The Air Force typically trains 30,000 to 40,000 new airmen in some 300 specialties each year. It utilizes two methods for training its enlistees: centralized initial skills training (IST, or "schoolhouse" training) and decentralized on-the-job training (OJT). All too often, only IST costs are considered when "pricing" training, seriously underestimating the overall cost to train an airman. When all the costs are considered, including those of OJT, decisions related to the length of IST can be better informed. To determine the most cost-effective combination of IST and OJT, the authors developed a methodology based on a cost-benefit analysis of seven Air Force specialties. From a statistical analysis of data taken from surveys of senior enlisted personnel, they were able to assess how productivity changes when IST course length changes and to make recommendations concerning the IST course lengths that would produce the most productive airmen for the least possible cost.

In 2002, RAND Project AIR FORCE studied the data systems used by the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) to manage training costs and capacities. The schoolhouse model, developed to inform policy decisions regarding technical training pipeline issues, grew out of this study. The model examines resources used and training limitations encountered during the execution of a training program. At the same time, the AETC Studies and Analysis Squadron (SAS) built a similar set of planning and execution assessment tools. RAND and AETC SAS agreed to combine the schoolhouse portion of their efforts into one model. The purpose of this report is to provide front-end users of the schoolhouse model with a reference for collecting and implementing data; it also briefly describes the simulation model and its uses. The model is potentially useful for evaluating changes in production and resources, highlighting resource bottlenecks, providing insight into classroom details such as empty seats and the rate of individuals who prove ineffective in training, and changes in production resulting from changes in resources, course syllabi, and washback and attrition rates.

Air Force members who do not routinely cross a defended perimeter when deployed may not have received sufficient training for doing so when they need to. The authors conducted surveys and interviews to determine the kinds of experiences airmen have had "outside the wire," worked with subject-matter experts to categorize them and suggest training levels, and developed a series of recommendations for course content and further areas for study.

Air Force's Innovative Development Through Employee Awareness (IDEA) program, this investigation of the feasibility of an ALO career field explores the array of research on the subject, turning to historical initiatives and instructions going back nearly a century, published literature, and interviews with ALOs, commanders, and TACP personnel. Questions that may affect the decisionmaking process will focus on whether a nonrated or nonstrike aviator can perform the job of an ALO, the feasibility of a career force, and whether changes are needed when the system is already functioning adequately."--BOOK JACKET.

USAF par rescue and combat controllers routinely recover downed or injured military personnel and direct military aircraft in hostile or denied regions. Consequently, to be effective in these careers requires the ability to cope with severe stress. The USAF uses many strategies to ensure that battlefield airmen perform well under stress but one strategy, termed stress inoculation training, has not been fully incorporated as a training element.

Describes a methodology for establishing physical fitness standards for four Air Force occupational specialties, as part of a broader Air Force effort to measure the physical readiness of airmen to perform their jobs.

The goal of this study was to help establish the strategic design for a comprehensive system to assess and manage the cost and capacity of the Air Force's pipeline for enlisted technical training. The study team concluded that such a system is useful only insofar as it supports the decision processes necessary for managing effective training. Therefore, this report examines training management and decision processes to determine the need for data to support informed decisionmaking. It briefly reviews training management systems and associated organizational arrangements in the other services and the private sector to draw insights for a model management system for the Air Force. The study identifies impediments to training planning and management in the current Air Force organizational structure that inhibit the flow of cost and capacity data and hinder effective decisionmaking. It also outlines analytic developments that could help convert raw data into information useful for decisionmakers.

The Air Force has a continuing interest in reducing high attrition and training-block failure (washback) rates, as both increase training and recruiting costs. This report describes research into these issues for nine career fields.

The Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) trains foreign nationals in English prior to their attending U.S. military education and training courses and plays a critical role in building partnerships. RAND evaluated options to optimize DLIELC1s output, made recommendations in eight critical management areas, and presented an implementation plan to DLIELC

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) carries out training activities both as part of its equipment and system development responsibilities and its more general responsibility to 0́−train the force0́+ in IED threats and countermeasures. It has unique authorities and capabilities intended to facilitate rapid fielding, but concern has developed that these programs and functions may be duplicative with the efforts of the military Services, U.S. Special Operations Command, and other agencies. The RAND team0́9s assessment is that while some programs and functions are similar to other activities and initiatives, there is little evidence of duplication0́4in fact, the programs and functions appear to add value. This finding reflects a conscious effort by JIEDDO to develop processes that ensure review and oversight of capability development. This may be an important lesson learned if the Department of Defense again confronts an asymmetric challenge and requires an organizational structure to meet it.