This report assesses the political implications of economic and related social problems in the five post-Soviet Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It also suggests U.S. policy measures that would help address these problems, consistent with broader U.S. goals in the region. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States led those in policymaking circles to realize that instability, failed and failing states, and economic and political underdevelopment present security concerns not just to the states that suffer directly from these problems but to the global community as a whole. From this perspective, political, social, and economic trends in Central Asia merit attention. The analysis in this report is informed by a year-long research effort, which included travel to the region and extensive interviews with U.S., regional, and global specialists, government officials, and others. It involved a multidisciplinary team of researchers who sought to combine their understanding of politics, economics, and military strategic analysis to bring fresh perspectives to the questions at hand.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is an obvious target region for Russian energy diplomacy. Unlike Western European states, Russia has never had an imperial presence in the region. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union pursued the policy of supporting Arab socialist movements under the flag of Communist ideology and served as a counter-balance to the United States’ influence in the region. Hence, bereft of the burden of an imperialist state and by untangling political concerns from its commercial interests, Russia has embarked on a pivot to the energy industry of the MENA region. [...] A conducive geopolitical environment, coupled with plummeting oil prices, has eased the Kremlin’s efforts to build bilateral energy relations with the regional powers. [...] The resilience of the American shale industry to the low oil price environment as well as the future of the Iran nuclear deal will be among the most significant elements influencing Russia’s future in the region. What will happen by 2025 to Russia’s energy policy of the Middle East is of critical importance in terms of meeting vision with the reality of energy politics and economics.

The past several years have seen an increase in the use of toxic weapons -- i.e., inexpensive and easily acquired chemicals and industrial waste -- on the part of state as well as nonstate actors. Nonetheless, little analysis has been done on the nature and extent of this threat either to the military or to the U.S. homeland. This report examines the implications of toxic weapon use for military planning and concludes that such weapons merit further analysis.

This monograph describes the structures, access, and declassification procedures for Soviet-era civil and military archives located in Moscow. Although there are numerous holdings within former Soviet territory housing materials dated between 1917 and 1991, only those associated with the top leadership bodies (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee); the diplomatic, security, and intelligence services (the NKVD, KGB, and GRU); and the former Soviet military are examined in this paper. The author gathered most of the information for this document through interviews with Russian archive officials during a visit to Moscow between May 23 and May 31, 1992. The information cutoff is October 1992. This monograph is a part of the ongoing RAND project on World War II, the early Cold War, and Korean War POW-MIA issues. Research for this paper was sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and undertaken within the International Security and Defense Strategy Program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. The monograph is expected to be of interest to officials and specialists seeking information on the organization of the post-Soviet archives.

This report suggests strategies for managing U.S.-Russian relations in light of the current highly fluid situation within the top echelons of the Yeltsin government and the uncertainties surrounding Yeltsin's health.

"As part of his "new thinking" ([novoe myshlenie]), Mikhail Gorbachev has introduced a number of new concepts whose meanings are still under debate both inside and outside the Soviet Union. One of these concepts, "reasonable sufficiency" (razumnaia dostatochnost'), provides material for a wide-ranging civil-military and intra-military conflict on Soviet national security policy. This paper discusses the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" in its domestic context as one of the tools used by the Soviet leadership to undermine and divide the Soviet military so it cannot function as an interest group against changes in doctrine and defense spending. The authors conclude that there is evidence that the Soviet leadership has had some success. As a result, the monopoly of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff on defense policy development appears to be broken. Whether the civilians will maintain the momentum and expertise to redefine who will decide the nature of the external threat to the Soviet Union remains to be seen."--Rand abstracts

This paper is a transcript of three presentations at a meeting that was part of the 31st Annual Conference of the Western Social Science Association in Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 29, 1989. It also includes transcripts of comments that were made in a discussion following the presentations. The theme of the papers centered around the removal and replacement of Central Committee Personnel in the Soviet Union, and whether these individuals are a new version of the old guard. The papers suggest that Gorbachev's efforts to consolidate power by purge and placement may be hampered by the factional splits among members of the Politburo.

This paper describes Politburo factionalization as an indication of Gorbachev's vulnerability. Reforms of the Party apparatus were opposed by two who argued for increasing the Party apparatus despite Gorbachev's call to reduce it. In addition, recent personnel changes and a polarization of forces in the Politburo depict a weakened Gorbachev and a possible retreat from reform.