women invest less than men in interactions with new partners, all other things being equal. Thedifferential opportunism hypothesis predicts that women's investments in social interactions are less responsive toinformation about the likely economic payoff to these investments. Both hypotheses, if true, imply importantdifferences in the formation of social networks by women and men. Evidence is found in support of the twohypotheses, using two cohorts of a total of 363 students that were matched randomly over two rounds withpartners to play trust games.The second chapter investigates whether social networks yield different salary benefits for some 22,000 male andfemale senior executive and non-executive board members in European and US firms. The number of currentlyinfluential individuals with whom executive men have previously worked has a large positive impact on their salary,while the impact for executive women is significantly weaker, and statistically distinguishable from zero only incertain years. These findings also hold for non-salaried remuneration. Using a placebo measure of individuals whowere employed in the same firm as the individuals, but at different times, it is shown that the network measuresreflect genuine connections and not merely unobserved individual characteristics. In contrast to executives, nonexecutiveboard members do not display systematic gender differences in the effectiveness with which theyleverage their links into remuneration. The possible mechanisms at play are explored, and it appears that the firmswhich do the most to integrate women into positions of executive power appear to rely less on networks forrecruitment.The third chapter focuses on the role of social networks in outside board appointments. Using data on US publiclyquoted companies from 2003 to 2012, prior employment links between candidates and the current directors sittingon the board are uncovered by studying the employment history of candidates and board members anddetermining whether they have previously worked together. This works shows that having historical connectionswith board members increases the probability of being appointed as an outside director, and knowing the CEO inparticular increases this probability further. On the contrary, being connected with members of the nominationcommittee in particular does not improve the chances of being appointed to the board above and beyond theeffect of knowing any board member. Future research should determine whether the effect of social networks onoutside board appointments is detrimental or not for firm performance and corporate governance in general.